

Northwest Ohio Quarterly

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Toledo and Fort Miami

OUR general interest in the site of Fort Miami, located on the west bank of the Maumee River in Lucas County, within the corporate limits of the Village of Maumee, goes back at least two generations. In the 1880's a movement was commenced by citizens of Maumee Valley which foreshadowed the activities of the present vigorous Maumee Scenic and Historic Highway Association. At that time it was thought that solution lay in federal development of this and the other historic sites of northwestern Ohio. Surveys of these sites were made by U. S. Army engineers, pursuant to legislation sponsored by Jacob Romeis of Toledo. The survey of Fort Miami in 1888 is reproduced in this issue. Nothing came of this movement, however, and little was apparently done to reclaim the site from the pastoral scenes pictured in the illustrated section of this issue until the first World War. This movement subsided under the inflated realty prices of the times. The active story, the beginning of the movement which finally saved the site for posterity, commences with the organization of the Maumee River Scenic and Historic Highway Association in 1939. The details of this fight are given in the October, 1942, issue of our QUARTERLY, and can only be summarized here.

The following names appear in the forefront:

The organizers of the Maumee River group, Mr. Ralph Peters, of the *Defiance Crescent-News*, Mr. S. A. Canary of the *Bowling Green Sentinel-Tribune*, Mr. Robert Hanna of Fort Wayne, Indiana, and Mr. Charles E. Hatch of the City and County Planning Commission were the sinews, so-to-speak.

Mr. Charles E. Hatch discovered that the site had been posted as security for a note, and was among the assets of a closed bank, which liquidators wanted sold to a private individual to cancel the note. He was always, from the time he learned this, in the thick of the fight.

The Honorable James A. Martin, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, in charge of bank liquidation matters, proved to be the key man by transferring the business to the State Banking Department and endeavoring to have the property retained for a public memorial but in such manner that the bank's depositors would be fully protected.


The Chamber of Commerce, through Mr. Stanley Grove, advanced \$300 as an option on the purchase of the site, and a person who desires to be anonymous later advanced \$100 more toward the purchase. This delayed action fifteen months, while a campaign for funds was worked up. The campaign did not receive support from the public generally.

Then the Ursula Wolcott Chapter, D.A.R., provided the final key to the solution by donating a little over \$4,000 toward the purchase of the site. The County Commissioners furnished most of the remaining \$16,000 (less the \$400 option money) by an appropriation of \$8,000 and the cancellation of taxes. The Toledo Metropolitan Park Board provided the balance of \$1,620.53. The site was acquired August 11, 1942.

The Toledo Metropolitan Park Board, realizing that it could do little planning for the restoration of the old fort without well authenticated facts, passed a resolution which reads in part as follows:

... that The Historical Society of Northwestern Ohio be, and it hereby is, requested to undertake such research as may be necessary for the preparation of a history of Old Fort Miami, and, in association with the Ursula Wolcott Chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution and such other organizations and individuals as the Society may think helpful, to prepare for submission to and the approval of this Board, a suggested plan for the future development of Old Fort Miami and a park to surround it.

Our Trustees on October 16, 1942 passed a resolution authorizing the Committee on Fort Miami, which was appointed on that day. This issue of the NORTHWEST OHIO QUARTERLY is the result of the work of our committee. They do not claim that every shred of evidence has been discovered. The Committee believes however that the facts set forth in its report furnish a good basis upon which the larger committee mentioned in the above resolution, can commence its work. Some idea of the problem can be gained by reading Mr. Spitzer's sketch in this issue.



PRESIDENT

*Historical Society of
Northwestern Ohio*



VIEW FROM THE SITE OF FORT MIAMI ACROSS THE MAUMEE RIVER LOOKING TOWARD PERRYSBURG. TAKEN 1942. Picture by courtesy of Dr. Leonard Nippe of Toledo.

Fort Miamis, Outpost of Empire

F. CLEVER BALD

I

ON APRIL 8, 1794,¹ a ship from Detroit entered the mouth of the Maumee River, then called the Miamis* of the Lakes. A group of British officials and a working party were on board. The leader was Colonel John Graves Simcoe, lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada. With him were Colonel Alexander McKee and his son, Captain Thomas McKee, Captain Matthew Elliot, and Lieutenant Prideaux Selby, all of the British Indian Department, and Lieutenant Robert Pilkington of the Royal Engineers.²

Colonel Simcoe had been ordered by Lord Dorchester, governor-general of Canada, to build a fort on the Miamis River.³ Disembarking with his suite, he set out to discover the most strategic position. Colonel McKee, deputy-superintendent of the Indian Department, knew the Miamis region well. He had a trading post at the foot of the rapids, about twelve and one-half miles from the bay, on the right bank of the river. There he was accustomed to meet the Indians to distribute presents from the British government.⁴

McKee's establishment was near the ruins of a British fort that had been built in 1781, as an outpost to defend Detroit.⁵ After the Treaty of Paris, 1783, it had fallen into decay. Perhaps McKee led Colonel Simcoe to this site as a proper place to erect the new fort. Whether he did or not, Simcoe, on April 10, chose a spot on the left bank of the river and about one and three-quarters miles nearer the bay.⁶ Here the lieutenant-governor and Lieutenant Pilkington traced the outline of the projected fortification and set men to work felling trees and digging entrenchments.

A few days later, the snow *Ottawa*, commanded by Captain David Cowan, landed three companies of the Twenty-fourth Infantry and a detachment of the Royal Artillery from Detroit.⁷

* Fort Miamis is the proper name, used in all the documents of that period.

Captain Robert Stiell was in command of the whole force; Lieutenant James Adye, of the artillery.⁸ The soldiers pitched their tents near the river. They remained to guard the encampment and to augment the working party.

Governor Simcoe sailed for Niagara aboard the *Ottawa* on April 18. At Turtle Island in Maumee Bay, he stopped to send to Lieutenant Colonel Richard England, commandant at Detroit, instructions for reinforcing the troops at the new post. One hundred twenty rank and file of the Twenty-fourth with the proper complement of sergeants and officers, and ten privates of the Royal Artillery with one non-commissioned officer were to be sent to the Miamis River. The Governor ordered that a corporal's guard be placed at Roche de Bout, and that posts be established on Turtle Island in Maumee Bay and at the settlement on the Riviere aux Raisins.⁹ Besides, he directed Colonel England to send four nine-pounders and four six-pounders for the defense of the new fort.¹⁰

What was the reason for Lord Dorchester's orders to Governor Simcoe and for the latter's orders to Colonel England? Why all this warlike activity of the British in the western wilderness, on land which had been ceded to the United States in 1783? The answer, in one word, was—Wayne.

