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BULLETIN No. 4

OCTOBER, 1930

# War of 1812

Reports and Correspondence from the Canadian Archives at Ottawa.

# GENERAL HULL'S SURRENDER OF DETROIT, AUGUST 16, 1812 Major-General Brock to Sir George Prevost (C677, P45)

Head Quarters Detroit August 16, 1812

Sir,

I hasten to apprize Your Excellency of the Capture of this very important Post—2,500 troops have this day surrendered Prisoners of War, and about 25 pieces of Ordnance have been taken without the sacrifice of a drop of British blood,—I had not more than 700 troops including Militia, and about 400 Indians to accomplish this service,—When I detail my good fortune Your Excellency will be astonished. I have been admirably supported by Colonel Proctor, the whole of my staff and I may justly say every individual under my Command

Believe me Your Excellency's faithful obedt & humble servt ISAAC BROCK

To His Excellency
Lt Genl. Sir Geo. Prevost Bt

### CAPITULATION FOR THE SURRENDER OF DETROIT (Q. 315, P. 168-170)

Camp at Detroit, 16 Aug. 1812.

Capitulation for the surrender of Fort Detroit, entered into between Major General Brock, Commanding His Britannic Majesty's Forces, on the one part, and Brigadier General Hull Commanding the North Western Army of the United States on the other part.

1st. Fort Detroit with all the Troops, Regulars and Militia, will be immediately surrendered to the British Forces under the command of Major General Brock, and will be considered prisoners of war with the exception of such of the Militia of the Michigan Territory as have not joined the army.

2nd. All public stores, arms and all public documents including everything else of a public nature, will be immediately given up.

3rd. Private persons and property of every description will be respected.

4th. His Excellency Brigadier General Hull, having expressed a desire that a detachment from the State of Ohio, on its way to join his army as well as one sent out from Fort Detroit, under the command of Colonel McArthur, should be included in the above capitulation. It is accordingly agreed to. It is however to be understood that such part of the Ohio Militia, as have not joined the army

will be permitted to return to their homes, on condition that they will not serve during the war, their arms however, to be delivered up, if belonging to the public.

5th. The Garrison will march out at the hour of 12 o'clock, this day and the British Forces will take immediate possession of the Fort.

J. Macdonell, Lt. Col. Militia D.A.D.C.

J. B. Glegg, Major A.D.C.

Approved, W. Hull, B. Genl. Comdg. N.W. Army

James Miller, Lt. Col. 5 R.U.S. Infy.

E. Brush, Col. 1 Regt. Michigan Militia

Approved, Isaac Brock

An Article supplemental to the Articles of Capitulation, concluded at Detroit the 16th of August, 1812.

It is agreed that the officers and soldiers of the Ohio Militia and Volunteers shall be permitted to proceed to their respective homes on this condition—that they are not to serve during the present war, unless they are exchanged.

W. Hull, B. Genl. Comg. N. W. Army U. S.

Isaac Brock, Major General

An Article in addition to the supplemental article of the capitulation concluded at Detroit the 16th of August A.D. 1812.

It is further agreed that the officers and soldiers of the Michigan Militia and Volunteers are placed by the supplemental article of the 16th inst.

W. Hull,

B. Genl. Comg. N.W. Army U.S.

Isaac Brock, Major General

# GENERAL BROCK'S PROCLAMATION (Q. 315, P. 172)

By Isaac Brock, Esquire, Major General Commanding His Britannic Majesty Forces in the Province of Upper Canada, etc., etc.

Whereas the Territory of Michigan was this day by Capitulation ceded to the Arms of His Britannic Majesty without any other condition than the protection of private property—and wishing to give an early proof of the moderation and justice of the Government, I do hereby announce to all the Inhabitants of the said Territory, that the Laws heretofore in existence shall continue in force until His Majesty's pleasure be known or so long as the peace and safety of the said Territory will admit thereof. And I do hereby also declare and make known to the said Inhabitants, that they shall be protected in the full exercise of their Religion, of which all persons both Civil and Military will take notice, and govern themselves accordingly.

All persons having in their possession or having any knowledge of any public property, shall forthwith deliver in the same or give notice thereof to the officer Commanding or Lieutenant Colonel Nichol, who are hereby duly authorized to receive and give proper Receipts for the same.

Officers or Militia will be held responsible that all arms in possession of Militia Men, be immediately delivered up, and all individuals whatever who have in their possession, arms of any kind will deliver them up without delay.

## of Northwestern Ohio

Given under my hand at Detroit this 16th day of August, 1812, and in the 52nd year of His Majesty's Reign.

Isaac Brock, Major General

Endorsed. Copy E. 16, Aug. 1812.

Proclamation by Major General Brock, Commg. H. M. Forces to the people of the Michigan Territory.

#### WINCHESTER'S DEFEAT AT RIVER RAISIN, JANUARY 22, 1813

Adjutant General's Office, Quebec, 8th February 1813

General Order (Q. 120, P. 189)

His Excellency the Commander of the Forces has the highest satisfaction in announcing to the Troops under his command, another brilliant action achieved by the gallant division of the army at Detroit, under Colonel Proctor.

