

# Northwest Ohio Quarterly

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# *The President's Page*

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## The Bill of Rights of The Federal Constitution

**W**HEN the Federal Constitution was presented to the people for ratification, one of the chief objections to it was that the instrument did not specifically contain guarantees of the fundamental rights of a free people. Some thought it unnecessary, but the experiences with England had left such an indelible impression on the minds of the people, that a demand was made for certain amendments expressly providing for a guarantee of these rights.

Thus the Constitution was ratified by such states as Massachusetts, New York and Virginia upon the condition that amendments would be submitted by the first Congress for ratification by the states. One of the early acts of the Congress was to adopt these amendments and submit them for ratification.

It may be of interest to recall that twelve amendments were submitted but only ten were adopted, and that these ten amendments, known as the Bill of Rights, placed limitations only on the National Government and not the states.

Lack of space does not permit a discussion of all ten amendments. However, the provisions of the first amendment are of such vital importance to the welfare of each individual and the family group that they are here quoted in full.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

In our country no newspaper or other publication can be forced to advocate policies or publish the views of any holder of public office in the National Government. While there may


be servile publications, none need be so except from their own choice.

As long as the American press remains independent of the politicians and pressure groups, our democratic form of government will be safe. Freedom of the press and Democracy are indispensable to each other. Neither can exist without the other. Corrupt or autocratic public officials cannot maintain their power or hold office for an indefinite number of terms, or for life, with free speech and a free press in existence.

In Germany, Italy and Russia the people first lost their freedom of the press. After that they became easy victims to the propaganda inspired by the politicians. They eventually became slaves.

The only certain means our people possess to insure these right is to elect men to public office whom they know will not solicit the vote or the support of any person who subscribes to the principles of communism or fascism or appoint such person to any public office. Let us keep the communist and fascist out of Washington.

A thousand years scarce serve to form a state; a single hour may lay it in the dust.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Richard Stogau". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large, prominent 'R' and 'S'.

PRESIDENT

# The Old Central High School of Toledo

SILAS E. HURIN

THE old Central High School—dear to the hearts of thousands of Toledo citizens of former generations—still lives in the memories of other thousands who have loved it for its old associations and have within the last three years seen its latest form of building destroyed to make room for our beautiful new Public Library.

The picture of the building here shown, taken before its more recent additions, shows it as it appeared in 1868 from the east side of the old Ohio and Lake Erie canal connecting Toledo with Cincinnati, a source of pride and profit to our city, but afterwards sadly neglected and finally destroyed as a nuisance. The wooden shanties in the photograph, disfiguring the space between the canal and the school, have long since disappeared, to be replaced by the more urban and substantial business buildings of Michigan Street.

To many Toledoans, the old school was regarded almost with reverence, representing, as it did, the highest culture of northwestern Ohio and the seat of their early scholastic struggles and triumphs. Its teachers are remembered with love or dislike according to the pupil's early memories of school life.

The school was historic for it was one of Ohio's earliest, at first a single-room log cabin, presided over, it is said, by Miss Harriett Wright, a niece of Governor Silas Wright of New York state; but her claim to priority is disputed by partisans of Miss Harriett Whitney, daughter of Major Ashley Whitney, who afterwards married Sanford L. Collins. She in after years dictated to a descendant the statement that in 1830 she taught in the old log house on the site of the Central High School, some of her pupils daily crossing the Maumee River in boats to attend her school. She was then only sixteen years old.

Among the earliest school directors who had charge of this and other local schools, according to the historian, Nevin O. Winter, were John Berdan, Samuel E. Scott and Oliver Stevens,

well known citizens of early Toledo. The first recorded honor student was Zebulon C. Pheatt who received an award for excellence in penmanship. The first graduating class in 1857 included two boys and one girl.

In 1851, the Board of Education astounded the conservative citizens of Toledo by squandering \$2700 for the actual purchase of the present site of old Central High, the first Toledo high school. One fifth of the site was presented to the city by Jessup W. Scott, a persistent friend of education in Toledo, after whom the present Scott High School was subsequently named.

In 1936 that site of the old Central High School was valued at one million dollars.

The clock tower shown in the photograph was destroyed by fire in 1895 and at the same time the old school bell—inscribed with the motto "To Learning's Fount, the Youth I Call," fell to the ground, tolling as it fell. That bell had summoned many a school boy "creeping like snail, unwillingly to school" and yet again it had pealed out its notes in triumph over many a school athletic triumph. It is still preserved on the campus of Scott High School. May it long be saved in commemoration of Toledo's school history.

Miss Harriett Wright above referred to was born in Vermont in 1812 and came to Toledo in 1834. The next year she taught in the building which afterwards became Toledo's first court house. In 1835 she married Munson H. Daniels who soon after became Toledo's first sheriff. In that year William Oliver gave to Mrs. Daniels lot #335 in Port Lawrence Division which was deeded to her "As a compliment by the proprietors on the occasion of hers being the first marriage in Toledo."

It may be interesting to recall the names of a few of the Toledo citizens who in years past have been associated with education in Toledo. The first school board consisted of Decius Wadsworth, Samuel B. Scott, John D. Fruman, M. L. Collins, Simeon Fitch, Jr. and Ira L. Clark. Among the very early ones were W. J. Daniels, S. B. Comstock and Stephen Bartlett, who erected the second school building, a frame structure. The first school house was built, it is said, by a Mr. Allen.

Among the more recent names are the following Presidents of the Board of Education: Joseph P. Hanley 1897 and again in 1901; J. Kent Hamilton 1898, 1903-1904; James Melvin 1899; John W. Dowd 1900; Lafayette Lyttle 1902; Charles M. Watts 1905-1906; C. A. Seiders 1907; R. A. Bartley 1908-9; Irving E. Macomber 1910; Frank E. Crane 1911, 1914; Edward D. Libbey 1912-1913; Isaac Kinsey 1915-1916; Thomas A. DeVilbiss 1917 and 1918.


The duties of the early members of the School Board were very different from those of more modern incumbents of that office for (as Mr. Arthur Patterson expressed it in an article in the Toledo Blade in 1936), they "haggled over the price of cord wood, wrangled over tiny janitorial claims for extra compensation; paid out salaries as low as twenty dollars a month to its school marms, read and adopted text books and zealously exercised its prerogatives of periodic school inspection—visits to scare the liver out of student and instructor alike and it was an added ogre unavoidable at examination time."

Old Central High, common school, high school, manual training school—gone now in its physical being—long will live in the memories of those who, in nearly one hundred years, knew it as a fountain of learning and scholastic discipline.

To show the primitive character of the early schools of Toledo we quote from an article written by Rosa L. Segur, an honored old lady of Toledo, at the time of the death in 1888 of Richard Mott, an early and much beloved school teacher, afterwards twice Mayor of Toledo, twice representative of this district in Congress, for many years President of Toledo Savings Bank. She wrote:

"As if but yesterday, memory recalls the first time a flaxen haired little stranger in a strange land, saw his kindly face. Ignorant of the English language, she went with fear and trembling to the district school, away back in the early forties. One room answered for the entire school accommodations of Port Lawrence township. It was in the second story of a cheap tenement on the site of the now Merchants' Hotel on St. Clair Street. The school funds were at so low an ebb that according to the

Toledo High School - 1868 - Michigan St between Adams and



phraseology of the time 'a master could only be hired for the three winter months.' And all who desired schooling must make the best of this meagre opportunity.

"The master taught all the 'branches' from A B C to the abstract sciences, and like Goldsmith's village pedagogue excited universal admiration because one small head could carry all he knew.

"The day was bitterly cold and the room most forlorn. A long box stove filled with hickory wood stood near its center, red hot while school kept. Slanting pine boards on two sides of the room answered for desks, and benches ten or more feet in length, without backs, stood before these desks, and were occupied by the senior pupils, divided, boys to the right, girls to the left.

"While the juniors broiled near the stove on similar benches, without the luxury of desks, the seniors froze at their distance from plutonic fires. The end of the apartment furthest from its door was ornamented with a throne-like dais, made of an old inverted dry goods box, from which the master gazed upon the school, over a narrow pine table, adorned with an English reader, a Maltebrun's geography, a Debol's arithmetic, a testament, a huge ferule, and an immense bundle of hickory rods. A motley crowd of knowledge seekers from five to twenty-one years of age, awaited the opening of school.

"The poverty of their parents who had settled in the Eldorado of the Maumee to better their fortunes and who were living upon hope deferred and chills and fever, was apparent in their ungainly clothes, and very democratic manners. They amused themselves by calling the little stranger 'tow head' and 'Dutchy' and in expatiating upon the attention the master would give her with the ferule and hickory rods, if she did not obey 'the rules,' some forty of which were pasted upon the solitary door.

"With tears she turned towards the door, to see a kindly gentleman enter leading two little girls, one her senior and the other her junior. The contrast of this refined group to the surroundings was soothing, and when the gentleman said, 'good morning little stranger, and where do you live?' her heart grew



lighter and momentarily the excited imagination forgot the teasing, taunting mob of children, the ferule and the hickory rods whose blows her fears had almost made her feel. A happy relief came with the smile, and the remark showed interest in her.

“As the school opened all who could, read a verse from the new testament, and when the oldest of the little girls spoken of read her verse without spelling the words, wondrous was her admiration for the little reader, and great her wish to read as well as she.

“Fever and ague so soon diminished the attendance at this school, that before its allotted three months had passed but few pupils remained, and all this story teller remembers of it is that she mastered the alphabet, without the assistance of ferule or hickory rod, and that she was cheered by the kind sympathetic smile of the Quaker gentleman, Richard Mott.”

# The Toledo Natural Gas Pipe-Line Controversy

CHESTER MCA. DESTLER

IN THE closing years of the last century Toledo was the scene of an important experiment with municipally supplied natural gas. The attempt to secure support for the enterprise split the city into bitterly hostile factions. It plunged Toledo, also, into a contest with the Standard Oil Company that attracted nation-wide interest. From it both parties suffered severely. The Standard interests witnessed the premature exhaustion of their large gas reserves in northwestern Ohio. Toledo's municipal pipe-line failed completely after a few years of limited success. This left a heritage of debt and of distrust with municipally managed enterprises that may have had some influence in defeating S. M. "Golden Rule" Jones' program of municipal traction,<sup>1</sup> although this is somewhat doubtful.<sup>2</sup> The failure, however, was publicised later by private utilities as an example of the incompetence of municipal business management.<sup>3</sup> Today the episode is forgotten by all but elderly Toledoans whose recollections may be stimulated by the huge pipe-lines laid to meet the demands of global warfare.