General Anthony Wayne, commanding the Legion of the United States, was at Fort Greenville.¹¹ More than one hundred miles of wilderness lay between him and the new post on the Miamis River; but during the fall of the previous year, he had advanced from Fort Washington, at Cincinnati; and he was waiting only for reinforcements and for favorable weather to resume his march northward.

General Wayne had been named by President Washington to command the force that should penetrate to the heart of the Indian country to punish the savages for their continual attacks on frontier settlers, and to wipe out the disgrace of the annihilation of St. Clair's army in 1791. In spite of some sharp criticism of his choice of a commander, the President was confident that Wayne was the most competent officer available for the difficult assignment.¹²

At Pittsburgh, in 1792, Wayne began to discipline his recruits

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for warfare in the wilderness. Thought by many to be too reckless for this task, and likely by his rashness to involve the nation in a war with Great Britain, Mad Anthony, this time, was a model of patience. Drilling his men unceasingly, he moved down the Ohio River by degrees, reaching Fort Washington in the spring of 1793. There he received orders to await the outcome of negotiations with the Indians, which, it was hoped in Philadelphia, would make a campaign unnecessary.

Although he was exasperated by the delay, Wayne continued to perfect his men in military tactics, literally whipping them into shape as a first class fighting force.¹³ The Commander in Chief, unable to move forward with his troops, strengthened Forts Hamilton, St. Clair, and Jefferson which reached about seventy miles north from Cincinnati into the Indian country.

Finally, in the fall of 1793, after having received news of the failure of the negotiations with the Indians, Wayne ordered his troops forward. A month after leaving Cincinnati, he had reached the end of the road, six miles beyond Fort Jefferson. It was November. The season was too late for a successful campaign. Consequently, Wayne decided to go into winter quarters. There in the midst of a broad prairie, the soldiers built log huts and surrounded them with a stockade and a ditch. This was Fort Greenville, an advanced base for operations to be started in the spring of 1794.¹⁴

In this position, Wayne could threaten both the Indian villages at the head of the Miamis and those at the confluence of the Miamis and the Au Glaize. The British feared that he was aiming at Detroit, their most important post in the West.¹⁵

Although some Americans opposed the appointment of Wayne as commander of the western army, the British had great respect for his ability. George Hammond, His Majesty's minister at Philadelphia, thus characterized him in a letter to Governor Simcoe: "General Wayne is unquestionably the most active, vigilant, and enterprising Officer in the American Service, and will be tempted to use every exertion to justify the expectations of his countrymen & to efface the Stain which the late defeat has cast upon the American Arms."¹⁶

The British minister feared that Wayne's "rashness" might

lead him to attempt to take the frontier posts even without orders, because the American people were very eager to have them.¹⁷

II

Although the treaty signed at Paris in 1783 by plenipotentiaries of the United States and Great Britain provided that the western posts on American soil be evacuated "with all convenient speed," and although the government of the United States repeatedly requested the British to withdraw, the posts were retained. His Majesty's troops continued to occupy Forts Ontario, Haldimand, Niagara, Detroit, and Mackinac. In 1791, George Hammond arrived as the first British minister to the United States, with instructions to discuss the settlement of problems arising from the terms of peace which had not been carried into effect.

The principal questions remaining to be settled were the evacuation of the posts by the British, and the payment of pre-war debts by Americans to their British creditors. It had been agreed in the treaty of 1783 that "creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted." Nevertheless, the states passed acts hostile to British creditors, which the Congress of the Confederation was unable to prevent.

This situation gave the British an excuse for holding the posts. The real reason, however, was the desire of London and Montreal merchants to retain the valuable fur trade which was based largely on Mackinac and Detroit. Half of the furs were collected in the region south of the Great Lakes.¹⁸ In numerous petitions, they urged the government to keep the posts; or, if they were to be relinquished, to give the merchants time to obtain a return on the trade goods which they had sent into the Indian country.

Besides, the officials in Canada feared to inform the Indians in American territory that the King had ceded their lands to the United States. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix, in 1768, had recognized as Indian territory the region north of the Ohio River.¹⁹ Now the Canadian officials bent all their efforts to retain, in

some manner, this land for their savage wards. Specifically, they desired to make of this area an Indian barrier state which would belong neither to Great Britain nor to the United States. Actually, however, they expected it to become eventually British.²⁰

With this idea in mind, Governor Simcoe and George Hammond asked that the British be permitted to mediate between the Americans and the Indians. When their request was denied, they demanded permission to attend, as advisers to the savages, any peace negotiations.

In order to offer united resistance to the westward movement of the Americans, Joseph Brant, the Mohawk chief, organized a loose confederacy of the tribes in the Old Northwest.²¹ This combination repudiated the several treaties which the United States had made with the Indians between 1783 and 1789, on the ground that not all of the tribes had given their consent. By these treaties, the United States claimed the eastern one-third and the southern two-thirds of the present state of Ohio. The Indian confederacy, however, maintained that the native title was clear to all lands north of the Ohio River.²²

The British officials encouraged and supported the Indians in their stand. Governor Simcoe, Sir John Johnson, superintendent of the Indian Department, and Colonel Alexander McKee, deputy-superintendent, used all their influence to strengthen the resolution of the savages. McKee, a loyalist who had fled from western Pennsylvania at the outbreak of the Revolution, was a bitter enemy of the Americans. During the war, he had led forays against the frontier settlements; now he exerted all his energies to keep the Indians united in opposition to any further encroachments of the Americans.