Information having been received that an advanced Corps of the American Army under Brigadier General Winchester, amounting to upwards of one thousand strong, had entered and occupied French Town, about twenty-six miles South of Detroit; Colonel Proctor did not hesitate a moment, in anticipating the Enemy by attacking this advanced Corps before it could receive support from the forces on their March under General Harrison.

At day break on the 22nd January, Colonel Proctor by a spirited and vigorous attack, completely defeated General Winchester's division, with the loss of beween four and five hundred slain; for all who attempted to save themselves by flight, were cut off by the Indian warriors; about four hundred of the Enemy took refuge in the houses of the Town, and kept up a galling fire from the windows, but finding further resistance unavailing, they surrendered themselves at discre-

On this occasion the gallantry of Colonel Proctor was most nobly displayed, in his humane and unwearied exertions in rescuing the vanquished from the revenge of the Indian Warriors.

The prisoners at the close of the action, amounted to 1 General, 1 Colonel, 1 Staff, 1 Major, 9 Captains, 20 Subalterns, 27 Serjeants and 435 rank & file. But the Indian Warriors were hourly bringing in Prisoners, and had taken a strong escort of the Enemy with five hundred Hogs.

Colonel Proctor reports in strong terms the gallantry displayed by all descriptions of Troops, and the able support he received from Colonel St. George and from all the officers and men under his Command, whose spirited valour and steady discipline is above all praise.

The Indian Chief Round Head, with his band of Warriors, rendered essential service by their bravery & good conduct.

It is with regret that Colonel Proctor reports the British loss amounts to twenty-four killed, and one hundred and fifty-eight wounded.

Officers wounded:

Colonel St. George four wounds but not severely.

Captain Tallon,

Lieutenant Clemon, 41st Regt.

Ensign Kerr, Royal Newfoundland Regt. dangerously. Lieutenant Rolette,

Lieutenant Irwin. Marine Dept.

Midshipman Richardson,

Captain Mills Lieutenant McCormic,

Essex Militia. Lieutenant Gordon,

Ensign Garvin,

A Royal Salute to be fired at 12 o'clock this day.

EDWARD BAYNES. Adjutant General North America.

#### THE FIRST SIEGE OF FORT MEIGS

#### Embarkation Return of the Western Army

Under Brigadier General Proctor, on an expedition from Amherstburg to the Miamis, April 23, 1813.

The vessels employed in this expedition were:

(1) "Lady Provost," (2) "General Hunter," (3) "Chippewa," (4) "Mary," (5) "Nancy," (6) "Miamis," (7) The Gunboat "Eliza," (8) The Gunboat "Col. Myers," (9) Batteau.

The army comprised:

General Staff	5
Royal Artillery 3	0
Royal Engineers	1
Tenth Veteran Battallion	5
Forty-first Regiment 41	3
Royal Newfoundland Regiment 6	3
Commissary Department	3
Field Train	2
Militia 46	1
Total—exclusive of Indians (1200)	-

(See detailed report of Peter L. Chambers, Major and Captain Forty-first Regiment D, A. Q. General.)

#### CASUALTIES IN BRIGADIER GENERAL PROCTOR'S ARMY

At the first siege of Fort Meigs on May 1, 1813.

Killed	14
Wounded	
Missing	None
Prisoners	37
	-
Total—exclusive of Indians	92

(See report of Peter L. Chambers, Major and Captain, Forty-first Regiment D. A. Q. M. General.)

#### PRISONERS TAKEN BY THE BRITISH

May 1, 1813, at the first siege of Fort Meigs.

United States Regulars	22
Kentucky Militia 10th and 13th Detachment	431
Prisoners since delivered up by the Indians	14
17th May-since the above return the Indians have	
given up	28
	-
Total	405

#### DISCONTENT OF CANADIAN MILITIA AT FORT MIAMI

Camp Miamie 6th May 1813.

Lt. Col. Waberton

We the undersigned officers of the 1st and 2nd Regt. of Essex & Kent Militia, beg leave to state to you as head of the Militia, Our opinion on the present circumstances of the Militiamen and of the District in general; from the situation of our District last fall, but very short crops of grain were put in the ground, and these, small as they were, will be rendered still less by the unfavorableness of the last winter. Under these unfavorable appearances the farmer had only the resources left of putting in crops of spring wheat and corn adequate to meet the necessities of the country, their coming here has prevented the putting in the crops of wheat and should they be kept here any longer, that of corn will also be out of their power, and the consequences must be a famine next winter. Indeed the men are now detained with the greatest reluctance, some have already gone and we are very apprehensive that it will not be in our power to detain them much longer.

We have the honor

to be your V. O. H. St.

William Shaw Capt. K.M. William Caldwell Capt. Geo. Jacob Capt K.M. Wm. Buchanan Capt 1st E.M. John Dolson Capt. Kent Riflemen Wm. Elliott Capt. E.M. Wm. Sterling Capt. K.M. James Askin Capt. 2nd Regt. E.M. Commanding James McGregor Lieut. 2nd Reg. E.M. Francis Caldwell Ensign 1st E.M. Commanding Alex D. Askin Lieut 2nd E.M. William McCormick Lieut. 1st E.M.

Certified to be the opinion of the Captains and other officers Commanding Companies Eben Reynolds Major 1st Reg. E.M.

### GENERAL PROCTOR PROPOSES TO EXCHANGE PRISONERS

7th May 1813.