The original impulse to the Toledo experiment came from Findlay.<sup>4</sup> This sleepy country town was the scene of great excitement in 1884-88, as the result of the unexpected discovery of huge natural gas reserves in the underlying Trenton limestone. High pressure wells with millions of cubic feet capacity were blown in in swift succession and Findlay was soon supplied with a super-abundance of cheap fuel. The city was piped at once by private companies, competing for the favor of a public thoroughly aroused to the advantages of natural gas. When the companies merged the citizens felt that they had fallen into the "clutches of a monopoly," and resented the reasonable rates charged as extortionate.<sup>5</sup> This feeling was intensified by the belief the supply of gas was inexhaustible since supposedly it was generated underground by chemical processes as swiftly as it was withdrawn at the surface.<sup>6</sup> "Free gas" was regarded as a

natural right which corporate monopoly was denying the public. If dispensed instead by the municipality at the cost of drilling and piping, it might be sufficient to attract industries to the city and promote a rapid growth in wealth and population. Accordingly, an act was secured from the legislature authorizing the city to drill wells and sell the product to its citizens. A rate war followed hard upon the laying of the city's pipes that soon forced the private company to sell out at a loss to the trustees of the municipal plant. Outside factories were drawn to the city by the promise of free fuel, which the city guaranteed in some cases for five years. Free plant sites and at times other inducements were granted. About a dozen glass factories, and iron industries, lime kilns, and brick yards soon became consumers of the new fuel. The seductive theory that the gas was inexhaustible led to the wasting of vast quantities. The city set an example by illuminating its streets with some 200 torches burning day and night that consumed at least 15,000,000 cubic feet of gas a month during 1887. Factories and private residences were equally reckless, while occasionally the wells themselves were ignited to entertain visitors. Rapid growth and a wild speculative boom accompanied these developments. The city limits were extended from four square miles to include the entire township, land prices rose to exorbitant figures, and the population of Findlay increased in five years from 4,500 to over 18,000. As salt water appeared in the first wells new gas territory was leased in 1889, and an ample supply was again secured.<sup>7</sup>

The Findlay boom soon produced reverberations in other towns of northwestern Ohio. Fostoria, a short distance to the northeast, embarked upon a similar venture in municipal gas when the services of the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company failed to produce the desired boom. Legislative authority and funds raised by private citizens to supplement municipal bonds were followed by the leasing of gas territory and the dispensing of gas to local industries, chiefly in glass, that soon came to consume 7,000,000 cubic feet a day. Bowling Green, twenty-four miles north of Findlay, Tiffin, and North Baltimore also embarked upon municipal gas experiments in which free gas

attracted a number of glass factories and produced a boom whose life was shortened by reckless waste.<sup>8</sup> In Tiffin, as in Fostoria, the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company had been first in the field, only to be shouldered roughly to one side by a municipal enterprise interested primarily in "free gas."

Popular excitement resulting from the discovery of the rich Lima petroleum and Findlay gas territory was such that virtually all parts of the state were affected. In northwestern Ohio every township in whole counties was tested by drilling. The belief that the gas was generated spontaneously underground was widely entertained despite stern warnings from the State Geologist, Edward Orton, that the supply was limited and should not be wasted. Although Orton urged that Findlay institute measures for the conservation of the priceless fuel, his own statement that the new "horizon of petroleum and . . . gas . . . bids fair to be the most prolific single source of gas and oil that has yet been discovered in this country"<sup>9</sup> must have contributed to the extravagant expectations of Ohio municipalities. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were spent drilling down to the Findlay gas-rock throughout Ohio,<sup>10</sup> Indiana, Kentucky, and Michigan. Indiana developed a gas field of her own in this horizon that was much greater in extent than the Findlay field in northwest Ohio.<sup>11</sup> One result of the discovery of the Indiana field was the organization of a Consumers' Gas company to supply Indianapolis in competition with private companies already in the field there.<sup>12</sup>

Meanwhile the best gas territory in northwest Ohio was becoming increasingly well defined. The heart of this field was "a few hundred square miles, distributed through portions of five counties" some forty miles southwest of Toledo. Hancock and Wood counties were the best of the five, and in Wood, Bloom township possessed the best gas territory of all. Over forty wells were drilled there before 1890. The Simons well, the largest of these, produced initially over 12,000,000 cubic feet per day.<sup>13</sup>

Popular imagination in Toledo was already inflamed by the gigantic wells opened up in the Findlay district. There the

great Karg well, or the Tippecanoe, that produced 32,000,000 cubic feet the first day, symbolized to laymen the "inexhaustible" riches of the field. A number of wells were drilled to the Trenton limestone under Toledo in the hope of securing an independent supply of the matchless fuel. Only one, in South Toledo, resulted in a fair flow of gas, but its title was so involved in litigation that it was unused for years.<sup>14</sup> As a result, attention was turned increasingly to Wood and Hancock counties as the most convenient source of abundant gas.

Toledo business men were already investing in gas leases in this area, while real estate operators were fully cognizant of the advantages to be secured from "free gas." The Toledo Rolling-Mill Company was on the market for cheap fuel after its test wells had produced only a feeble supply.<sup>15</sup> The Business Men's Association was eager to secure gas in quantity and at a price that would attract outside industries to the city and precipitate a boom matching that of the towns in the gas territory. Judge John H. Doyle, a prominent and highly regarded attorney, tried in vain to interest citizens of means in organizing a company of their own to bring natural gas to the city while the Findlay boom was in its first year. Captain M. J. Enright, President of the Business Men's Association, and his friends tried to get the Brice-Thomas syndicate to pipe gas to Toledo, only to have them decline the invitation after an investigation cast some doubt on the prospects of the enterprise.<sup>16</sup> Judge Doyle then went East to interest New York capitalists in gas for Toledo, only to find that ex-Governor Charles Foster of Fostoria, President of the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company that Doyle had helped to organize in 1886, was there before him. Foster had already laid the project of piping gas to Toledo before the Standard Oil interests. Seconded by Judge Doyle and the Toledo Business Men's Association, apparently, he induced them to enter the field and apply for a franchise.<sup>17</sup> Meanwhile, another company, the Toledo Natural Gas Company, had been organized, and its president, L. H. Smith, sought a similar franchise. The Standard Oil men soon acquired an interest in this company,<sup>18</sup> although for several years it appeared as an

independent concern. At the same time they financed a rapid expansion of the activities of the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company, now a Standard subsidiary. This corporation rapidly acquired control of the best gas territory in Wood and Hancock counties, piped lines to towns and cities in the gas region that had failed to secure gas for themselves, and planned to lay pipe lines to Sandusky, Toledo, and Detroit.<sup>19</sup>

Franchises were granted by the Toledo City Council to the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company and the Toledo Natural Gas Company on the same day, September 6, 1886.<sup>20</sup> According to a champion of the municipal pipe-line, several years later, there had been some opposition to granting the franchises without compensation to the city. This was overcome, according to him, by statements from President Foster and Judge Doyle that if the city felt mistreated by the gas companies, it was always free to bond itself and enter the business in competition with them.<sup>21</sup> The prospect of competition between the two companies undoubtedly contributed to the same end. The franchises, under which the two companies began to lay their pipe-lines provided that the price of gas in Toledo should be fixed by agreement between the Common Council and the companies.<sup>22</sup> Before the lines were completed, however, a quarrel developed between them over rates. The Standard Oil interests ordered construction of the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company's line stopped, and for a while contemplated going elsewhere only to be persuaded by Foster and Doyle that the business interests of Toledo would see that they were treated fairly, as President Daniel O'Day of the National Transit Company asserted later.<sup>23</sup> Whether it was the assurances of Doyle and Foster, or the acceptance by the City Council of the schedule of rates dictated by the Standard Oil managers (as asserted later by the city pipe-line advocates)<sup>24</sup> that closed the breach cannot be determined. At any rate, construction was resumed after the adoption of the schedule of rates and on September 7, 1888, gas was turned on in Toledo.

This was the occasion for a spectacular "natural gas jubilee" in the city. Thousands of sight-seers strolled "from point to



JUDGE JOHN H. DOYLE,  
FOUNDER OF THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF  
NORTHWESTERN OHIO

point to view the standpipes, each tipped with a huge banner of hissing, roaring flame, lighting the city as if by a conflagration." A "mighty throng" attended the mass-meeting that, as the city's leading newspaper put it, gave convincing proof of the interest taken in the new era of Toledo's progress, inaugurated by the advent of the new fuel.

Ex-President Rutherford B. Hayes, of Fremont, Ohio, headed the list of speakers that congratulated the city. He gave particular attention to what he termed "the gravest question touching the future. Will this beautiful, this delightful, this matchless fuel last? Has it come to stay? Will it be exhausted in ten years . . . will it out-last the present generation of men?"<sup>25</sup> On this crucial issue he was able to quote at length from a letter from the State Geologist. Orton argued that although "Natural Gas . . . has not come to stay—forever," the geological structure and rock pressure in the gas rock of the Trenton Limestone was such as to promise a supply longer than the "gas of any other known horizons or fields." Although such a supply was not great enough to "make the careless use or wanton waste of its accumulations a matter of indifference to us [it was great] enough to amply repay the capitalists who are bringing it in . . . to the cities and towns who so greatly desire and need it . . . enough to confer inestimable benefits on the few and favored communities that are able to avail themselves of it. It is the best fuel known to man. . . ." <sup>26</sup> This statement was welcomed by the *Toledo Blade*, the most influential city daily, which observed "that there are many scientists who believe that the production is continuous, and the supply will be perennial. But if [it] be limited, our reservoir is greater than any other." It went on to urge the Business Men's Committee to advertise this and bring the great advantages of Toledo "as an industrial center to the attention of those interested," prophesying that "With her unrivaled system of transportation, and with natural gas as fuel, our city should become the great manufacturing city of the West."<sup>27</sup>