Simcoe, who had been in command of the Queen's Rangers during the Revolutionary War, also was hostile to the Americans. He was alarmed by the threat to British domination of the Indians by "this persevering, rapacious and ambitious People."²³ Besides, he had little hope for success in negotiations with American officials "until Messrs. Washington, Jefferson and Hamilton have lost direction of the affairs of the Confederation. . . ."²⁴ Simcoe had a poor opinion of the talents and the integrity of George Washington. In his estimation, the principal

characteristics of the President were avarice and vanity. The Governor believed that Britain's only hope of maintaining control of the West lay in trying to dissolve the Union.²⁵

In spite of Simcoe's captious estimate of these men, they were honestly trying to establish peace with the western Indians. The President's order to General Wayne to cease operations, which has been mentioned, was meant to facilitate the making of a general treaty. Washington sent Benjamin Lincoln, Timothy Pickering, and Beverley Randolph as commissioners to treat with the savages. These men were known to be favorably disposed toward Great Britain. They carried instructions to obtain confirmation by all the western tribes of the Treaty of Fort Harmar, which had been accepted by some of them in 1789. This treaty left to the Indians only about the north-western third of Ohio. The commissioners were authorized to offer additional annuities and the abandonment of military and trading posts beyond the treaty line.²⁶

Governor Simcoe opposed a conference, fearing lest the Indians accept the terms of the Americans. Consequently, he detained the commissioners for six weeks at Niagara, during the early summer of 1793, while Colonel McKee, at the rapids of the Miamis, worked assiduously to unite the Indians in opposition to the American plan. Finally, the commissioners were taken to the mouth of the Detroit River. There on July 31, a delegation of chiefs led by Matthew Elliot, McKee's deputy, met them and announced that the tribes would recognize no American claims to land north of the Ohio River. This being the case, there was nothing for the commissioners to do but return home.²⁷

III

Wayne's advance northward during the fall of 1793 and his building Fort Greenville worried Lieutenant Colonel Richard England, commandant at Detroit. He believed that the American general would move against his post in the spring. Consequently, he wrote to Lord Dorchester warning him that Wayne intended "to close us up at Detroit."²⁸

Lord Dorchester was expecting war with the Americans in the near future. To a delegation of visiting chiefs, on February

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10, 1794, he expressed that opinion, and added that the warriors could then establish the boundary line they desired.²⁹ The savages, of course, were pleased and encouraged by the expectation of having the open support of the British against their enemies.

Since he believed that hostilities were inevitable, Lord Dorchester, with Colonel England's plea for protection in mind, ordered Governor Simcoe to take immediate steps to guard against Wayne's expected advance. ". . . for our own security at Detroit," he wrote, "we should occupy nearly the same Posts on the Miamis River which we demolished after the Peace [of 1783]."³⁰ Nevertheless, Dorchester gave Simcoe permission to choose the position for a fort "without confining yourself to the Spots we occupied in 1783." The proposed post was intended to protect Detroit and to defend overland communication with the western country. Simcoe was ordered to garrison it with troops from Detroit and from other forts, and to arm it with cannon.³¹

Governor Simcoe was pleased with the prospect of action against the Americans. When in command of the Queen's Rangers during the Revolutionary War, he had fought Wayne in Virginia with indifferent success. Now he hoped for another opportunity. Supremely confident of his own military genius, he outlined to Dorchester his plan of campaign: to set out from Presqu'Isle [Erie, Pa.] with regulars and Indians, take Fort Franklin, float down the Allegheny River to Fort Pitt, take that post or blockade it, then proceed down the Ohio to Fort Washington which he would attempt to capture; if that was impossible, he would at least cut Wayne's long line of communications. Meanwhile, Colonel Richard England from Detroit would occupy the rapids of the Miamis, thus putting the American general between two British forces.³²

Simcoe promised the Governor-general that he would leave for the West as soon as ships could sail in the spring, and that he would take Lieutenant Robert Pilkington of the Royal Engineers with him.³³ Becoming impatient while waiting for navigation to open, Simcoe traveled overland to Detroit. From there, he and Pilkington sailed for the Miamis River on April 6.³⁴

Four days later they had selected the site for the fort and had set workmen and soldiers to felling trees and heaping up earthworks. Writing to Lord Dorchester, the Governor explained his reasons for establishing the post at this point: "The Principle which I have adopted as the best means of preventing Mr. Wayne from forcing the passage of the Miamis, is by placing a Fort in such a position that it may be of easy access from the River, be readily supplied by water carriage with provisions, and should it be invested, that the islands in the river and the distance of the opposite banks might afford opportunities of every assistance being given to the post by such a force as could be collected. . . .

"Should Mr. Wayne leave the post in his rear and move to Detroit, it is apparent that he must give a fair opening for striking at his communications for sixty miles in extent."³⁵

Lieutenant Pilkington soon discovered that he had neither sufficient skilled workmen nor enough tools to make satisfactory progress in building the fort. Consequently, he sailed with Governor Simcoe on April 18 to Niagara where he gathered the required tools and returned to the Miamis with all the artificers of the Fifth Regiment, some soldiers of the Queen's Rangers, and all the civilian carpenters he could procure.³⁶ They arrived on or about May 18.³⁷

The absence of Lieutenant Pilkington probably retarded work on the fortification, but progress was slow even after his return. A month later, Colonel England reported that "The Fort at the Miamis is not in great forwardness but by this time in a state to prevent surprise."³⁸

IV

In the spring of 1794, relations between Great Britain and the United States were severely strained. It seemed as if Lord Dorchester's prediction of hostilities would soon be fulfilled. Ever since news had reached America that the republican government of France had declared war on Great Britain on February 1, 1793, hostile feeling in the United States had been increasing against the British. The majority of the people sympathized with France because she had provided assistance during

the Revolutionary War, and because she was now a sister republic. The enthusiastic acclaim with which the populace received Citizen Edmond Genêt, the French minister, expressed both their friendship for his nation and their enmity toward Great Britain.

There were many reasons why Americans disliked the British: memories of the war which had recently been fought; the supercilious attitude of the government, which refused to make a commercial treaty with the United States; the procrastination of George Hammond, British minister, in settling outstanding questions between the two governments; the continued occupation of the western posts despite the Treaty of Paris; the recurrence of Indian depredations in the West for which the people blamed British agents;³⁹ the impressment of American seamen to serve on His Majesty's warships; and commercial restrictions that were highly injurious to American trade.