Brigadier General Proctor proposes to Major General Harrison to exchange Wyandot, Senecas and Delawares of Sandusky in exchange for an equal number of Kentucky Militia.

Signed—Henry Proctor, Brigadier Gen'l Commdg. his Majesty's Forces on the Miami

A true copy A. H. McLean B.M.

#### GENERAL HARRISON'S REPLY TO GENERAL PROCTOR

Major General Harrison can only refer to his Government the proposition made to him by Brig. Gen. Proctor to send out of the American Lines the Wyandots, Senecas, and Delawares of Sandusky in exchange for an equal number of He assures Gen. Proctor, however, that he will make that Kentucky Militia. reference at an early day and communicate the result.

7th May 1813.

Signed Willm. Henry Harrison Major Gen. Commanding the N. W. Army of the U.S.

A true copy A. H. McLean B.M.

#### AGREEMENT FOR EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS

An Agreement for the exchange of Prisoners made between Brigadier General Proctor, Commanding his Britannic Majesty's Forces on the Miamis, and Major General W. H. Harrison Commanding the North Western Army of the United States.

The Prisoners of the Kentucky Militia now in the Possession of General Proctor to be sent to the River Huron, upon the condition of not serving against Great Britain or her Allies during the War, between that Power and the United States—Captain Price 1st Regiment U.S. Light Artillery and twenty Regular of the U.S. Army now in the possession of General Proctor, will be considered as exchanged and permitted to serve after the termination of one month.

Lieut. McIntyre and Hailes of the 41st Regiment and thirty-nine privates are also to be considered as exchanged, but are not to serve excepting on Garrison Duty until the expiration of one month, a return of Prisoners released on each side to be furnished to the respective commissaries of each nation and the surplusage to be accounted for in a future settlement of the account of Prisoners agreeably to the tariff of exchange heretofore established.

Signed
Henry Proctor, Brigadier General
Commanding his Britannic Majesty's Forces
on the Miami

Head Quarters Camp Miamis 7th May 1813

Signed
W. H. Henry Harrison, Major General
Commanding the N. W. Army of the U. S.

A true copy
A. H. McLean
B.M.

#### GENERAL PROCTOR'S REPORT OF SIEGE TO EARL BATHHURST, HIS MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT

Sandwich

May 14th, 1813.

Sir:

From the circumstances of the War, I have judged it expedient to make a direct report to your Excellency of our operations and present state in this District.

In the expectation of being able to reach the enemy who had taken Post near the foot of the Rapids of the Miami before the reeinforcement and supplies could arrive, for which only he waited to commence active operations against us, I determined to attack him without delay and with every means in my power, but from the necessary preparations and some untoward circumstances, it was not in my power to reach him within three weeks of the period I had proposed and at which he might have been captured or destroyed.

From the incessant and heavy rains we experienced, and during which our Batteries were constructed, it was not until the morning of the 1st inst, the 5th day after our arrival at the mouth of the river twelve miles from the enemy, that our Batteries could be opened. Illness from successive fatigue deprived me of the services of the only Artillery Officer, on an occasion, when three would have found ample employment.

The enemy who occupied several acres of Commanding Ground strongly defended by Block-houses, and the batteries well furnished with Ordnance, had, during our approach, so completely intrenched and covered himself as to render unavailing every effort of our Artillery though well served, and in batteries most

judiciously placed and constructed under the able direction of Captain Discon of the Royal Engineers, of whose ability and unwearied zeal, shown particularly on this occasion, I cannot speak too highly.

Though the attack has not answered fully the purpose intended, I have the satisfaction to inform your excellency of the fortunate result of an attack of the enemy aided by a sally of most of their garrison made on the morning of the 5th inst. by a reinforcement which descended the River a considerable distance in a very short time, consisting of two Corps, Dudley's and Boswell's—amounting to 1300 men, under the command of Brigadier General Green Clay—The attack was very sudden and on both sides of the river. The enemy was for a few minutes in possession of our batteries and took some prisoners. After a severe contest, though not of long continuance, the enemy gave way and excepting the bodies of those who sallied from the Fort, must have been mostly killed or taken.

In this decisive affair, the Officers and men of the 41st Regiment who charged and routed the enemy near the batteries, well maintained the long established reputation of the Corps. Where all deserve praise, it is difficult to distinguish—Capt Muir, an old Officer who had seen much service, had the good fortune to be in the immediate command of these brave men, besides my obligations to Capt. Chambers for his unwearied exertions preparatory to, and on the expedition as Depy. Assist. Q. Master General, I have to notice his gallant conduct in attacking the enemy near the batteries at the point of the Bayonet; a service in which he was well supported by Lieutenants Bullock and Clements of the 41st and Lieut. Le Breton of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment. The courage and activity displayed through the whole scene of action by the Indian Chiefs and Warriors' contributed largely to our success. I have not been able to ascertain the amount of prisoners in possession of the Indians.

I have sent off agreeable to Agreement nearly five hundred prisoners to the River Huron near Sandusky.

I have proposed an exchange which is referred to the American Government.