The rates charged by the two gas companies during the three years were decidedly lower than those levied on consumers in Pennsylvania. On the other hand, they averaged about ten per



cent more than those charged in the smaller Ohio towns, and were decidedly higher than those in the cities where the municipal authorities furnished gas at cost to householders and factories. Monthly charges for large cooking stoves from November 1 to May 1, were \$3.00, from May 1 to November 1, \$2.00. The largest furnaces for heating were supplied on an annual net contract for \$75.00. After a little over a year of service, it was estimated that the citizens saved on an average some forty per cent over the cost of coal, some consumers complaining that they did not save anything, others admitting a saving of one half of former fuel bills. A local rolling-mill asserted that it saved \$20,000.00 on its fuel bill. Glass furnaces were supplied with power and fuel at a flat rate of \$30.00 a pot. Within three years after commencing operations the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company alone was supplying two glass furnaces, a large rolling-mill, a large number of miscellaneous industries, and two-thirds of the city as well.<sup>28</sup>

Dissatisfaction with the services of the gas companies developed, however, almost from the day of the "natural gas jubilee." This can be traced to a variety of causes. Undoubtedly some resentment had been produced by the stoppage of construction prior to the adoption of a rate schedule by the City Council. The city boosters must have been dissatisfied with rates ten per cent higher than those charged in the smaller towns of the interior. Such a schedule would make it difficult indeed to attract industries in competition with Findlay, Fostoria, or Bowling Green whose municipally operated plants were offering "free gas" for a period of years in addition to concessions of other kinds. Under such circumstances a boom that would accelerate the city's growth and elevate real estate values could hardly materialize in Toledo. Since the public accepted the theory of the perennial supply of natural gas, propagated by the "real estate school" of geologists as Edward Orton called the speculators in the gas region, it was hardly to be expected that Toledo would be satisfied for long with the relatively limited advantages obtained from the services of the Northwestern and the Toledo companies.

Under such circumstances the public relations of these companies should have been a matter of first concern to their managers. Such was far from the case. No special inducements were made to factories to take the edge off the complaints of the boosters. The absence of competition between the companies soon became apparent to all, since they divided the city between themselves and refused to bid against each other for business. Eventually the control of the Toledo Gas Company by the Standard Oil interests leaked out, and many citizens came to feel that they were now at the mercy of the most unprincipled corporation then in existence.<sup>29</sup> While such a feeling would give a formidable weapon to agitators for municipally supplied natural gas, the treatment dealt out by the companies to their customers poured oil on the flames of public discontent. Such a friend of the companies as the State Geologist criticized them for inequitable rates given to different branches of the Toledo glass industry.<sup>30</sup> Customers were treated rudely by officials who exhibited little regard for the public interest. The companies felt from the beginning, apparently, that the city authorities had treated them churlishly in the initial negotiations over franchises and rates.<sup>31</sup> This resentment must have been intensified by the early development of agitation for a municipal pipe-line and by the recollection, probably, of losses sustained in Tiffin and Fostoria by the Northwestern Ohio Company when the municipalities entered the field. At any rate, where steps should have been taken from the beginning to offset the inevitable dissatisfaction with the inability of the companies to supply "free gas" to all and sundry and precipitate a wild boom in the interest of Toledo, if not of their stockholders, both corporations played into the hands of the opposition by showing "no consideration for the ordinary citizen."<sup>32</sup>

The Standard Oil interests put a stenographer named Corwin from 26 Broadway in charge of the Toledo office of the Northwestern Company. One Saturday Corwin threatened to shut off the gas in the local Catholic church unless it paid its bill, due that day. "Pay at once or he'd close the church, was his ultimatum," despite the promise of the pastor to pay the bill

Monday out of the Sunday collections. Judge Doyle, the company's attorney, had to call 26 Broadway by long distance telephone in order to secure an order letting gas be used in the church on that Sunday. A Toledo bank president was rudely addressed as "Old Man" by one of the clerks of the Northwestern and kept waiting a long time when he went in to see about some business. When the conflict between the companies and city was at its height in 1889, M. B. Daly, Superintendent of the Buffalo Natural Gas Fuel Company, a Standard Oil subsidiary, was sent to Toledo to investigate the situation for the Standard interests. He reported to Daniel O'Day that "the lack of courtesy on the part of the Company and its representatives was responsible to a very large degree for the feeling that existed against the Company itself. Its officers seemed not to recognize the fact that they were employed to direct the rendering of, literally public service, and were acting, in a sense, as stewards of the people." The superintendent of the Toledo Natural Gas Company was worse than Corwin in dealing with the public. As Judge Doyle said years later, "I never could guess how such men came to be put in such positions." Such management, unchanged for several years, gave a legitimate basis for public discontent with the service offered by the Standard Oil subsidiaries. It proved to be the decisive factor that brought victory to the movement for a municipally owned and operated pipe-line to the gas region to the south.<sup>33</sup>

Long before the character of the management of the gas companies became fully apparent, however, a formidable agitation was launched in Toledo for the construction of a municipally owned natural gas plant. Less than two months after the "natural gas jubilee" it became obvious to the city booster element that the Northwestern and Toledo Natural Gas companies were not going to offer the special inducements to attract the outside industries necessary to produce a boom.<sup>34</sup> A powerful and energetic faction within the Toledo Business Men's Association set out at once to achieve this much desired end. Its leader was Captain M. J. Enright, President of the Association, with whom the project of a city-owned gas plant originated.<sup>35</sup>

## *The Toledo Natural Gas Pipe-Line Controversy*

Other men such as Washington I. Squire, and W. S. Thurstin, and Sam T. Fisk figured actively on the Natural Gas Committee of the Association or as effective propagandists. Additional leadership emerged as the movement developed.

Enright began his agitation in October, 1887, only six weeks after the companies had turned on the gas for their first Toledo customers. A city pipe-line, Enright argued, was necessary to enable the city to "offer special inducements to manufacturers." He proposed that the City Council memorialize the Legislature to authorize the issuance of bonds to finance the project. Once completed, the "pipe-line . . . would furnish gas at one-sixth of the prices now charged by these companies" while the "revenue thus obtained would not only pay the interest on the bonds but would be sufficient to create a sinking fund by which we could redeem the bonds as they mature," and

We could offer such inducements to foreign manufacturers that there would be a strife as to who could get here first. We would no longer be playing second fiddle to all the one-horse villages surrounding us, but could meet their propositions and go them several per cent better. . . .

But the great feature of the enterprise is the boon it would be to the poor man. To-day natural gas is a luxury . . . a city pipe-line would enable them to keep a fire the year around for \$5.00. Every poor man in Toledo could have gas and every one of them would be in favor of the project. . . . We are in shape to get all the territory we want, and right in the heart of the fields, too, . . . of the very richest gas lands, . . . and can bring all the gas to this city that she will want for centuries to come.

When asked if he were afraid of opposition from the Standard Oil Company Enright admitted that this would have to be guarded against. He asserted, however, that there were "plenty of good men in this city" who could not "be bought up by any monopoly, and we shall be very careful that no others have any part in the matter."<sup>36</sup> In a public meeting held by the Business Men's Association to discuss the project a few days later, he made much of the fact that if the field were left to the gas companies some \$50,000.00 a month would be drained out of Toledo to 26 Broadway. He had no desire to make war on the gas com-

panies, he said, but he was determined to go ahead with his program regardless of them. "No one will claim that the Standard Oil Company, of all companies, is possessed of a very large soul or that it is worthy of very much consideration." The entire project would cost under \$1,000,000.00, and should be embarked upon without delay.<sup>37</sup>

These arguments were widely discussed and received, in the beginning, almost unanimous approval. The *Blade*, which later opposed the project, declared that there was "but one sentiment among the people concerning the proposition that Toledo shall build a pipe-line to the natural gas fields and supply nature's fuel to manufacturing establishments practically free." This, it declared, "would give the industrial interests of the city a boom that no other thing can possibly do. . . . Given this one thing—free fuel for her factories—and "Toledo would at once enter upon a growth so rapid, so enduring, that the past dreams of her greatness will not only be realized but surpassed in the enormous extension of her industries. She will become a mighty hive of industrious workers, a city of wealth and power, and the great industrial metropolis of the West."<sup>38</sup>

The *Blade* denied that previous entrance of outside capital into the business and the construction of pipe-lines by the gas companies should militate against another pipe-line. "No vested right has been created, no exclusive franchise has been given," and the argument that 600 men were on the pay-rolls of the companies was "really no argument for allowing the present companies to monopolize the gas supply of Toledo."<sup>39</sup> It was useless for Judge Doyle to plead in the public meeting held by the Association that the companies with millions invested were vitally interested in the city, that the people were still crowding the offices of the companies clamoring for gas, and that the managers were too busy at the moment to go out in search of new industries, or to urge that the cry that Toledo was "in the toils of an octopus" be stopped. The *Blade* replied:

There will have to be stronger arguments than any adduced last night to convince the people that a city pipe-line will not be of vast advantage to Toledo. The friends of the plan must watch the

legislature. The candidates for senators and representatives in this district and county should be placed on record at once. Toledo cannot afford to elect tools of a monopoly to the General Assembly.<sup>40</sup>

Three weeks later, W. S. Thurstin of the Association's Natural Gas committee reported on the probable cost of a city pipe-line, basing his estimates upon the city's experience with the municipally operated water works. Thurstin estimated that \$725,000.00 would be adequate for the enterprise, including \$60,000.00 for gas wells and leasing of gas territory, and some \$531,000.00 for pipes of all kinds. Even if the project should cost twice the estimates, Thurstin argued that two years' gas rentals would pay the whole debt and leave the city with free gas. The real issue, he contended, was whether it was best for the citizen to "burn his own gas" or to buy from the private companies.<sup>41</sup> With these estimates in hand, the Toledo investors in gas territory and the men who wished to reap a harvest of money by a boom in the values of real estate such as Findlay, Fostoria and Bowling Green were then experiencing,<sup>42</sup> set out to secure the necessary enabling act from the State Legislature.