These last practices were so flagrant that even the Federalists, who favored Great Britain, were aroused to protest. The order-in-council of June 8, 1793, which instructed naval officers to capture ships carrying foodstuffs to France, injured American agriculture to such an extent that Thomas Jefferson, secretary of state, delivered a formal protest to the British government in December, 1793.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, another order-in-council had been issued secretly on November 6, 1793. As a result, two hundred fifty American vessels in the Caribbean were seized before their captains learned of the order. The crews were confined in prison-ships, and one hundred fifty of the vessels were condemned for engaging in trade with the French islands.⁴¹

News of these outrages reached the United States while Congress was debating resolutions introduced by James Madison proposing increased tariff rates on British goods in retaliation for earlier seizures considered by the Americans to be contrary to the law of nations. The Federalists opposed the resolutions. They showed that three-fourths of our trade was with Great Britain, and they argued that any interference with this trade would injure our interests more than those of the British.⁴²

Reports of the recent seizures in the Caribbean, however, an-

gered even the Federalists. Alexander Hamilton urged the raising of an army of thirty thousand men in preparation for possible hostilities. Nevertheless, Congress did no more than lay an embargo of a month's duration on ships in American ports; but accounts of Lord Dorchester's speech to the Indians on February 10, 1794, now began to appear in the newspapers.⁴³

The Federalists, fearful that the thoroughly aroused people would force the government into a war which would ruin our commerce, and, perhaps, destroy the nation, urged that a special envoy be sent to London to negotiate. Their plea was accepted. The President, who was anxious to avoid war, appointed Chief Justice John Jay special minister. He sailed for England on May 12, 1794. Meanwhile, Congress decided to suspend retaliatory measures against Great Britain.⁴⁴

When Jay sailed, news of Simcoe's new fort on the Miamis River had not reached the American people. Shortly afterwards, however, reports of this new affront became current, and there was a fresh outburst of indignation. On May 20, Edmund Randolph, who had succeeded Jefferson as secretary of state, wrote to George Hammond requesting a disavowal of Lord Dorchester's speech to the Indians. He asked also whether rumors about the new fort were true. Randolph declared that the sending of Jay to London was a proof that the United States desired peace and a good understanding with Great Britain, but he asserted that the Indian invasion of American territory would be repulsed.

In conclusion, the Secretary of State expressed a veiled threat: ". . . I have it in charge from the President of the United States, to request and urge you to take immediate and effective measures as far as in you lies, to suppress these hostile movements, [and] to call to mind that the army of the United States, in their march against the enemy, will not be able to distinguish between *them*, and *any other people*, associated in the war. . . ."⁴⁵

Hammond answered rather curtly that American aggressions were responsible for Lord Dorchester's statement. He denied knowledge of Simcoe's having built a fort, but he suggested that if the Lieutenant-Governor had gone to the Miamis River, he was simply protecting British subjects there or defending De-

troit from an attack by Wayne's army. In either case, the Minister declared, Simcoe was not disturbing the status quo.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, Hammond realized that a war might easily be precipitated by further incidents or even by an unfriendly attitude toward the United States. In his dispatches to the Foreign Office, he gave a full account of the popular indignation in America over the orders-in-council, seizures of merchant ships, Lord Dorchester's speech, and the building of Fort Miamis, and of the proposals for retaliatory legislation against British commerce. This information impressed his superiors with the necessity for making concessions.⁴⁷

Great Britain wanted no war with the United States. Her resources were already strained by the conflict with France. The First Coalition was weakening, and a new Armed Neutrality of the North seemed an imminent probability.⁴⁸ Besides, the United States was the best customer for British manufacturers, and an important source of foodstuffs.

Consequently, Henry Dundas, Secretary for War, writing to Lord Dorchester, expressed apprehension lest "your answer to the message from the Indians of the Upper Country . . . and your proposing to Colonel Simcoe . . . to occupy nearly the same Posts on the Miamis River, which were demolished after the Peace, may not rather provoke Hostilities, than prevent them."⁴⁹ Regarding new posts on the Miamis River, Dundas wrote: "I am afraid that they cannot be considered to be within the Limits of the Post at Detroit, the *immediate* protection of which, as well as the other Posts in our possession, on the American side of the Treaty Line, is the only object to be attended to."⁵⁰

Dundas warned Governor Simcoe also that he must avoid "proceeding to extremities," if possible. The Minister for War expressed the hope that Jay would make a treaty that would terminate all disputes and make for a good understanding between the United States and Great Britain.⁵¹

Simcoe assured George Hammond that the old fort on the Miamis River had always been considered by the commandants at Detroit as within their jurisdiction. He also declared that, al-

though the fort had been "evacuated in some respect" after the Treaty of 1783 as an unnecessary expense, it had been occupied occasionally afterwards.⁵²

Colonel Alexander McKee, perhaps at Simcoe's request, wrote a letter supporting the Governor's statement: "With regard to Great Britain having occupied a Post on this River, it has been uniform ever since the [year] 1781 and was always considered as a dependency of Detroit—Captain Pots⁵³ of the 8th Regiment built a Fort at this place in that year and the British Flag has been flying every year since that period, during the Summer Months while I was waiting the arrival of the different Nations of Indians, to deliver to them the presents directed by His Majesty. This Post was again re-occupied in 1786 by a Party of the 53rd Regiment."⁵⁴

V


After his return from Niagara with additional carpenters and tools, Lieutenant Pilkington pushed the work on the Fort.⁵⁵ Early in July, he sent a plan and a description of the works to Governor Simcoe. The plan, unfortunately, cannot be found; but the description, which follows, gives a fairly clear picture of the Fort.

"The Plan of the Fort exhibits the disposition of the several Buildings; the Barracks forming a part of the Rampart, and are the lining of it, they are roofed with Logs 12 inches thick, and those on the longer faces of the work, have Loopholes for firing in the reverse. The Bastions have casemated Flanks, and the whole interior part below of each Bastion may be considered as a casemate serving for a secure lodgment of Stores. The Bastions will be somewhat superior to the other parts of the work, and each of their Platforms will be capable of receiving Four Guns, which may be directed variously, each Bastion having six Embrasures. The flat Bastion on the water front I have not raised with Earth higher than the Platform of it, as I purpose the remaining part to be of Log work, as represented in the section, pierced with Loopholes and Port holes, and to have a Machicouli Fire, proposing by this to have a perfect defence for the water front, with a formidable Battery commanding the River and opposite shore, this work being but little advanced, is not

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exposed to view from either Flank. I have availed myself of a hollow in the ground, before the left face of the Ravelin by making a covered passage under the Glacis for a communication with any work on the adjacent rising ground, and it gives easy and secure access in receiving of Stores into the Fort from the side of the River. The present state of the work is such that in four days from hence the body of the place will consist of an elevated Parapet of Earth, the casemates of the Bastions and Flanks perfectly formed, the whole completely fraised and surrounded by the ditch requisite on the Land side. The Barracks on the water front are in great forwardness and the casemated Flanks ready for receiving Cannon."⁵⁶