I could not ascertain the amount of the enemy's loss in killed, from the extent of the scene of action and mostly in the woods. I conceive his loss in killed and prisoners to have been between one thousand and twelve hundred men. These unfortunate people were volunteers, and complete Kentucky's quota. If the enemy had been permitted to receieive his reinforcements and supplies undisturbed, I should have had at this critical juncture to contend with him for Detroit, or perhaps on this shore.

I had not the option of retaining my situation on the Miami. The mode in which the militia turned out, raised hopes and expectations that were very far from being realized in the sequel. The day after the enclosed letter was received, half of the militia had left us, and the remainder declared their determination not to remain longer. I also received a deputation from the Chiefs, counselling me to return as they could not prevent their people as was their custom after any battle of consequence, returning to their villages with their wounded, their prisoners and plunder, of which they had taken a considerable quantity in the boats of the enemy.

Before the ordnance could be withdrawn from the batteries, I was left with Tecumsith and less than twenty Chiefs and Warriors, a circumstance that stongly proves that, under present circumstances at least, our Indian Force is not a disposable one, or permanent, though occasionally a most powerful aid. I have however brought off all the Ordnance and indeed have not left anything behind. Part of the Ordnance has embarked under the fire of the enemy.

The service on which we were employed has been, though short, a very severe one, and too much praise cannot be given to both officers and men, for the cheerfulness with which on every occasion they met the service. To Lieut. Col. Warburton I feel many obligations for the aid he zealously afforded me on every casion—from my Brigade Major Lieut. McLean I received the same zealous assistance as on former occasions. To Capt. Mockler Royal Newfoundland Regt. who acted as my Aid de Camp, I am much indebted for the assistance afforded me. Lieut. Le Breton of the Newfoundland Regt. Assistant Engineer, by his answeried exertions rendered essential service, as did Lieut. Gardiner of the 41st Regt. from his science in Artillery. The Royal Artillery in the laborious duties

they performed, displayed their usual unwearied zeal, and well assisted by the Royal Newfoundland (under Lieut. Garden) as additional Gunners. The laborious duties which the Marines, under Commodore Hall, have performed, have been most cheerfully met, and the most essential service rendered.

I have the honor to send an embarkation return of the force that served under my command at the Miami, exclusive of the Indians, who may be stated at Twelve Hundred. I also enclose a return of our killed and wounded and

prisoners who have however been exchanged.

I had taken upon me to give the rank of Major to the six Captains of the Line, as Militia were employed on the same service with them; some of them are old Officers, all of them deserving. Any mark of your Excellency's approbation of them, would be extremely grateful to me.

I beg leave to mention the four volunteers of the 41st Regt. Wilkinson,

Richardson, Laing and Proctor, as worthy of promotion.

Your excellency will perceive that the reinforcement you intended I should long ago have received, has not been sent, nor do I expect to receive any, whilst any circumstance may seem to justify their detention. I had only half the 41st Regt. before the late Action. Daily experience more strongly proves, that a regular Force is absolutely requisite to insure the safety of this District, and which may be endangered by the detention of the intended reinforcement.

My Brigade Major Lieut. McLean, who is the bearer of my report, will be

My Brigade Major Lieut. McLean, who is the bearer of my report, will be able to give your excellency any further information relative to the District or our late movements, that may be required. I hope my sending him, and by the only secure route at present, will meet with your excellency's approbation.

I have the honor to be with the highest respect.

Sir, Your excellency's Most Obedient Servant

(Signed) Henry Proctor
Brig. Gen. Commanding

I beg to acknowledge the indefatigable exertions of the Commissariat,
(Signed) Henry Proctor
B. Gen. Comd.

#### LETTER OF TRANSMISSION OF PROCTOR'S REPORT

Colonial Correspondence Lower Canada 1813. Vol. 2 No. 122

Kingston, Upper Canada 14th June 1813.

No. 69 My Lord

I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship the enclosed report from Colonel Proctor which owing to the temporary possession of York by the enemy has only just reached me by a circuitous route. I sincerely congratulate your Lordship upon this additional proof of the steady discipline and valor of His Majesty's Forces on the Detroit Frontier and which have enabled them under the judicious arrangements of their distinguished Leader so successfully to repel the attack of the enemy. By the last accounts received from Colonel Proctor dated the 4th inst. he was still at Sandwich waiting for the reinforcements which had it not been for the late events on the Niagara Frontier would have long ago reached him. I have reason to think they are now on their way to him and when arrived he will probably be enabled again to advance against Major General Harrison who remains strengthening himself in his position at Fort Meigs where he is watched by a large body of Indians.

I have the honor to be

My Lord
Your Lordships
Most Obedient
Humble Servant
George Prevost

The Right Honorable Earl Bathurst

#### SECOND SIEGE OF FORT MEIGS (JULY 20, 1813) AND CROGHAN'S VICTORY (AUG. 2, 1813)

Brig. Gen. Proctor to Sir George Prevost, (C679 p. 371)

Sandwich August 9, 1813.