Despite the "strong popular appeal" of the proposal to make Toledo a great manufacturing center by furnishing gas for little or nothing to large concerns, sober second thought developed increasing opposition to the pipe-line project among the business and professional men of the city. Within a month after Captain Enright had initiated the movement, "a very respectable portion" of the citizens were arrayed against it.<sup>43</sup> Some said they would have favored the plan were it not for the flings against the gas companies and an apparent desire to punish them. Others doubted the feasibility of constructing the city pipe-line for as low as \$750,000.00 and feared that the taxpayers would be saddled with a large addition to the municipal debt. Some conservatives charged that the leaders in the agitation were acting from personal motives, out of a desire to unload on the city worthless gas lands and leases. To this the pipe-line advocates replied that the strongest opponents of the city line were financially interested in the natural gas companies and their motives, too, were purely personal. The general charge

of "Standard Oil Monopoly" was raised against any one who opposed the plan to bring the gas boom to Toledo.<sup>44</sup>

After several months of heated debate the *Toledo Blade* undertook to confine the discussion to the question of the practicality of the proposed municipal pipe-line. It also launched a sweeping inquiry into the state of public knowledge on the subject. By that time the Business Men's Association was circulating petitions in support of the enabling act which they wished to secure from the legislature. Reporters were sent to interview the signers. When interviewed, the *Blade* reported the petitioners lacked

any clear idea of the cost; . . . where it is proposed to obtain gas, or whether it will be necessary to pipe it twenty miles or forty miles; there were as many opinions as there were persons interviewed as to the number of wells, . . . no one could give anything but a guess as to the cost of obtaining control of land or wells, . . . [or] a clear idea as to the cost of piping the streets, or what price will have to be charged to consumers.

It then called upon the city pipe-line champions to supply detailed estimates of costs, and a statement of the source and quantity of the prospective gas supply together with the number of consumers anticipated and the expected surplus that could be applied to liquidation of the bonded indebtedness. Any attempt to push the project through on the "hurrah plan" would fail, it predicted. "Its feasibility and economy must be demonstrated." This is termed the "kernel of the whole matter" and it agreed with Wm. H. Maher, the leading public opponent of the scheme, that "free gas" alone could be expected to attract few outside industries of importance to Toledo when the towns of the gas regions were offering free sites and tax exemptions.<sup>45</sup>

While Enright attempted to furnish the particulars called for by the *Blade*,<sup>46</sup> its editors made an elaborate survey of business and professional opinion on the widely discussed pipe-line project. It reported its findings in extenso, on January 14, 1888. A careful analysis of these reveals that 117 of the leaders on the produce exchange, in wholesale and retail business, in the professions, and in "other branches of trade" were opposed to the

municipal natural gas plant while only fifty favored it, eight were conditionally for it, and fifteen were listed as doubtful. Even Captain Enright conceded the fairness of the survey. Those opposing the project did so for a variety of reasons. Some felt that in honor the city could not now build a line after inviting the private companies to enter the field, others that the gas companies should first be given sufficient time to earn a return on their investment. Some feared the heavy taxes that would result if the city were bonded "for so uncertain a thing as this natural gas." Several men said pointedly, "There is no use bucking against the Standard Oil Company. . . . If anybody supposes for an instant that the Standard Oil Company would permit the city to construct a pipe-line for free gas, that person has a very limited knowledge of the extent and power of the gigantic monopoly." Thus the speculative character of the natural gas business and the hazards of entering the field in competition with the powerful Standard Oil interests were fully comprehended long before the city finally embarked upon the project. The business and professional men who favored the municipal pipe-line did so because of the prospect of cheaper fuel, or of getting "gas for nothing," because it would boom the city, or because citizens rather than the Standard Oil Company should profit from the "gas fields of the city." A prominent lawyer, A. E. Macomber, urged that the example set by cities in England and Germany in the management of gas plants justified the belief that a similar project could be managed efficiently by Toledo. There, assuming an ample supply of natural gas available, it could be supplied at cost to consumers at a saving of at least half. With no complaint to offer against the gas companies, Macomber believed that it was the city's duty to enter the business if it could assure such a saving to its citizens.<sup>47</sup>

As viewed by the *Blade*, however, the strong opposition among the business men to increasing the city's indebtedness was decisive. It urged those who favored the project otherwise to join hands with the pipe-liners and establish a consumers' company like that of Indianapolis. It argued that if Captain Enright's estimates were correct such a venture would be highly



profitable and useful to the city.<sup>48</sup> On the other hand, it gave publicity to the industries which the Toledo companies had induced to come to the city,<sup>49</sup> and opposed attempts to secure an enabling act for the municipal pipe-line from the Legislature.

As the tide of public opinion turned against them, the city pipe-line advocates transferred the struggle to Columbus where the Legislature was in session. A sub-committee of the Business Men's Association prepared an enabling bill and, without reporting it to the Association for approval, in January, 1888, secured its introduction in the House of Representatives by Charles P. Griffin, a member from Toledo. A hot contest ensued as the pipe-liners attempted to push the measure through the Legislature. The *Blade* expressed its doubts of the city's ability to finance the proposed pipe-line with the \$750,000.00 in bonds the Griffin bill authorized and demanded numerous changes in the measure. Mayor J. K. Hamilton of Toledo wrote a letter of protest to the Municipal Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives which was seconded by statements from the City Auditor and the President of the Sinking Fund Trustees. Representatives of Toledo business men and property holders presented their objections to the bill and the methods employed in its introduction, while Judge John H. Doyle pled skillfully the case of the Toledo gas companies. These, he declared, merely asked for "fair treatment" after having been invited into the city, instead of being taxed "to bring them into competition with themselves."<sup>50</sup> Despite this opposition, the amended bill passed the House of Representatives in March<sup>51</sup> only to be smothered in a committee in the Senate. The gas companies, aided by the great majority of large tax-payers and business men, had won the first contest.

During the next nine months the pipe-line agitation died away. In this interval the Northwestern and Toledo gas companies were given their first opportunity to win over their customers by tactful dealing and favorable rate adjustments. Their policy, unfortunately for all concerned, was contrary to what a sane appraisal of the situation would have demanded. Embittered, perhaps, by the previous contest and deluded by the vic-

tory at Columbus both companies continued to exhibit a lack of courtesy and consideration that developed increasing indignation among the general public.<sup>52</sup> An even greater mistake, possibly, was the failure to reduce rates to small domestic consumers to a level proportionate to those charged others, as the presidents of the two companies admitted later and then failed to carry into effect.<sup>53</sup> Meanwhile, new discoveries of gas in the Findlay field suggested that the Toledo companies would be unable to control the supply as they had claimed, while an abrupt increase of twenty-five per cent in gas rates in Pittsburgh alarmed the *Blade* and caused it to revive its agitation for a "Consumers' Pipe-Line" as a means of protecting Toledo's industries. Attempted as a "Consumers' Trust," the venture failed to attract sufficient support.<sup>54</sup>

As the next meeting of the Legislature approached, the leaders of the city pipe-line movement prepared to renew their agitation supported by a newly organized Citizens' Board of Trade. Its president, L. S. Baumgardner, was a leading pipeliner with large interests in gas leases. The Board of Directors recommended that the organization take immediate action to promote the passage of the Griffin bill now pending in the State Senate.<sup>55</sup> Just before the public meeting scheduled to receive the joint report of the three committees<sup>56</sup> to which this scheme had been referred, the influential *Toledo Blade* swung over to the support of the municipal natural gas project. In a powerful editorial of December 1, 1888, it argued that if Toledo's industries were to develop properly in the future, it was useless to rely upon the gas companies. If the city was to attract factories of the largest class, it must arrange to furnish natural gas "as cheaply as Findlay and the other towns of the gas area do" and "relieve men who are looking for locations for new plants from the fear of being placed at the mercy of the natural gas corporations" once they had become established locally. Under these circumstances, the city must either forego "the advantages she might reap from cheap gas, or she must do the work of supplying it at the public expense. . . . Cheap gas is a necessity," and the *Blade* pledged its support to the city pipe-line movement,

although it recognized frankly the dangers of excessive expense and of wasting city funds on gas leases and drilling.

Judge John H. Doyle, counsel for the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company, replied at once to the *Blade* in a public letter that widened the breach between his clients and the public. He declared that what the city needed most and had "not the slightest danger of getting" was "more of that deliberation and judgment in public affairs that successful men give to their own business." Although he went on to offer cogent reasons against the Griffin bill and any municipal venture in natural gas, they were offered in a tone that must have infuriated disinterested Toledoans. If more were needed to antagonize the city it was supplied by President D. J. Smith of the Toledo Natural Gas Company. In a heated session with the county commissioners, several weeks later, occasioned by an overcharge to the county of \$127 above the rates fixed by the City Council, Smith said, hotly,

The people of Toledo don't appreciate natural gas, and we had better pull out of here and take it to some city where they do. Detroit, for instance.

I know of \$5,000,000 of capital that would have been invested in Toledo had the council not fixed the natural gas price.<sup>57</sup>

Thereafter the breach between the city and the gas companies was virtually complete, and the conservative business element opposed to the city pipe-line was left helpless.

A well attended public meeting, held December 4, the night after the publication of Judge Doyle's letter, voted unanimously in support of the Griffin bill.<sup>58</sup> Mayor J. K. Hamilton, hitherto opposed to the measure despite the prominence of his brother-in-law in the movement, now appointed a committee at the request of some prominent citizens to investigate the feasibility of the proposal. Thenceforth, he gave his support to it, antagonized, apparently, by the strictures of Doyle and Smith.<sup>59</sup> The *Blade*, on the last day of the year, declared that "Natural Gas is King" and predicted that the Legislature, Common Council, and citizens of Toledo would devote their attention "during the entire winter" to "the problem" presented by the monopolistic

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combination between the two gas companies, both of which it asserted were "practically Standard concerns."

Conservative opposition to the admittedly imperfect Griffin bill before the Legislature was handicapped severely by the tactics of the gas companies. The State Senate sent a special committee to Toledo to investigate the question, only to report that "a large majority of the citizens of Toledo desire an opportunity to vote on the question." Despite the telegraphed protests of one hundred leading business men of the city against the bill, the Senate passed it under strong pressure from the large lobby maintained by the pipe-liners. The *Blade* declared that the battle had been fought on fair lines with ten dollars spent by the citizens interested in the project to one spent by the Standard Oil company.<sup>60</sup> Two days earlier at a mass meeting held in Memorial Hall in opposition to the Griffin bill, President Smith of the Toledo Natural Gas Company had announced that he wouldn't oppose the city if it wished "to pipe gas here. . . . We want it understood, we can take care of our business, and don't want anybody to tell us how to run it."<sup>61</sup> Doyle had said earlier that the Standard was willing that the bill should pass and a popular vote be taken on the pipe-line project, although it did not believe it would be carried. The gas companies contented themselves with securing amendments to the Griffin bill before its final passage. The chief of these provided that before the city could bond itself for a natural gas plant the venture must be approved by sixty per cent of the voters at the next general election.