[EDITOR'S NOTE: It is rather difficult, without the Pilkington Plan to explain the technical terms in his description. The ramparts, of course, are the main walls or earth works thrown up using the earth removed while digging the ditch surrounding the fort. The outer earthworks beyond the ditch were the glacis. The barracks evidently formed part of the ramparts and on the longest faces, or sides of the fort, loopholes were placed so that guns could be elevated to an angle of more than 30% with the slope of the parapet (Firing in reverse). A bastion is similar to a blockhouse but built differently. It is a bulge in the works, as in the diagram, which is designed to bring a cross fire on any party attacking



between bastions and so protect the rampart or "curtain." The faces of the bastion are represented by lines AB and AC. The flanks are the lines BD and CE. A casemated chamber is a bombproofed chamber, so with the flanks of the bastions and the entire area below the bastions, as Pilkington describes them (see also Captain Shortt's description, post p. 35). The guns were fired from the bastions through embrasures or slit openings. For one bastion on the river side, Pilkington had the floor beams projecting out beyond the supporting earthworks, with openings between the beams through which the troops could pour shot, and projectiles of all sort directly on the head of the advancing enemy (Machicoulis fire, often used in castle defense, Middle Ages). On one side, where there was a dip or hollow in the ground he had a tunnel under the outer earthworks starting from the ravelin which is simply a bastion without the flanks. The fraise was a row of stout pointed stakes extending out almost horizontally from the parapet.]

Work on the fortification was retarded by lack of skilled artisans and by illness. For some unreported reason, the men whom Lieutenant Pilkington had brought from Niagara left. Lieuten-

ant Adye had to go to Detroit to engage others.⁵⁷ When the days became hot, "agues and fever"—malaria—attacked officers and men. Surgeon Thomas Wright⁵⁸ expressed the opinion that "their sickness proceeded principally from remarkable thick fogs in the morning and evening, and constant work during the intense heat of the day. . . ."⁵⁹ He recommended an issue of rum "to qualify the bad water they are obliged to make use of. . . ."

Colonel England, who had heard that Lieutenant Pilkington was ill and wanted to return to Niagara, sailed for the Miamis River to view the situation. He prevailed upon the engineer to remain until the work was completed; then, following the surgeon's advice, he ordered rum for the men and urged them to greater exertion.⁶⁰ The Colonel sent the soldiers who were seriously ill to Detroit, replacing them with men from his own garrison. Before he left Fort Miamis, Colonel England had three six-pounders mounted. A nine-pounder remained to be mounted; and he ordered the other guns, which were aboard the vessels lying at Turtle Island, to be sent to the Fort as soon as the platforms were ready to receive them.

Colonel Alexander McKee remained in the neighborhood of the Fort during the spring and summer of 1794, sending out spies, gathering the Indians to resist Wayne's advance, feeding them, and furnishing them arms and ammunition. He complained to Joseph Chew, secretary of Indian Affairs, that the guns sent to the Rapids by the Indian Department were worthless. The barrels of some of them had burst when they were fired. He urged that better arms be provided.⁶¹

McKee was successful in assembling a large number of Indians at the Rapids. Some of the savages, however, were lukewarm in their attachment to the British. He learned that Antoine and Jacques Lasselle, traders from Detroit, were tampering with the loyalty of the natives. They were alleged to have declared that the Indians' "Old French Father" would soon be among them again. Captain John, a chief, asserted that François Lafontaine, also of Detroit, had made the Miamis, the Wea, and the Potawatomi suspicious of the British.⁶²

Orders from Detroit to British officers at other posts set bands of warriors on the trails leading to the Rapids. Captain William

Doyle, commandant at Mackinac, reported that he had sent more than a hundred Ottawa and Chippewa.⁶³ On June 25, Colonel England reported to Governor Simcoe that 1700 Indians were on the Miamis River, and that others were on the way.⁶⁴

Five days later, a determined attack on Fort Recovery by the northern Indians resulted in losses which discouraged them and caused them to set out for home. Colonel McKee feared that many would follow their example and thus weaken his savage force.⁶⁵ He urged Colonel England to send plenty of provisions to the Rapids to keep the warriors contented. The latter sent as much as he could, and he promised to do his utmost to return to the Miamis River, Indians who had retired to Detroit.⁶⁶

Colonel McKee remained at the Rapids, encouraging the savages who came in, and sending out raiding parties. He reported to Governor Simcoe that a band of Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, and Wyandots had gone to harass Wayne's line of communications; that some Chippewa had brought in a prisoner and two scalps; and that a party of Delawares on horseback had pursued an American scouting detachment. All the Indians, he declared, were hostile to the "Big Knives." McKee asked that still greater supplies of provisions be sent for his warriors. He complained that he had not received the promised blankets, guns, rifles, ball, flints, knives, tobacco, and paint.⁶⁷

VI

General Anthony Wayne was at Fort Greenville awaiting the arrival of mounted Kentucky volunteers to augment his army. He was eager to meet and engage the force of Indians that was assembling to oppose him. Secretary of War Knox had informed Wayne that the President was anxious for the campaign to be completed as soon as possible.⁶⁸ At the same time, Knox instructed the Commander in chief how to deal with Fort Miamis. Because it was a new establishment, Wayne was not to be bound by his orders to refrain from molesting the British posts. "If therefore in the course of your operations against the Indian enemy," the Secretary wrote, "it should become necessary to dislodge the party at the rapids of the Miami, you are hereby

authorized in the name of the President of the United States to do it, taking care after they shall be in your power to treat them with humanity and politeness and to send them immediately to the nearest British Garrison. But no attempt ought to be made unless it shall promise complete success—an unsuccessful attempt would be attended with pernicious consequences.”⁶⁹

When about 1500 Kentuckians arrived under the command of General Charles Scott, the Commander in chief hastened his preparations, and, a few days later, on July 28, the army began to advance. Besides the Kentuckians, there were more than 2000 regulars—the Legion of the United States—veterans all, thanks to Wayne’s intensive training. Almost due north they marched, with mounted riflemen and scouts thrown out in front and on the flanks to prevent surprise. On August 8, the Legion reached the confluence of the Au Glaize and the Miamis. There Wayne halted for a week to build a fort which he named Defiance.