Sir:

It being absolutely requisite for several urgent Reasons, that my Indian Force should not remain unemployed, and being well aware that it would not be moveable except accompanied by a regular force, I resolved, notwithstanding the smallness of that Force to move, and where we might be fed at the expense of the Enemy. I had however the mortification to find that instead of the Indian Force being a disposable one, or under my direction, our movements should be subject to the Caprices and Prejudices of the Indian body, to the Degree in which my regular Force was disproportionate to their numbers. For several Days after the arrival of Mr. R. Dickson his Indians were restrainable, and tractable to a Degree, that I could not have conceived possible. I am sorry to add that they have been contaminated, by the other Indians. I was, very contrary to my judgement, necessitated to go to the Miami, in the vicinity of The Enemys Fort, where I remained a few Days, in the hope that General Harrison might come to the relief of the Fort, which was invested, <sup>1</sup>in the Indian mode, when finding that the Indians were returning to Detroit and Amherstburg I moved to lower Sandusky where however we could not muster more hundreds of Indians that I might reasonably have expected thousands. The neighbourhood of the Sandusky, (Fremont) and the settlement on the Huron River, eight miles below it, could have afforded cattle sufficient to have fed my whole Indian Force for some time, had they been induced to accompany us. Sandusky is nearly fifty miles by water from Lake Erie; and nearly forty from several Points whence strong Reinforcements might be expected; I could not therefore with my very small force remain more than two days, from the Probability of being cut off, and of being deserted by the Few Indians who had not already done so. The Fort at Sandusky, (Fort Stephenson) is composed of Blockhouses connected by Picketing which they flank, and is calculated for a Garrison of five or six hundred men. On viewing the Fort I formed an opinion entirely different from any Person under my command. The General idea being that the Garrison did not exceed fifty men, and that the Fort could be easily carried by assault. On the morning of the 2d Instant the Gentlemen of the Indian Department who have the direction of it, declared formally their decided opinion that unless the Fort was stormed we should never be able to bring an Indian warrior into the Field with us, and that they proposed, and were ready to storm one Face of the Fort, if we attempt another. I have also to observe, that, in this instance, my Judgement had not that weight with the Troops, I hope might reasonably have been expected. If I had withdrawn without having permitted the assault, as my judgement certainly dictated, much dissatisfaction would have followed me, and I could scarcely have Continued to direct their movements. I thus with all the responsibility resting on me, was obliged to yield to circumstances I could not possibly have prevented. The Troops, after the Artillery had been used for some hours, attacked two Faces, and, Impossibilities being attempted failed. The Fort from which the severest Fire I ever saw was maintained during the attack, was well defended. The troops displayed the greatest Bravery, the much greater part of whom reached the Fort and made every effort to enter; but the Indians who had proposed the assault, and had it not been assented to, would have ever tigmatized the British character, scarcely came into Fire, before they ran off ut of its reach. A more than adequate Sacrifice having been made to Indian Opinion, I drew off the brave assailants who have been carried away by a High sense of Honor to urge too strongly the attack. I enclose a disembarcation Return which will show how small my disposable Force was.

The enemy had a six pounder, and smaller one in the Fort. I also enclose return of the Killed, wounded and missing. Our Loss the severe, and much to be regretted, is Less everything considered than could have been expected.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>This is the strategy that failed to draw old. Gen. Green Clay out of Ft. Meigs, July 25.

You will perceive that the Indian Force is seldom a disposable one, never to be relied on, in the hour of need, and only to be found useful in Proportion as we are independent of it. Ten Indians were surprised on a plain near Sandusky and were cut to Pieces. The Indians have always had a dread of Cavalry, of which the Enemy have a considerable number. A troop of the 19th would be of the greatest service here, in the confidence they would give to our mounted Indians. I have experienced much Deficiency in my Artillery, another officer at least, is absolutely required, and one of science and experience. The Enemy's Defences are composed of Wood, if we knew how to burn them, as they did ours at Fort George, Mr. Harrison's Army must have been destroyed long since. The Enemy's Vessel's are out of Presque isle harbour, and so decidedly stronger than ours, that Capt. Barclay has been necessitated to return to Amherstburg, and with all haste to get the new vessel ready for sea, which she will be in Eight or ten days at farthest, and then only want Hands. Whatever may happen, to be regretted, may be fairly attributed to the Delays in sending here the Force Your Excellency directed should be sent. Had it been sent at once, it could have been used to the greatest advantage, but, it arrived in such small Portions, and with such delays that the opportunities have been lost. The Enemy are in great numbers at Presque isle, (Erie) and have been already re-inforced at Fort Meigs. General Harrison's Head Quarters are near lower Sandusky where he arrived on the 3d Instant. I must now look for the Enemy from two Quarters, and will have to meet them with my small Force divided, for the Indians will make no stand without us. You will probably hear of the Enemy's Landing shortly at Long Point, whence they may gain the Rear of the Centre Division, and also affect my supplies. An hundred and fifty sailors would have effectually obviated this Evil. I apprehend the Enemy's rapid advance to the River Raisin in Force, and establish himself there which he can do surprisingly soon. If I had the means I would establish a Post at that River, but not having two or three hundred to send there it is not in my Power. I must entreat Your Excellence to send me more troops, even the second Batallion of the 41st Regt. the weak would be extremely acceptable. If the Enemy should be able to Establish themselves in the Territory it will operate srongly against us with our Indian Allies. Your Excellency may rely on my best endeavours, but I rely on the Troops alone. and they are but Few, and I am necessitated to man the vessels with them. I have never desponded, nor do I now, but I conceived it my Duty to state to Your Excellency the Inadequateness of my Force.