The gas companies, however, were determined to defeat the Griffin bill at the city election which was scheduled for April 1, 1889, although they refused to modify their policies to conciliate the public. Instead, they complained of mistreatment by the city authorities, threatened to withdraw entirely from the city, and refused to open their books to verify the construction costs that they submitted to the Mayor's Committee. The figures that they gave, if taken at face value, must have given pause to many a propertied citizen, since each company asserted that the cost of its lines and gas properties approximated \$2,000,000,<sup>62</sup>

whereas the Griffin Act empowered the city to bond itself only to the extent of \$750,000 for its natural gas plant. Once carried in a municipal election, the Gas Trustees authorized by the measure were obliged to go ahead with the project, and of course would have to ask for more funds if the initial bond issue proved inadequate. This prospect alarmed the *Blade*, which first hedged and then entirely abandoned its support of the city pipe-line, asserting that it would cost the city at least \$2,000,000. Instead, it began to urge Toledoans to reconsider the entire question.<sup>63</sup> Then it set out to inform them of the experience of city after city with natural gas, whether supplied municipally or by private enterprise. Its reporter visited Indianapolis, Wheeling, Pittsburgh, Jamestown, New York, Bowling Green, East Liverpool, Youngstown, and Findlay, Ohio. The early exhaustion of natural gas wells, the inevitable increase in gas rates as the nearest supplies were exhausted, inability to supply factories with cheap gas for any length of time, the small results obtained by the most extravagant inducements to outside industries, and the failure of the Citizens' Trust in Indianapolis to promote a boom there were presented with great force to its readers.<sup>64</sup> The *Blade* declared flatly that the city could not afford to speculate in natural gas and that if the citizens adopted the Griffin act they would have lost their last chance to withdraw from such a hazardous enterprise.<sup>65</sup>

The detailed reports submitted by the Mayor's Natural Gas Committee left the *Blade* unmoved in its opposition to the measure. The various sub-committees submitted conflicting estimates on the cost of the pipe-line, including wells and city connections. The one controlled by ardent pipe-liners put it at \$766,923.00 including a large main line, and \$678,425.00, for a main line somewhat smaller. Another sub-committee, dominated by Wm. H. Maher, persistent foe of the project, estimated the total cost at the much higher figure of \$1,559,782.00. On the question of the duration of the gas supply, a sub-committee headed by Dr. W. W. Jones was able to quote the State Geologist against himself, showing that at one time he believed that the gas was produced by the oxidization of petroleum when reached

by the drill, while just two months previous he had written that the life of a gas well at Findlay was but three years and that the business had best be left to private enterprise. Accepting Orton's earlier views and citing other authorities, Jones reported that the gas wells would last thousands of years. A fourth sub-committee accused the existing companies of having employed "credit mobilier" methods in constructing their lines, and revealed that the Northwestern lines to all the towns and cities it supplied had been laid by the National Transit Company in return for \$2,000,000 in stock. The Toledo line of the Northwestern was estimated to have cost only \$700,000.00 and stock watering by both Toledo companies was frankly charged.<sup>66</sup> The *Blade* replied to all this by accepting Maher's estimates of costs and by attempting to expose the geological fallacy upon which estimates of the future gas supply were based.<sup>67</sup>

Then, as the election approached, the *Blade* lent vigorous support to an executive committee that was set up by five hundred and forty-eight leading business men to defeat the Griffin act at the polls. This group urged that the city's chances of refunding a large section of its municipal debt in the next four years would be jeopardized by embarking upon a natural gas project that would cost from a million and a half to two million dollars. The *Blade* also set out to expose the interested motives of the leading pipe-liners. A reporter was sent to examine the books of the county recorders in Hancock and Wood and discovered extensive holdings listed as under lease to outstanding pipe-line advocates in Toledo or assigned by them to companies in which they were interested. This, it declared, gave added meaning to the assertion of the Mayor's sub-committee that "really choice [gas] land can be obtained by the city at a reasonable figure." It opened its columns once more to the strictures of Wm. H. Maher and repeatedly sought to counteract the slogans of the pipe-line movement. Just before the election it charged that the enabling act, if adopted by the voters, would set up gas trustees in perpetuity and pave the way for a gigantic steal.<sup>68</sup>

All of this was of no avail. Unknown to the *Blade* and the Business Men's Committee, the pipe-liners had established a

secret campaign committee that completely out-generalled them. Headed by E. S. Dodd it hired halls, furnished orators, and put out effective propaganda.<sup>69</sup> It enjoyed, furthermore, the consistent and able support of the *Toledo Commercial* which favored the pipe-line as in the "best interests of the city," and charged after the election that "All the power of the Standard Oil Company . . . all the money that could be used—were industriously employed" to defeat the enabling act.<sup>70</sup> "Free gas" and "The city against the Standard Oil" were effective slogans. So were proposals to boom the town and utilize the enabling act as a club in dealing with the Standard Oil Company.<sup>71</sup>

Endorsement of the municipal pipe-line was secured from the Central Labor Union, and the strictures of the *Blade* were nullified by charges that it had been purchased by the Standard, which the *Blade* hotly denied, and by assertions that the leases it had exposed were for oil and not for gas.<sup>72</sup> In April 1889, the Griffin act received sixty-two per cent of the votes cast, a close margin though sufficient to give a clear-cut victory to the municipal pipe-line project,<sup>73</sup> despite the strenuous efforts and a last minute appeal from the Business Men's Committee.

All that remained, seemingly, was the selection of Gas Trustees, the acquisition of gas lands, and the construction of the city natural gas system. Toledo was to discover, however, that the Standard Oil Company had just begun to fight. No sooner had Governor Joseph B. Foraker appointed the Trustees from the ranks of the pipe-liners, with minority representation for the large property interests in Toledo,<sup>74</sup> than Judge John H. Doyle commenced action in *quo warranto* before the Supreme Court of Ohio to test the constitutionality of the enabling act.<sup>75</sup> At the same time, an application was made for an injunction from the United States Circuit Court of the Northern District of Ohio against the sale of the natural gas bonds on similar grounds. On June 7, 1889, Judge Howell E. Jackson heard the suit in chambers in Nashville, Tennessee. In a sweeping decision, he upheld the enabling act and the right of Toledo to use its taxing power, if necessary, to support its natural gas pipe-line.<sup>76</sup> Then, when this enabled the Gas Trustees to market \$75,000.00

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in bonds at a premium and begin the purchase of gas lands and leases, the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company, which now absorbed the Toledo Natural Gas Company, bid up prices and paid large sums in a futile attempt to prevent them from securing sufficient productive territory to commence operations.<sup>77</sup> When this failed, suit was brought by the Standard Oil Company in the Hancock County court in September for an injunction against the Toledo, Findlay and Springfield railroad to prevent it from laying its tracks across lands under oil or gas lease without consent of the lessee. If the injunction had been granted, it would have enabled the Standard to block the city pipe-line to Toledo in addition to denying access to Lake Erie to the independent oil men of the Lima field.<sup>78</sup> When the day approached for opening bids on the remainder of the pipe-line bond issue in Toledo, "a determined, vigorous and implacable" campaign was begun to prevent their sale. This was launched by an anonymous printed letter, dated at New York, mailed from Pittsburgh, and sent to leading investment agencies. Entitled "Caveat Emptor," it exploited the pending suit before the Ohio Supreme Court and the appeal from Judge Jackson's decision to attack the validity of the bonds, and went on to assail Toledo's credit, the financing of the municipal pipe-line, and the adequacy of its gas supply.<sup>79</sup> The *Toledo Commercial*, the only morning daily and long the friend of the municipal pipe-line, changed hands at this juncture and executed a back somersault in its editorial policy. Patrick C. Boyle, ex-oil scout and better known for his *Oil City* (Pa.) *Derrick*, was brought in to edit the *Commercial* "in the interest of the gas companies." At once he began a vigorous and scurrilous attack upon the city pipe-line, its sponsors, the municipal government, and the city's credit. Boyle's prejudiced editorials and articles on Toledo circulated throughout the country either through insertion in metropolitan financial journals or over the wires of the news association.<sup>80</sup> As Judge John H. Doyle wrote later:

He [Boyle] was the worst of all. I don't know what kind of journalism they had in Oil City, where he came from, but he acted as if Toledo were some wild west town and he began to ride rough-shod



over everybody who dared to oppose the gas companies or favor municipal gas ownership. The vile abuse he published in his editorial columns of everyone he deemed in opposition to the gas companies made votes for the opposition every day. If ever concerns should pray to be delivered from their friends, the gas companies were in that fix.<sup>81</sup>

The more immediate effect of the attack upon the gas bonds, however, was evident on October 9, when no outside bids materialized for the sale of the remaining \$675,000.00 of natural gas bonds.<sup>82</sup> With their funds exhausted, the Gas Trustees might well have felt themselves check-mated despite their success in securing six hundred and fifty acres of gas lands in the most promising township in the gas field.<sup>83</sup> This property was composed in part of small holdings surrounded by the lands of the Northwestern Ohio Company and had been acquired at top prices during the competitive bidding alluded to above. Although the Gas Trustees could report October 30, 1889, that their wells had a capacity of 138,000,000 cubic feet,<sup>84</sup> they had to be capped pending completion of the pipe-line to the city. Meanwhile, the Northwestern Company commenced protective drilling in its holdings adjacent to the city's wells. A long delay in the completion of the city line would, under these circumstances, be accompanied by swift depletion of its gas reserves, and if it was able to begin operations later, the operation of competing sets of wells threatened a premature exhaustion of whole districts in the Lima gas field.<sup>85</sup> Ultimately, both sides to the controversy would lose heavily, if the city completed its line, but in the meantime, all the advantages of delay inured to the subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company. Delay in construction of the city lines would also strengthen the position of the Northwestern Oil Company when it should apply for a renewal of the rate franchise from the Common Council before July 1, 1890.