The Indians who had been at the Grand Glaize, or even closer to Greenville, fled down the Miamis River before Wayne’s advancing troops. The sudden arrival of the natives at the foot of the Rapids caused Colonel McKee to send an urgent appeal to Colonel England for large quantities of provisions. McKee promised to try to hold the Indians there to resist the American army.⁷⁰

At Detroit, Colonel England was having troubles of his own. On August 5, Tarhee and other principal chiefs of the Wyandots appeared at Fort Lernoult. They delivered to the Commandant the hatchet which Lieutenant-governor Henry Hamilton had given them during the Revolutionary War. Now they demanded that the Colonel sharpen the hatchet and clean off all the rust. By this symbolic language they required his assistance to defend their country against the advancing Americans. Unless the British supported the Indians, the chiefs declared, Wayne would come to Detroit, “take you [Colonel England] by the hand and sling you across the River.”⁷¹

Colonel England answered the chiefs cautiously, but he promised that the British force at Fort Miamis would protect them. He urged them to go to Colonel McKee at the foot of the Rapids and take his advice.⁷²

On August 9, fearing that the garrison at Fort Miamis was insufficient to check Wayne's advance, Colonel England ordered Major William Campbell to sail for the Fort on the armed snow *Chippewa* with fifty men from the Twenty-fourth Regiment, eight artillerymen, and a detachment of the Queen's Rangers commanded by Lieutenant James Givens. The Colonel ordered Commodore Alexander Grant⁷³ to hold the *Chippewa* at Turtle Island in Miamis Bay, where there were military stores, to keep the line of water communication open.⁷⁴

Colonel England sent also 100 unarmed Canadians to help complete the barracks and casemates and to clear the trees away from the vicinity of the Fort. In order to prove his loyalty, Antoine Lasselle, who had been accused of tampering with the Indians, accompanied this force, taking with him his nephew Jacques and seven or eight of his *engagés*.⁷⁵ In addition, 50 volunteer militiamen under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William Caldwell set out from Detroit with orders from Colonel England not to engage Wayne's army unless it was absolutely necessary.⁷⁶

The Commandant at Detroit, in answer to McKee's request for supplies for the Indians, sent 350 barrels of provisions besides two boat loads which were shipped at the same time by the Indian Department.⁷⁷

When Major William Campbell arrived at Fort Miamis, he hastened the work and sent to Turtle Island for the remaining nine-pounders which would complete his armament. Optimistically he wrote that in three days he expected to be able "to bid defiance to General Wayne's whole Army."⁷⁸

The new Commandant, however, could do little to check the ravages of his immediate enemy—malaria. The garrison was decimated by fever. He sent the most serious cases under the care of Surgeon Wright, to Detroit; Dr. William Harffy⁷⁹ remained at the Fort to attend the rest.⁸⁰ Colonel England could send no soldiers now to replace the sick. On August 17, he reported that he had in Fort Lernoult only twenty men fit for duty.⁸¹

Colonel McKee was certain that Wayne would attack Fort Miamis, and, if successful there, advance to Detroit. Two Amer-

icans assured him that this was Wayne's intention. One of them was Robert Newman, a deserter from the Kentucky volunteers, who gave McKee exact information about Wayne's force early in August.⁸² The other was an emissary of General Wayne to the Indians, Christopher Miller, a scout. On August 14, he arrived at the Rapids under a flag of truce. The Commander in chief urged the warriors to send a delegation to the Grand Glaize to make peace. Wayne warned them that only by this means could they save themselves from defeat and their women and children from suffering. Miller declared that General Wayne intended to "drive away the English from the Country."⁸³

The savages, advised by Colonel McKee, kept Miller waiting until August 17 for an answer, in order to gain time for the Potawatomi and other Indians from Detroit to arrive.⁸⁴ The Deputy-Superintendent conveyed the information which Newman and Miller had given him, to Fort Miamis. There the garrison was laboring feverishly to complete the defensive works.⁸⁵

From his headquarters on the Niagara River, Governor Simcoe ordered Captain Joseph Bunbury of the Fifth Regiment to proceed by ship to Turtle Island, to occupy and to fortify it. This post was intended to prevent General Wayne from advancing toward Detroit if he took Fort Miamis.⁸⁶ Simcoe informed Lord Dorchester that he was going to Detroit with all the troops he could muster. He wrote that he had slight expectation of defeating Wayne, but he protested that "an honorable devotion to the public service bears me up above all personal considerations. . . ."⁸⁷ He expressed the hope that the Governor-General would send him reinforcements so that he could meet Wayne on equal terms.

General Wayne's patrols were ranging far ahead of his army. On August 11, Captain William Wells, chief of the American scouts, captured a Shawnee warrior near the Rapids of the Miamis. The prisoner reported that an American deserter had brought information of Wayne's advance. He then told Wells that the Indians were at McKee's post on the right bank of the river, and that the new fort was a mile farther down on the left bank. He declared that the garrison consisted of 200 men; that

a reinforcement of militia and regulars from Detroit was expected; that about 700 Indians had assembled; and that 540 more were on the way. The Shawnee asserted that the Indians would fight at the foot of the Rapids.⁸⁸

On August 15, Wayne set out with his army from Fort Defiance, marching along the left bank of the Miamis River. He reached Roche de Bout three days later. There he built Fort Deposit for the protection of his stores and baggage. On August 20, his army of about 3000 men advanced to meet the Indians. They numbered 1500 or more—Shawnee, Delawares, Wyandots, Ottawa, Potawatomi, Chippewa, and Miami. Lieutenant Colonel William Caldwell, commanding about 50 volunteers from the New Settlement on Lake Erie, was with them.⁸⁹ Colonel McKee, Matthew Elliot, and Simon Girty were also with the savages on that day.⁹⁰

The Indians and their allies awaited the American troops in a tangle of tornado-felled trees at the foot of the Rapids of the Miamis. Wayne ordered his men forward in two long lines, with dragoons on the right, beside the river, infantry in the center and the mounted Kentuckians on the left. After some preliminary skirmishing, the dragoons galloped into the fallen timbers, cutting down the startled savages with flashing sabers; the infantry pressed home the attack with bayonets, routing the warriors from their lair; and the Kentuckians, closing in from the left, drove them back to Fort Miamis and beyond.

The garrison of the Fort numbered about 200 men—British regulars, Queen's Rangers, Canadians, and artificers.⁹¹ In addition, Captain Alexander Harrow was in command of two cannon, with sailors from his ship, the *Chippewa*, serving as gunners.⁹² During the battle, Jonathan Schieffelin, who had probably been with the Indians, slipped into the Fort and took command of the Canadians.⁹³

Major William Campbell, the Commandant, on the morning of August 20, heard desultory firing up the river at about eight o'clock. Later the firing became quite brisk and increased in volume until near eleven o'clock. At this time, the Major saw a number of Indians emerge from the woods, running toward the Fort. Expecting to be attacked by the Americans, he ordered his

men to their stations, filled up gaps in the abattis, and set up chevaux de frise.⁹⁴

Colonel McKee, fleeing from the battlefield with the defeated warriors, stopped at the Fort.⁹⁵ Perhaps he urged Major Campbell to assist the dejected savages. However that may have been, the Commandant steadfastly obeyed his orders not to fight unless he was attacked. The Indians and McKee must perforce continue their retreat to the mouth of the Miamis. The Major expressed the opinion that Wayne would not attack him; nevertheless, he asked for reinforcements from Detroit.⁹⁶


In the Battle of Fallen Timbers, six of Lieutenant Colonel Caldwell's volunteers were killed, and Antoine Lasselle was captured by the Americans.⁹⁷ The loss of the Indians in killed and wounded was sufficient to break their spirit of resistance; and the refusal of Major Campbell to give them aid destroyed their faith in British promises of protection.