I have the honor to be with much respect
Your Excellency's Obedient Servant
HENRY PROCTOR
Brigt General Comp

August 12, 1813

His Excellency

Lt. General

Sir Geo. Prevost Bt.

Kingston.

#### PERRY'S VICTORY (SEPT. 10, 1813)

Maj. Gen. Proctor to Maj. Gen. De Rottenburg (C680, p. 71)

Sandwich, September 12, 1813.

Sir:

With the deepest regret I acquaint you that the Squadron of His Majesty's vessels, Detroit, Queen Charlotte, Lady Prevost, Hunter, Chippewa, Erie, two ships, schooner Brig, small schooner, sloop, six sail under the Command of Captain Barclay sailed at 3 o'clock P. M. on the 9th Instant to seek that of the Enemy, nine sail, two Brigs Carrying 20, 32-Pound Canonades each and two long 12-Pounders, and that on the 10th Inst. the two Fleets were seen engaged between the Islands about 25 Miles from the Settlement below Amherstburg. The action lasted from twelve to nearly half-past-three, and I understand from Lt. Col. Warburton who saw the Action from an Elevated situation fifteen Miles below Amherstburg, that the firing was incessant, and the vessels appeared to be very near each other. The spectators were fully impressed with the Idea that our Fleet were the Victors, but Circumstances have since placed it beyond a doubt that

the whole of our Fleet have been taken or destroyed. The wind was fair for imherstburg the whole of the 10th and 11th Inst. No accounts from or of Captain Barclay, and, on the latter day the Vessels eleven evidently under one Flag worked down the Lake. The Commissariat might have preserved this District; or a Due Attention to the Naval Establishment on this Lake. It have no neglects to upbraid myself with, that could have the slightest effect on the safety of this Country, tho, one is implied in Your Letter "not employing the Queen Charlotte and my Craft diligently in Conveying Provisions from Long Point, at the opening of the Navigation." I beg leave to observe, in Answer, that those from whom you received that Information, might have mentioned, that the unfortunate ship Queen Charlotte could not be used at the Period alluded to, for want of hands, who were in the craft employed on the expedition to the Miami, which has received the approbation of His Excellency the Commander of the Porces. I take the liberty of suggesting the Expediency of occupying immediately an Eligible Piece of Ground at Turky Point, by Blockhouses connected by Picketting; that may be defended by from three to five hundred men. I not see the least chance of occupying to advantage my present extensive Position, which can be so easily turned by means of the entire Command of the Indian Force very inefficient. It is my opinion that I should retire on the Thames, without Delay preparatory to any other movement that may be found requisite, or determined on. I have written to Colonel Talbot to send to the Thames whatever Articles of Food there may be in his reach, also to have the road, as far as possible, repaired, thro' the wilderness. I feel myself much at a Loss with respect to the Indians; The Loss of the Fleet is a most Calamitous Circumstance. Michilimackinac will require immediate attention. It is to be prehended that the Enemy may make an Attempt to pass up some of their ressels to possess themselves of that place, and some vessels we

I have the honor to be Sir,

Your obedt humble Servt HENRY PROCTOR Brigr General Comp

Major General Rottenbrg &c &c St. Davids.

<sup>1</sup>Proctor had urged for months the necessity for seamen, shipwrights, guns and reinforcements for the fleet. He cannot be censured for the disaster, and neither can Barclay be blamed, both did their utmost.

# EVACUATION OF DETROIT (September 27, 1813) Official Account Issued at Montreal, October 13, 1813

Major General Proctor having sustained, by the unfortunate capture of the Squadron on Lake Erie, the loss of a considerable portion of his military force, which was serving on board that fleet, as well as the principal heavy ordnance necessary for the defense of his military possessions—commenced his retreat from the fort at Sandwich on the 24th of September, having previously dismantled the posts of Amherstburg and Detroit, and burned and destroyed every public building and stores of every description.

# BATTLE OF THE THAMES (Oct. 5, 1813) Maj. Gen. Proctor to Maj. Gen. De Rottenburg

October 23, 1813. Ancaster<sup>1</sup>

Sir

Having decided on the necessity of retiring on the Thames, It became immediately an object of the utmost importance to convince the Indian Body of

Ancaster—now Rifle Range, is a few miles southwest of Burlington, Ontario.

This letter is Proctor's official report. The buildings at Detroit "Were destroyed" by fire as ordered by him.