The attack on Toledo's credit, meanwhile, precipitated an outburst of popular indignation that united many former opponents with the champions of the municipal pipe-line in an attempt to float the bonds and vindicate the city. A hasty canvass of local capitalists resulted in subscriptions to \$100,000 of the

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gas bonds for the continuation of the pipe-line. Then a great public meeting, called by Mayor J. K. Hamilton, was held on October 18, to arrange for the disposal of the remainder of the bonds and to reply to the attack on Toledo. It appointed committees to canvass the city for additional subscriptions and to prepare and circulate a pamphlet containing the facts on Toledo's municipal finances and on the soundness of her venture in municipal gas. The Common Council was requested, also, to send a committee to eastern financial centers to further the disposal of the gas bonds there. The resolutions appealed to the people of Ohio and the United States

to observe that the Standard Oil Company, or its agents, not content with destroying individuals, and associations which stand in the way of its monied interests, now rises to grapple with and destroy the rights of cities and states,

and asked them to "make common cause with us in the defense of the community against the aggressions of colossal power."<sup>86</sup>

Within three weeks, a committee had published *The City of Toledo and Its Natural Gas Bonds*. This able pamphlet presented Toledo's case to the investing public. Reviewing the history of the natural gas controversy in the city and of municipal gas experiments in the United States and Europe, it demonstrated beyond cavil the soundness of Toledo's financial position and presented facts and figures on the proposed municipal pipe-line and its gas supply that had been furnished by the Gas Trustees.<sup>87</sup> With this in hand, the committee of four, headed by Mayor Hamilton, was sent east by the Common Council to market the gas bonds. It found, as the Mayor reported later, that not only was "the air poisoned by hostile charges" but that the special efforts of the committee were defeated by a system of espionage that kept the "Standard people . . . informed of our movements" and by the influence which they brought to bear upon "proposed purchasers."<sup>88</sup> The third committee was no more successful in its canvass of Toledo investors, and a substitute plan for a "Natural Gas Bank" to finance the city pipe-line was equally abortive.<sup>89</sup>

Thus, by December of 1889, although the municipal pipeline had received the approval of the voters and the Gas Trustees had obtained seemingly an adequate supply of gas, attempts to finance the project had been defeated by the boycott in the money markets. Settlement of the law suits pending, including one enjoining the city from issuing the bonds already sold, was an essential condition to any further attempt to market the gas bonds, as Mayor Hamilton advised the Trustees, but one that promised indefinite delay. Meanwhile, many supporters of the project lost heart and demanded a compromise, or a manufacturer's pipe-line or some settlement of the controversy with the gas companies.<sup>90</sup>

At this juncture, Daniel O'Day, who was in charge of the Standard Oil gas interests, came to Toledo and offered a plan of settlement to the Gas Trustees and the city government after President H. S. Walbridge of the Toledo Rolling Mills had paved the way with an inspired but unofficial proposal and an offer of mediation. O'Day asked that the Common Council accept an ordinance that would fix the price of gas at twelve cents a cubic foot to domestic consumers and much lower rates to factories, all on a meter basis, for a period of not less than five years. In exchange O'Day hinted that the Standard Oil Company would be willing to buy out the city's gas lands and leases and its right of way, but he bluntly threatened to withdraw from Toledo by next July when the initial contract expired if this offer were not accepted. Despite the dilemma facing the city and strong pressure from the *Blade* to accept the Standard's proposal, it was rejected by the Trustees and Common Council, owing in part, at least, to popular opposition to introduction of gas meters and the necessary economizing on gas which Nature, supposedly, generated free in the Trenton limestone for the benefit of the gas companies.<sup>91</sup>

At this moment, when the supporters of the municipal gas plant were discouraged and without press support, Clark Waggoner took up cudgels in their behalf. Formerly editor of the *Blade*, and also of the *Commercial*, and later the best United State Collector of Internal Revenue that the Toledo district

had ever had in the estimate of ex-President Rutherford B. Hayes,<sup>92</sup> he was well known as the champion of "lost causes" in the city. Late in 1889 he had been approached by both Judge John H. Doyle<sup>93</sup> in behalf of the gas companies and by T. H. Tracy of the Gas Trustees,<sup>94</sup> each seeking his journalistic support in the bitter controversy, with a view, apparently, to the election of the next Common Council and one of the Gas Trustees on April 1, 1890.

Declining to write on the side of the question opposed to his personal convictions despite his own pecuniary embarrassments, Waggoner undertook singlehandedly a journalistic campaign in behalf of the now dormant municipal pipe-line with little prospect of financial reward.<sup>95</sup> Securing access to the columns of the *Blade*, whose editorial policy was now one of silent opposition to city Gas Trustees, Waggoner commenced the publication of a series of ninety-five letters that in ten months<sup>96</sup> reviewed the history and covered every phase of the controversy between Toledo and the Standard Oil Company. The violent personal abuse showered upon him by Patrick C. Boyle in the *Toledo Commercial* bore immediate and continuing witness to the effectiveness of Waggoner's arguments and did much to revive the popular support of the city pipe-line.<sup>97</sup> Over the signature of "C. W.," Waggoner defended the Gas Trustees from the attacks of the *Commercial* on their purchases of gas leases and gas bonds, and compared the attack upon the credit of Toledo with that which had been made by the Standard Oil Company upon the bonds and record of the Consumers Gas Trust Company of Indianapolis. He made cutting references to the earlier statements of Charles Foster and Judge Doyle that they would not oppose future competition if the city became dissatisfied with the services of the gas companies, and exposed the exorbitant price paid by the Standard for a single acre of gas land in order to acquire a well within two hundred feet of one of the city's well that was located in a seventy-acre tract leased by the Gas Trustees.<sup>98</sup> Then as the date of municipal election drew near, "C. W." asked, "Shall Toledo be the First Subjugated Municipality?" and reviewed the exposure of Stand-

ard Oil business methods made by J. F. Hudson in his *Railways and the Public*.<sup>99</sup> At the same time he charged that the *Commercial* had been bought by the Standard Oil interests to end its support of the city pipe-line and ride down all popular support of the measure by means of the libelous assaults of P. C. Boyle upon Toledoans.<sup>100</sup> Boyle was so enraged by Waggoner's attacks that he declared that the *Blade* had been bought by the pipe-liners and went on to make a sensational and libelous attack upon the Gas Trustees on the eve of the city election.<sup>101</sup> This last assault subjected him and his editorial assistant to libel suits immediately after the election.<sup>102</sup> These completed the destruction of the *Commercial's* influence in the city. Eventually it was sold to H. C. Vortriede of Toledo, who restored it to the channels of "legitimate journalism."<sup>103</sup> Meanwhile, Boyle's tactics had so alienated Toledoans that both political parties united in the re-election of the retiring Gas Trustee, Dr. W. W. Jones. Every member elected to the new Common Council was "an avowed opponent of *The Standard*" and of a "Toledo Ripper Bill" that had been introduced into the State Legislature in order to limit Toledo's control of her municipal government. Not a single Toledo daily had supported the city pipe-line during the preceding campaign, and Waggoner rightly regarded the result as a personal triumph.<sup>104</sup> He thanked Patrick C. Boyle, ironically, for the *Commercial's* assistance,<sup>105</sup> and continued his articles until early in October, exposing the obstructionist tactics behind the law suits initiated by the Standard Oil interests and their continued purchases of territory while attempting to discourage the city line with the argument that the supply was uncertain.<sup>106</sup> He also laid responsibility for the billingsgate of the *Daily Commercial* squarely upon the shoulders of Judge John H. Doyle, attorney for the gas companies and director of the Commercial Publishing Company,<sup>107</sup> and appealed to Charles Foster, President of the Northwestern Ohio Company, to protect Toledo from "the vicious methods of those employing him."<sup>108</sup> Doyle, as we have seen, did not approve of Boyle's methods.

Rallied by Clark Waggoner's stream of articles in the *Blade*,

indignant at Boyle's peculiar brand of oil region journalism, Toledo determined to complete its pipe-line and free itself from the toils of "the Standard octopus."<sup>109</sup> Popular subscriptions and the city's sinking fund took up the unsubscribed gas bonds. An occasional eastern investor purchased a block despite Boyle's abuse, after the stigma upon the bonds was removed in successive decisions against the Standard in its litigation against the city.<sup>110</sup> The line from the gas fields to Toledo was laid during the spring and summer of 1890, and part of the city was piped by a contractor who accepted gas bonds in payment. Other contractors were paid from the income from the city's gas sales, and in other cases customers advanced part of the cost. The gas was turned on late in 1891.<sup>111</sup> After two years of delay Toledo had completed its municipal pipe-line. The long delay, the endless litigation, the expensive competition for gas lands and leases with the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company, and the depreciation of the gas bonds resulting from the attack upon the city's credit had inflicted a loss upon Toledo "estimated at more than a million dollars."<sup>112</sup> Legislative authorization of \$400,000.00 more bonds for construction and to take up the floating debt incurred by the city in its support of the Gas Trustees was secured at the expense of another contest at Columbus and additional litigation.<sup>113</sup> Meanwhile, the systematic drawing off of the city's gas reserves through the wells of the Northwestern Ohio Company had helped to reduce the pressure in the city's main to a point where it found it difficult to supply both manufacturers and domestic consumers.<sup>114</sup> The installation of a pumping station in 1892, after additional litigation, and the acquisition of more gas territory enabled the city to supply domestic consumers. Sabotage of the line from a giant well during the first winter of the municipal plant's operation, and suspension of service by the private company to municipal institutions before the city's line was completed were but belated incidents in the attempt to prevent its satisfactory operation. By December 31, 1893, the Gas Trustees reported that they owned 5,433 acres of gas lands, with eighty-five wells, seventy-three miles of pipe outside and ninety-one miles within

the city at a total cost of \$1,150,000. Its revenues to date had enabled it to meet operating expenses, absorb \$67,000.00 advanced for piping the streets, and pay \$60,000 into the sinking fund, while charging ten cents a cubic foot less for gas than charged by the Northwestern Ohio Company to domestic consumers.<sup>115</sup>

The victory of Toledo in its long and bitter contest with the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company and its Standard Oil owners was destined, however, to be short lived. Beginning in 1896, failure of the gas supply in the Findlay field, precipitated undoubtedly by competitive drilling and wasteful consumption, soon affected the operations of the Gas Trustees and their competitors. A new supply developed in Ottawa County enabled the municipal plant to meet its requirements for an additional year, but when this failed the city authorities declined to spend the large sums required for the location and development of other and more distant fields. With a dwindling supply, the municipal plant lost nearly all of its customers. Finally, in 1899, the city sold its outside pipe-lines for junk and leased its city lines for the insufficient sum of \$6,500 a year to the Toledo Gas-Light and Coke Company.<sup>116</sup> At no time during its operation had the municipal plant been able to offer "free gas" to manufacturers or to "boom the town," nor had it been able to avoid increasing its rates year by year, although it kept them beneath the level charged by the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company.<sup>117</sup> Substantial savings accrued to the customers of the municipal plant as long as it was able to supply them, and for a short period the Toledoans were able to enjoy the satisfaction of having defeated the most hated and feared "trust" of the day. However, an expert accountant, in 1919, estimated that the total loss to the city, including interest paid on gas bonds liquidated by the city and still outstanding, resulting from its venture into the speculative field of natural gas was in the neighborhood of \$2,000,000.<sup>118</sup> This, and the creation of a popular anti-monopoly party that was later rallied by S. M. Jones and Brand Whitlock, were the more enduring results of pipeline controversy in Toledo.