General Wayne lost 33 killed and 100 wounded. After the battle, he established a post on high ground almost within range of the guns of Fort Miamis.⁹⁸ This action was construed by Major Campbell as a deliberate insult. Consequently, in support of "the honor of the British Colours," he sent Captain Spears with a message asking "in what light I am to view your making such near approaches [*sic*] to this Garrison."⁹⁹


The victor of Fallen Timbers answered Major Campbell's question the same day:

"I have received your letter of this date requiring of me the motives which have moved the Army, under my command, to the position they now occupy, far within the acknowledged Jurisdiction of the United States of America.


"Without questioning the authority or the propriety, Sir, of your interrogatory, I think I may without breach of decorum observe to you, that were you intitled to an answer, the most full & satisfactory one was announced to you, from the muzzles of my small arms yesterday morning, in the Action against the hoard [*sic*] of Savages in the vicinity of your Post; which terminated gloriously to the American Arms—but had it continued until the Indians &c were drove under the influence of the Post and Guns you mention—they would not have much impeded the




Louis Hennepin, Leyden, 1701. Section of his map of North America. The much distorted southern extension of Lake Erie was an error of his first edition in 1698 and persisted for several more editions. This Fort des Miamis was the one established in 1680 by the La Salle expedition, at the mouth of the St. Joseph's River. From plate loaned by Michigan Historical Commission, used in Karpinski.




Section from map entitled "Carte de la Nouvelle France. . . ." From certain authenticated deductions, this map was a copy of one by Nicholas de Fer, published in Paris in 1718. Courtesy Dominion Archives, Ottawa. The inscription "Port des Miamies," west of "Lac des Eric" is found on the Fer map to be "Portage des Miamies" which means carrying place of the Miamies, referring to one at the site of the present Fort Wayne, Indiana. This could not possibly have referred to Fort Miami. This map was misdated 1690 in the Canadian Archives and used erroneously by some writers.




Part of Map of North America by Jean Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville, Paris, 1746. From plate loaned by Michigan Historical Commission, used in Karpinski. The "F. des Miamis" shown here on the tributary to the "R. des Miamis" obviously was intended for the fort established by the French on the site of modern Fort Wayne, Indiana before 1749. See following plate.



From "A Map of Canada . . ." by Thomas Jeffreys, London, 1761. From plate loaned by Michigan Historical Commission, used in Karpinski. The Fort Miami here shown at site of modern Fort Wayne, Indiana was captured by British during French and Indian Wars. See preceding plate.




From "Map of North America . . ." by Jedediah Morse, London edition, 1798. Fort Miami is indicated as one of the white reservations in Indian country. Fort Defiance is lacking, but Wayne's other forts are shown. Note that "1st State" corresponds roughly to the present Ohio. From plate loaned by Michigan Historical Commission, used in Karpinski.




MAP OF THE BATTLEFIELD OF AUGUST 20, 1794.


Map of Battle of Fallen Timbers. Sketch sent by Lord Dorchester to Henry Dundas. From *Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections*, XXV, 36.



A manuscript map of Wayne's campaign of 1794, by John Graves Simcoe, lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, sent by him to his old commander, Sir Henry Clinton. Henry Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library.



Survey of site of Fort Miami by United States Topographical Engineers under direction General Orlando Poe, 1888. From War Department Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.




RUINS OF FORT MIAMI.

Ruins of Fort Miami, by Benjamin Lossing. From *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. XXVII, Aug. 1863.




River view of Fort Miami. From C. S. Van Tassel, *Picturesque Northwest Ohio* (Toledo, 1901).



Rem of Fort Miami. From *Picturesque Northwest Ohio*, by C. S. Van Tassel (Toledo, 1901).



Picture of Fort Miami in 1910. From *Diary of Mrs. John Graves Simcoe* by
J. Ross Robertson, p. 217.



A View on the Miami River, 1794. . . . From a drawing by Lieutenant Pilkington, copied by Mrs. Simcoe. From *Diary of Mrs. John Graves Simcoe* by J. Ross Robertson.



Overgrown ruins of ramparts of Fort Miami. Picture taken September 25, 1910. Courtesy The *Toledo Times*.



Lieutenant Governor (General) John Graves Simcoe. Courtesy
Dominion Archives, Ottawa, Canada.



From Harry E. Wildes, *Anthony Wayne* (New York, 1941), frontispiece.

Anthony Wayne

Fort Miamis, Outpost of Empire

progress of the Victorious army under my command, as no such Post was established at the commencement of the present war, between the Indians & the United States."¹⁰⁰

Major Campbell was infuriated by Wayne's bombastic reply and by the sight of "hundreds of American Cavalry . . . constantly skirting the wood all around us and . . . a number of their officers . . . looking at us from the Point of Colonel McKee's Island."¹⁰¹ He explained to Colonel England that he had been more forbearing with Wayne than a higher ranking officer might have been. The situation, he wrote, was delicate, and he preferred to err on the safe side. "The consequences attending a too hasty conduct might be very serious."¹⁰²

The Major reported that the Americans were burning the Indian huts in the neighborhood, and that Wayne, supported by his light infantry and riflemen, reconnoitered the Fort from all points. "It was extremely insolent—but he will never do it again with impunity," the Commandant promised.¹⁰³

To General Wayne, Campbell dispatched another note on August 22, warning him that, although he had "forborne for these two days past to resent these Insults you have offered to the British Flag flying at this Fort, by approaching it within pistol shot of my works, not only singly, but in numbers with arms in their hands," in future he would fire on the Americans if they ventured near his post.¹⁰⁴ On the same day, after the Major had learned that Captain Joseph Bunbury had arrived at Turtle Island, he informed the Captain of Wayne's actions and of his own determination to resist further insults. The sound of cannon fire, Campbell wrote, would mean that hostilities had commenced, and he ordered Bunbury to "act accordingly."¹⁰⁵