its expediency also, and likewise to dispell all apprehension of their being deserted by us. Both of which to a considerable degree were effected, by commencing with the Chief Tecumthei and then by means of him. The Indian cause and ours experienced a serious Loss in the Death of Roundhead. On the 24th ulto, I concentrated my Force at Sandwich, having previously sent off to the Thames my remaining Ordnance and Stores of every Description for which Transport could be found, and destroying the small Portion that remained, as well as the Public Buildings &c. &c. at Amherstburg. On the 26th the Enemy appeared in the offing, sounding in every direction, and on the 27th landed nine miles below Amherstburg in considerable Force. On the same evening the Public Buildings at Detroit were destroyed, I commenced my retreat, and by easy Marches arrived on the 29th at the River Thames. I had immediately after the Loss of our Fleet observed an Impatience to retire, by which however, I was not influenced ere it became at least prudent. A considerable number of Indians remained; but not from the want of attachment to us, nor do I apprehend any Diminution of it whilst our conduct is such as to retain the confidence of those who have accompanied us, I was disheartened, the I could not but observe that the idea of making a stand on the Thames, below the Wilderness, A wood between the Moravian Town and Deleware the Road thro' which is thirty-four miles and very bad, or maintaining any Position on it was generally treated as visionary; and that every Direction given for that Purpose was received with apathy, and I soon perceived that it would not be in my Power to occupy the Narrows of the River Sinclair as I had intended, and prevent the Enemy's vessels passing into Lake Huron. I had assured the Indians that we would not desert them. and it was my full Determination to have made a stand at the Forks (Chatham) by which our vessels and stores would be protected, but after my arrival at Dover, three miles lower down the River, I was induced to take Post there first, where Ovens had been constructed, and where there was some Shelter for the Troops; and had accordingly directed that it should be put into the best possible state of Defense, that time and circumstances would admit of. Indeed it had been my Intention to have opposed the Enemy nearer the Mouth of the River; had not the Troops contrary to my Intention, been moved during my absence to the purpose of acquiring some broadless of the surpose of acquiring the surpose of acquiring the surpose of the surpose of acquiring the surpose of the surpose of the surpose of acquiring the surpose of the sur of a Few hours for the purpose of acquiring some knowledge of the country in my rear. On the 3d Inst. during another unfortunate attempt for the said Purpose with the Officer of Engineers whom Indisposition had prevented waiting on me, from the 24th ulto; to the evening of the 2d Inst. The Troops, on the Advance of the Enemy, retired until stopped at the Forks; and altho the measure was at the time strongly opposed by the Indian Body. It had the effect of determining them the next morning to immediately retreat to the Moravian Town and which on my Arrival was Carrying into effect; a hasty measure that made it requisite to immediately sink and destroy the Vessels and Naval stores brought from Amherstburg as well as all others that could not, from the want of Time, or means be removed, and which was accordingly done. Immediately on my Determination to fall back Directions were given and measures immediately taken for the Construction of Ovens, and a sufficiency of Peroques or large Canoes on the Communication. Had my intentions been carried into effect promptly we should have been well accommodated with Provisions, and not encumbered with them on the move, as I had explicitly directed, that every article of Food should be in our rear, and that Portions of it, as well as Individuals of the Commissariat be at stated distances for the Accommodation of the sick, and of the women and children, who were to be sent off as conveyances could be found. In short every measure was adopted that my experience or Enquiries could prompt for the disencumbering my Force and facilitating its supplies. In the attempt to save Provisions and Ammunition we became encumbered with Boats not suited to the state of the Navigation, The Indians and the Troops retreated on different sides of the River and the Boats to which sufficient attention had not been given became particularly exposed to the Fire of the Enemy who were advancing on the side the Indians were retiring, and most unfortunately fell into the possession of the Enemy, and with them several of the men, Provisions, all the Ammunition that had not been issued to the Troops and Indians. This disastrous draws of the troops are the troops and the troops are troops. cumstance afforded the Enemy the means of crossing and advancing on both sides of the River; Finding the Enemy were advancing too near I resolved to meet him, being strong in Cavalry, in a wood below the Moravian Town, while last was not cleared of Indian women and children, or of those of the Troops.

nor of the sick. The Troops were formed with their left to the River; with a reserve and a six pounder, on the Road near the River. The Indians on the Right. The want of Ammunition was unknown to the men, and but to few of the officers. My only anxiety was on that head, which I made an immediate attempt to procure a supply of, as well as the Flour and Corn, and awaited the Result of the Attack with full confidence. The Gun which certainly should have produced the best effect if properly managed, was in possession of the Enemy immediately as the attack commenced, without having fired a shot. This circumstance operated so very unfortunately that the Line commencing near the Left gave way, and notwithstanding the Exertions of the officers in general could not be reformed or the men rallied. Having in vain endeavored to call the men to a sense of Duty and having no chance by remaining, but of being captured, I reluctantly quitted the ground, and narrowly escaped being taken by the Enemy's Cavalry. I cannot but observe, that the Troops do not seem to have had that Confidence in themselves that they have shown on every former occasion, and which had produced a conduct that I witnessed with Pride and satisfaction, and which had they felt, in the late unfortunate Instance, would I am confident, have produced quite another result, and have placed me in a very different state from what I feel myself in at present. Having already waited too long for the return of Lieut. LeBriton¹ whom I sent with a Flag of truce to ascertain the Fate of Individuals etc. I shall no longer delay, but take the Earliest opportunity of giving any information I may obtain respecting the late unfortunate affair of the 5th Inst., with deep concern, I mention the Death of the Chief Tecumthei who was shot on the 5th Instant. I must mention that the Indians repulsed the Left of the Enemy. The conduct of the Enemy's Cavalry was marked by peculiar cruelty to the Families of the Indians who had no time to escape or conceal themselves.

Major General de Rottenburg, Kingston.