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Failure of the Toledo experiment left the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company in sole possession of the field. In 1891, the Standard Oil interests changed its management for the better, sending Martin B. Daly from Buffalo to take charge and heal the breach between the public and the Company. In this he was entirely successful,<sup>119</sup> aided no doubt by the return of Patrick C. Boyle to Oil City, Pennsylvania, where his *Derrick* was for years to come an outstanding champion of the Standard Oil viewpoint on the petroleum business and the advantages of large-scale corporate organization. As a result, when the Northwestern's gas supply also failed, it retained its Toledo market despite having to shift from one to another Ohio field and finally to lay lines in 1902, to West Virginia from which it secured gas for Toledo during the next two decades.<sup>120</sup> Ultimately the Standard Oil interests disposed of their holdings in the company.

### NOTES

1. *John D. Rockefeller Papers, Conversations with Inglis* (courtesy John D. Rockefeller, Jr.), pp. 1166D-E, M. B. Daly, President of the East Ohio Gas Company, to William O. Inglis, December 2, 1918. Miss Ida Tarbell in her history of the Standard Oil makes no mention of the Toledo gas controversy. John D. Rockefeller told Mr. Inglis that the Standard Oil was joined by outsiders in its Toledo investments; and that he personally had nothing whatever to do with the affairs of the Toledo companies. No evidence that he had has ever been presented. See Allen Nevins, *John D. Rockefeller, The Heroic Age of American Business*, New York, 1940, II, 336.
2. Brand Whitlock, *Forty Years of It* (New York, 1914), 133, 177, for other reasons.
3. A. R. Crum and A. S. Dugan, *Romance of American Petroleum and Gas* (American Petroleum & Gas Co., New York, 1911), I, 42-44.
4. Russell S. McClure, "The Natural Gas Era in Northwestern Ohio," in *The Historical Society of Northwestern Ohio: Quarterly Bulletin*, XIV, 83-105. This gives the story, here briefly outlined.
5. John Adams Bownocker, "The Occurrence and Exploitation of Petroleum and Natural Gas in Ohio," *Geological Survey of Ohio, Fourth Series, Bulletin No. 1* (Columbus, 1903), 34-35; McClure, *op. cit.*, 88-89.
6. Edward Orton, *First Annual Report of the Geological Survey of Ohio, (Third Organization)* (Columbus, 1890), v; Bownocker, *op. cit.*, 36.
7. Bownocker, *op. cit.*, 35-36; Edward Orton, "The Trenton Limestone as a Source of Oil and Gas in Ohio," *Ohio Geological Survey*, VI (Columbus, 1888), 141-150; Orton, *First Annual Report*, 113-16.
8. McClure, *op. cit.*, 92-97; Bownocker, *op. cit.*, 38-39, 44-45.
9. Orton, "Trenton Limestone," *op. cit.*, 155, 306.
10. Ex-President Rutherford B. Hayes, writing at Fremont, April 18, 1887,



observed: "Business is daily more and more active. This is especially true of the newly discovered oil and gas region near here in the counties next west of us. We shall share to a *limited extent* in this new prosperity. We find here gas enough for domestic fuel and lighting. It is a great comfort." C. R. Williams, (ed.), *Diary and Letters of Rutherford B. Hayes*, IV (Columbus, 1925), 230.

11. Orton, "Trenton Limestone," *op. cit.*, 307.
12. *Toledo Blade*, December 20, 1889; May 1, 1890.
13. Bownocker, *op. cit.*, 35. See map in McClure, *op. cit.*, 90.
14. Orton, "Trenton Limestone," *op. cit.*, 208-09.
15. *Ibid.*, 208.
16. *Toledo Blade*, January 13, 1888, "Merchant" to Editor.
17. *Ibid.*, November 2, 1887, speech by Judge Doyle; *Ibid.*, February 7, 1889; *Ibid.*, January 13, 1888, letter from "Merchant"; *Rockefeller Papers, Conversations with Inglis*, p. 1166L.
18. John M. Killits, (ed.), *Toledo and Lucas County, Ohio*, I (Chicago, 1923), 574-75. Judge Doyle, some years later, said "It is true that the Standard Oil interests owned a majority of the stock of the Toledo Company as well as the Northwestern Company. The Toledo brought its pipe lines to Toledo and commenced furnishing gas in the territory set apart to it." It is not clear whether the Standard Oil interests controlled this second company from the beginning. If they did, they preferred obviously that the citizens of Toledo should think they were going to enjoy the benefits of competition between the two companies, whatever they might be. *Rockefeller Papers, Conversations with Inglis*, pp. 1166L-M, statement by ex-Judge John H. Doyle, made at Toledo, January 24, 1919.
19. Bownocker, *op. cit.*, 45.
20. Killits, *op. cit.*, 574-75.
21. *Toledo Blade*, May 27, June 13, 1890, "C. W." (Clark Waggoner) to the Editor.
22. *Rockefeller Papers, Conversations with Inglis*, pp. 1166L-M, statement of Doyle.
23. The National Transit Company was the Standard Oil pipe-line subsidiary that laid the pipe-line of the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company to Toledo. O'Day's statement was made in a meeting between the Mayor's committee investigating the natural gas question and the representatives of the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company. *Toledo Blade*, February 7, 1889.
24. *Toledo Blade*, February 8, 1890, "C. W." to editor: The ordinance, however, specified that no "exclusive rights or privileges" were thereby granted that would "prevent any other company from furnishing natural gas" to the city. Quoted in Henry D. Lloyd, *Wealth Against Commonwealth* (1894), 317.
25. *Toledo Blade*, September 8, 1887, Address by Rutherford B. Hayes.
26. *Rutherford B. Hayes Papers* (Hayes Memorial, Fremont, Ohio), Edward Orton to Rutherford B. Hayes, September 2, 1887.
27. *Toledo Blade*, September 8, 1887.
28. *Ibid.*, December 31, 1888, "Natural Gas is King"; Orton, *First Annual Report*, 144-46.
29. Bownocker, *op. cit.*, 39-40; *Rockefeller Papers, Conversations with Inglis*, pp. 1166A-C, M. B. Daly to Wm. O. Inglis; *ibid.*, pp. 1166L-N, statement of Judge Doyle.
30. Orton, *First Annual Report*, 144.

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31. *Toledo Blade*, October 18, 1889, F. J. Scott to Editor. Scott at this time was a leader in the movement against the Standard Oil interests, but said frankly that in the beginning of the controversy he had felt that Toledo had done the gas companies an injustice, and "may have treated them churlishly."
32. *Rockefeller Papers, Conversations with Inglis*, p. 1166N, statement of Judge Doyle.
33. *Ibid.*, statements of Doyle, interview with Martin B. Daly, and letter from Daly, December 3, 1918, pp. 1166B-C, G-H, and N-O. Also statement of Mayor J. K. Hamilton, in a meeting with representatives of the gas companies early in 1889, reprinted in *Toledo Blade*, May 10, 1890.
34. *Toledo Blade*, October 27, 1887.
35. *Rockefeller Papers, Conversations with Inglis*, pp. 1166M-N, statement of Doyle.
36. *Toledo Blade*, October 27, 1887.
37. *Ibid.*, November 2, 1887.
38. *Ibid.*, October 27, 1887.
39. *Ibid.*, November 2, 1887.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, November 23, 1887.
42. Bownocker, *op. cit.*, 41.
43. *Toledo Blade*, November 26, 1887.
44. *Ibid.*, November 25, 1887; January 12, 23, 1888. Enright expressly denied holding any gas land or leases, or any urban real estate of sufficient size for industrial purposes, or any personal ambitions or interest in the promotion of a boom.
45. *Ibid.*, January 12, 13, 14, 1888.
46. *Ibid.*, January 13, 16, 1888. Enright concluded his estimates by the declaration that the city could acquire gas lands, lay the pipe-line, and pipe its streets for a total cost not exceeding \$750,000.00.
47. *Ibid.*, January 14, 1888.
48. January 16, 1888.
49. February 23, 1888. These were the "Cochran mill works, the Libby glass works, the McLean glass works, and several minor enterprises."
50. *Toledo Blade*, January 18, 23, 24, 27, 31, 1888.
51. *Ibid.*, March 7, 9, 1888.
52. *Supra* pp. 83-84.
53. *Toledo Blade*, May 10, 1890.
54. *Ibid.*, April 12, December 1, 3, 1888.
55. *Ibid.*, December 4, 1888.
56. Natural Gas, Manufactures and Legislation.
57. *Toledo Blade*, December 3, 19, 1888.
58. *Ibid.*, December 4, 1888.
59. Doyle could not understand why the Mayor changed his position on the municipal pipe-line question. *Rockefeller Papers, Conversations with Inglis*, pp. 1166N-Q.
60. *Toledo Blade*, January 17, 18, 1889.
61. *Ibid.*, April 22, 1890, "C. W." to the Editor.
62. *Ibid.*, February 7, 9, 1889; May 10, 1890. Mayor Hamilton told Daniel O'Day, Governor Foster, and Judge Doyle in a meeting between them and the Mayor's Committee, that unless the companies altered their policies the Griffin act would be adopted at the coming election.
63. *Ibid.*, February 8, 11, 1889.

64. February 21, 23, 28; March 2, 5, 7, 16, 1889.
65. March 12, 18, 29, 1889.
66. March 20, 1889.
67. March 21, 1889.
68. March 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 1889.
69. *Ibid.*, April 5, 1889.
70. Quoted by "C. W." from the *Toledo Commercial*, April 2, 1889, in *Toledo Blade*, April 3, 1890. No file of the *Commercial* for 1889 has been found.
71. *Toledo Blade*, March 25, 28, 1889.
72. *Ibid.*, March 16, 28, 30, 1889.
73. *Ibid.*, April 2, 1889. The *Blade* asserted that in some wards the regular Republican ticket was "openly traded to secure votes for the pipe-line!" The *Blade* announced, however, that it would not oppose the verdict at the polls.
74. Clarence Brown, Thomas H. Tracey, John E. Parsons, Abner L. Backus, W. W. Jones, two lawyers, an insurance agent, a retired merchant, and a physician, all of whom were to serve without pay. *Toledo Blade*, April 12, 13, 1889.
75. *Rockefeller Papers, Conversations with Inglis*, pp. 1166 O-P, statement of Doyle; State *ex rel. v. City of Toledo*, 48 *Ohio State Reports* 112-42.
76. *Fellows et al. v. Walker, Auditor, et al.*, 39 *Federal Reporter* 651-54 (St. Paul, 1889); Orton, *First Annual Report*, 148.
77. *Ibid.*, 137.
78. *Toledo Blade*, September 28, 1889.
79. Annual Report of Mayor Hamilton, April 27, 1890; *Toledo Blade*, April 28, 1890; Editorial, "An Anonymous Letter," of the *Detroit Free Press*, reprinted in *Toledo Blade*, October 5, 1889. Described in detail in Lloyd, *op. cit.*, 328-30.
80. *Toledo Blade*, October 7, 1889; Annual report of Mayor Hamilton, *Toledo Blade*, April 28, 1890; Lloyd, *op. cit.*, 317-18.
81. *Rockefeller Papers, Conversations with Inglis*, pp. 1166 O-N, statement of Judge Doyle. Clark Waggoner of Toledo, prominent Republican and former editor of the *Blade*, asserted that he had been asked to undertake the journalistic defense of the gas companies by a "prominent representative" of the Standard Oil Company. Clark Waggoner to R. B. Hayes, April 9, 1890, *Waggoner Papers*, Letterbook VIII (Toledo Public Library), pp. 306-07.
82. *Toledo Blade*, September 30, 1889.
83. Orton, *First Annual Report*, 148-49; *Toledo Blade*, October 30, 1889.
84. Orton, *First Annual Report*, 137, 142-43.
85. *Toledo Blade*, October 10, 1889.
86. *Ibid.*, October 9, 12, 18, 19, 21, 1889; *The City of Toledo and its Natural Gas Bonds* [Toledo, 1889], 32, 33-36; Orton, *First Annual Report*, 151.
87. Prepared largely by A. E. Macomber, Attorney, in collaboration with Frank J. Scott, a former opponent of the city pipe-line, and David Robison, Jr. This rare pamphlet is an important source of information on the pipe-line controversy.
88. Report of Mayor Hamilton, *Toledo Blade*, April 28, 1890.
89. *Toledo Blade*, December 12, 1889.
90. *Ibid.*, December 12, 31, 1889, "The Perfect Fuel."
91. *Rockefeller Papers, Conversations with Inglis*, pp. 1166A-B, Martin B. Daly to Wm. O. Inglis, December 2, 1918, and *ibid.*, pp. 1166 P-Q, statement of Doyle; *Toledo Blade*, December 28, 1889. Walbridge's unofficial proposal had

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included the offer to reimburse the city entirely for its expenditures on its pipe-line project and a pledge to extend the new low rates for as long as an adequate supply could be secured in Wood and Hancock counties. *Ibid.*, December 18, 1889. Standard officials later thought that such a contract would have entailed heavy loss to the gas companies in view of the early exhaustion of the Lima field. It may be doubted, however, if exhaustion of the gas deposits there would have come so rapidly had competitive drilling stopped and the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas reverted to its earlier policy of conserving the supply by proper spacing of its wells and other measures.

92. Williams, *Diary and Letters of Rutherford B. Hayes*, IV, 455-56.
93. C. Waggonner to John H. Doyle, November 1, 1889, Scrapbook VIII, *Clark Waggonner Papers*; *Ibid.*, Letterbook VIII, pp. 306-07, C. Waggonner to R. B. Hayes, April 9, 1890.
94. *Ibid.*, Letterbook VIII, p. 161, Clark Waggonner to T. H. Tracy, October 5, 1889.
95. *Ibid.*, Letterbook VIII, p. 306-07, Waggonner to R. B. Hayes, April 9, 1890. Waggonner said that he had little personal interest in the pipe-line question, but that his neighbors had and that was reason enough for him. *Ibid.*, Letterbook VIII, p. 275, Waggonner to G. H. Hartupel, January 31, 1890; Letterbook VIII, pp. 277-78, C. Waggonner to his son, Ralph H. Waggonner, February 8, 1890. Waggonner apparently expected no pecuniary return from the discouraged pipe-liners, when he began, although he may have thought that he might improve his prospects of being restored to the collectorship of the Toledo district if he were successful. Later, the friends of the city pipe-line paid him \$350.00 which he tried in vain to treat as a loan. *Ibid.*, Letterbook VIII, pp. 369, 393, C. Waggonner to A. E. Macomber, July 14, 1890; memorandum dated October 21, 1890.
96. *Ibid.*, Letterbook IX, p. 69, memorandum entitled "95 Pipe-Line Articles" by C. W. in *Toledo Blade*, January 4 to October 4, 1890.
97. See *Toledo Commercial*, February 2, March 2, 4, 5, April 10, 1890, for libelous cartoons of "C.W."; clippings in *Waggonner Papers*, Scrapbook VIII; and Waggonner's letters to his son Ralph for the public effect of the *Commercial's* abuse in reviving the popularity of the municipal gas experiment, *ibid.*, Letterbook VIII, pp. 269-70, 272-73, 277-78.
98. *Toledo Blade*, February 6, 8, 13, March 10, 18, May 27, June 13, 1890.
99. *Ibid.*, March 28, April 1, 1890. See Hudson, *op. cit.*, Ch. III, "The History of a Commercial Crime" which was circulated in Toledo as a campaign document.
100. *Toledo Blade*, March 20, April 3, 1890.
101. *Ibid.*, April 12, 1890; *Toledo Daily Commercial*, March 25, 1890, clipping in *Waggonner Papers*, Scrapbook IV. See also the attacks on the Gas Trustees in the only number available in the Toledo Public Library, *Toledo Daily Commercial*, February 28, 1890.
102. *Waggonner Papers*, Letterbook VIII, p. 315, C. Waggonner to R. H. Waggonner, April 16, 1890; *ibid.*, Scrapbook IV, clipping from *Toledo Daily Commercial*, April 17, 1890.
103. *Ibid.*, Letterbook IX, p. 170, C. Waggonner to H. C. Vortriede, August 27, 1892.
104. *Ibid.*, Letterbook VIII, pp. 301, 303, 304-5, C. Waggonner to Senator John Sherman, April 4, 1890, C. W. to J. F. Hudson, April 18, 1890, C. W. to Ralph H. Waggonner, April 8, 1890.

105. *Ibid.*, Letterbook VIII, pp. 308-9, C. W. to P. C. Boyle, President, Toledo Commercial Company, April 14, 1890: "I deem it due to truth here to say, that no Toledo paper did as much toward consolidating the people of the city in emphatic protest against the Standard Oil monopoly and outrage, as did the *Commercial* under your special direction."
106. *Toledo Blade*, June 13, May 6, 1890.
107. *Ibid.*, May 6, 8, 1890. In this article "C.W." quoted the terms, "Snot Rag," "Bladder," that the *Commercial* was applying to the *Blade*, and the vitriolic attack upon one of the most prominent newspapers of Ohio, probably the *Dayton Journal*, and its editor: "That aged, sedulous addlepatte, the monkey-eyed, monkey-browed monogram sarcasm, and spider-shanked, pigeon-witted public scold, Majah Bilgewater Bickham, and his back-biting, black-mailing, patent medicine directory, the *Journal*."
108. *Ibid.*, June 13, 1890.
109. *Ibid.*, April 27, 1890, Mayor H. K. Hamilton's annual report to the Common Council, and *ibid.*, June 6, 1890, "C.W." to Editor.
110. *Ibid.*, May 6, 1890, "C.W." to Editor. State *ex rel v.* City of Toledo, 48 *Ohio State Reports* 112-42, decided in favor of Toledo on Feb. 24, 1891; Lloyd, *op. cit.*, 315.
111. Lloyd, *op. cit.*, 359; Killits, *op. cit.*, I, 464-65.
112. Bownocker, *op. cit.*, 42.
113. Killits, *op. cit.*, I, 464; Lloyd, *op. cit.*, 354-56.
114. Some of the decline in gas capacity of the city's properties may have been the result of unloading of supposedly "high pressure" wells upon the Gas Trustees by Toledo speculators (Bownocker, *op. cit.*, 41-42) and some of it was probably due to the inevitable decline in capacity as the wells flowed into the city pipe-line.
115. Bownocker, *op. cit.*, 42; Lloyd, *op. cit.*, 358-59; Report of the Gas Trustees summarized in Lloyd, *op. cit.*, 367-68, note.
116. Killits, *op. cit.*, I, 465; Bownocker, *op. cit.*, 42-44. \$100,000 only of the revenues of the municipal natural gas plant were applied to the extinction of the bonded debt, the remainder going to maintenance and the extension of its gas lands and pipe-lines.
117. Lloyd, *op. cit.*, 361, 367-68, note; *Rockefeller Papers, Conversations with Inglis*, pp. 1166A-B, M. B. Daly to Wm. O. Inglis, December 2, 1918.
118. Killits, *op. cit.*, I, 465. Henry D. Lloyd contended that the city saved more than its investment in its municipal plant from the lower rates secured from the Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Company, *op. cit.*, 362.
119. *Rockefeller Papers, Conversations with Inglis*, pp. 1166C-E, M. B. Daly to Wm. O. Inglis, December 2, 1918.
120. Killits, *op. cit.*, 575; Judge John H. Doyle in later years felt that the Northwestern Ohio Company would have been ruined by this early exhaustion of the Lima field had Toledo accepted the generous five year ordinance proposed to the city in settlement of the pipe-line controversy in December 1889. *Rockefeller Papers, Conversations with Inglis*, pp. 1166O-P, statement of Judge John H. Doyle, January 24, 1919. Compare *supra*, note 91.