I have the honor to be Sir, Your obedient servant, HENRY PROCTOR Major General

<sup>1</sup>Le Breton

### COURT MARTIAL OF MAJOR GENERAL PROCTOR Earl Bathurst to The Duke of York (C682, p. 132)

War Department, 21st February, 1814

Sir:

I do myself the Honor to submit to Your Royal Highness that the reports which I have received from Sir George Prevost upon the occurrences of the late Campaign in Canade, convey a very unfavourable Impression of the Conduct of Major General Proctor. The officer appears by the Documents which are before His Majesty's Government, to have occasioned in a great measure the Misfortune which befell the Body of Troops retreating under His Command before the American General Harrison, by his want of Military Judgment and exertion. And further that the destruction of His Majesty's Naval Force upon Lake Erie, may be attributed to the order which Captain Barclay appears to have received from Major General Proctor, to sail with a force very inferior to that of the Enemy, altho, the Major General must have been aware that a reinforcement of seamen was to be expected, and that there existed no necessity for exposing The British Flotilla to so great a Risk.

Under these circumstances, it is the opinion of his Majesty's Government that a Court Martial should be holden upon Major General Proctor, in order that his conduct in the above instance may be strictly investigated; and I have to request Your Royal Highness would be pleased to address such Instructions

as may be thought necessary to Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost in order that no time may be lost in bringing the said Major General Proctor to trial before a General Court Martial.

I have the honor to be &c &c
BATHURST

His Royal Highness
The Duke of York K. G.

#### FINDING OF THE COURT

There were five charges in all, as follows:

1st. That he did not abandon Detroit and retreat as soon as he should. He began his retreat in the evening of September twenty-seventh, although he was aware of the Barclay's defeat on Lake Erie on the day of the battle, September tenth.

2nd. He did not carry on his retreat expeditiously and did not destroy the bridges he passed over; thus allowing the American to overtake him.

3d. Allowed property to fall into the hands of the enemy that he should have carried off or destroyed.

4th. That he did not fortify Chatham in order to resist the enemy at that point.

5th. That he did not properly arrange his troops at the battle at Moraviaa town, October fifth, but "quitted the field soon after the action commenced; such conduct on the part of the said Major General Proctor betraying great professional incapacity, tending to the defeat and dishonor of His Majesty's arms to the sacrifice of the division of the army committed to his charge, being inviolation of his duty, unbecoming and disgraceful to his character as an officer prejudical to good order and military discipline, and contrary to the articles of war".

The finding of the Court, the report of which is dated July twenty-sixtle 1815, was partly in favor and partly against the accused. The closing of the verdict is as follows: "Upon the whole the court is of opinion that the prisoner, Major General Proctor, has in many instances during the retreat, and the disposition of the force under his command, been erroneous in judgment and in some deficient in those energetic and active exertions which the extraordinary difficulties of his situation so particularly required."

The sentence of the Court was that he should be publicly reprimanded and suspended from rank and pay for six months. The Prince Regent acquiesced in the sentence so far as the public reprimand, only.

#### THE OHIO-MICHIGAN WAR

#### The Mitchell Map in the Museum of the Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society at Columbus

A discovery of unusual interest and importance has been made in the Museum's large collection of maps, which is now being reorganized and catalogued. It is an original of the celebrated map made by John Mitchell, famous English artographer, in 1755, of the British and French Dominions in North America at that time. Its rarity and significance had not been realized before it was cumined by Col. Lawrence Martin, Chief of the Division of Maps in the Library of Congress at Washington, while he was visiting the Museum recently. Col. Martin, after a minute scrutiny, pronounced the map to be, without doubt, a rest edition, of which very few were issued, including only six now known to cuist.

The map, which is an unusually large one, had become so worn during its 175 years of existence that it could be handled only with extreme care. It has now been remounted and completely restored, so that it can be handled freely without danger of injury.

In commenting upon this fine old map, Col. Martin said: "Mitchell's map is of unusual interest to people in the state of Ohio because it is related to important episodes in Ohio history. Indeed, this map may be said to have caused the dispute between Ohio and Michigan which is commonly referred to as "The Toledo War." In 1755, when the map was printed, its author represented the Great Lakes as accurately as he knew how, but he placed the south end of Lake Michigan farther north than it should be in relation to the west end of Lake Erie. As a result of this the Continental Congress, using Mitchell's map in 1787, when the Ordinance of that year was drawn up, planned a northern boundary of Ohio and Indiana so placed as to give the mouth of the Maumee river to Ohio. As the city of Toledo grew up at the mouth of this river, people in Ohio became customed to the idea that Toledo was theirs. In 1802, when the Constitutional convention of Ohio was held in Chillicothe, and when the members of the convention learned that the south end of Lake Michigan was farther south than they Bought, and that Toledo would be given to Michigan, they took steps to prewe their ownership of Toledo, and these steps resulted in a dispute which sted until 1836, and in Michigan's being forced to take what is now the Upper Peninsula of Michigan in order to satisfy its disappointment in losing Toledo.

"It would be interesting to know the previous history of this particular copy of Mitchell's map, since, for all I know, it is the identical copy which was used at the Constitutional Convention of 1802, or at conferences at Columbus during the 1830's between representatives of the state of Ohio, the Territory of Michigan, and the federal government at Washington."

Col. Martin did not mention that, although Toledo was the bone of contention when the "war" occurred, the settlement of that place was not begun until the year 1822. In 1835, when the war was at its height, troops of Ohio and of Michigan were massed at the boundary line in dispute, and a clash of arms was arrowly averted.

From "The Museum Echoes"