General Wayne's answer to Major Campbell characterized the building of the post on American soil as "an Act of highest Aggression. . . ."¹⁰⁶ In the name of the President of the United States, he demanded the withdrawal of the troops. Major Campbell replied that he would obey his orders to hold the position; and again he warned Wayne not to approach Fort Miamis.¹⁰⁷

Although it would appear that General Wayne was attempting by his provocative attitude to goad Major Campbell into

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hostilities, yet it is not likely that the General was eager to fight the British. If he remembered that Secretary Knox's permission to attack emphasized the necessity of victory, he must have realized that he could hardly hope to fulfill that condition. For, even though the Fort was not completed, he could scarcely have expected to take it by storm, especially since he had no artillery with which to breach its defenses; and reducing it by a siege was out of the question because his own supply of provisions was low. Nevertheless, in view of Wayne's challenging actions, it was only Major Campbell's forbearance that prevented hostilities which might have precipitated a war. Both Governor Simcoe and Lord Dorchester commended the Major for his discretion and good conduct.¹⁰⁸

After having destroyed Colonel McKee's trading post and some Indian villages and cornfields, Wayne withdrew with his troops to Fort Defiance. The savages were so discouraged by their recent defeat and by the lack of British support that they could not be induced even to harass the retiring army. Wayne's retreat puzzled both Major Campbell and Colonel England. Because the latter expected him to return, he ordered the Fort to be completed as quickly as possible.¹⁰⁹ When Simcoe learned that Wayne had withdrawn, he expressed the opinion that the government had ordered him to Pittsburgh to put down the Whisky Rebellion.¹¹⁰

Although John Jay reported from London that he and Lord Grenville had agreed to preserve "a pacific and unaltered state between us and the British on the side of Canada and the frontiers," and that "Mr. Simcoe will soon receive orders to retire from Miami [*sic*] to his former positions,"¹¹¹ Lord Grenville informed George Hammond simply that they had decided to maintain the status quo during negotiations, and the Duke of Portland sent the same message to Lord Dorchester.¹¹² To the British authorities in Canada this apparently meant that they might continue to occupy Fort Miamis; for the garrison remained, and work on the defenses was hastened.

VII

Wayne's withdrawal relieved Fort Miamis of one enemy; but another, and one much more deadly to the garrison, remained.

Malaria again took almost complete mastery of the post. Major Campbell, Captain Stiell, and Lieutenant Robinson were so ill that they were removed to Detroit where 190 men of the Miamis force were in the hospital. Captain Joseph Bunbury, who also was ill, took command of the Fort.¹¹³

On September 27, Governor Simcoe visited Fort Miamis. When he found only 35 men fit for duty, he sent off an express to Colonel England with an order to send every man of the 24th Regiment at once as a reinforcement. The Governor was panic-stricken. He confessed that he slept "with some personal anxiety below the Fort that night," because Wayne was not more than forty miles away.¹¹⁴ Colonel England answered Simcoe's urgent appeal by reporting that he had no one to send. He declared that because of illness he had not even a sentry to post at night to guard His Majesty's stores.¹¹⁵

The arrival next day of Lieutenant Brooking with 50 men of the Queen's Rangers must have calmed Simcoe's fears somewhat. Besides, Joseph Brant, the Mohawk chief, came in with a band of his savage warriors. On October 1, Governor Simcoe, Colonel McKee, and Matthew Elliot conducted Brant, at his request, on a tour of the battlefield of Fallen Timbers.¹¹⁶

Governor Simcoe ordered Captain Bunbury to complete the bombproofs of the several bastions as quickly as possible.¹¹⁷ They were to be used as barracks for some of the men who were living in tents. The Governor ordered a guard to be maintained on Turtle Island, and a blockhouse mounting two cannon to be built on Swan Creek, where two or three thousand Indians were assembled under Colonel McKee's supervision.¹¹⁸ He ordered also that Captain Robert Pratt and Lieutenant Brooking, with their detachments of the 5th Regiment and of the Queen's Rangers, be returned to Niagara on the *Dunmore*. At the same time, Simcoe gave Lieutenant Pilkington permission to leave for Niagara whenever he found it convenient, and he ordered Lieutenant Cooper of the Royal Engineers to Fort Miamis to complete the defenses.¹¹⁹ Temporary log houses for the officers and barracks for the soldiers were finally completed by the end of December.¹²⁰

On October 13, the Governor, apparently desiring to please the Indians, issued a general order to the commanding officer

Fort Miamis, Outpost of Empire

of Fort Miamis to fire on any American troops that approached his post.¹²¹ He urged upon the Duke of Portland the necessity of maintaining a garrison in the Fort. Withdrawal, he predicted, would completely alienate the Indians from the British.¹²²

The Duke wrote, on November 19, that Jay and Grenville had signed a treaty on the preceding day. He called Simcoe's attention to the articles relating to Canada, one of which provided for the evacuation of the posts on or before June 1, 1796, and ordered him to prepare to carry them into effect. Portland also ordered Simcoe to assure the savages that the British were their friends; and, by the erection of new posts to replace the ones to be evacuated, to maintain trade with them and keep them under British influence.¹²³

Simcoe obeyed these orders, but he found it difficult to control the Indians after the terms of the treaty became known. As early as November 1, a rumor had reached Detroit that the posts would be delivered to the Americans.¹²⁴ Fur traders and Indians both were disturbed.

General Wayne, from his headquarters at Fort Greenville, was sending out invitations to the chiefs to come there for a parley. In his efforts to win their confidence, he had the services of a number of French Canadian traders, one of the most influential of whom was the same Antoine Lasselle who had been captured by the Americans in the Battle of Fallen Timbers. Tried by court-martial as a spy, because he had been painted like an Indian, he had been acquitted, largely through Colonel Hamtramck's intervention. After having been exchanged for prisoners taken by the Indians, he had returned to Detroit whence he had set out for his usual wintering grounds.¹²⁵ In addition to trade goods, he carried a speech from Wayne to the Indians. So effectively did he labor for the Americans that in January he led Potawatomi, Chippewa, Ottawa, Huron and Sac chiefs to Fort Greenville.¹²⁶

The British agents were chagrined at the turning of the Indians to Wayne, but there was little they could do to counteract his influence. The Duke of Portland, realizing the present uselessness of Fort Miamis, suggested to Simcoe that, to prevent dangerous incidents during the time intervening before the

evacuation of the posts, the United States withdraw its troops from Fort Defiance, and the British abandon and destroy Fort Miamis.¹²⁷

The post was neither abandoned nor destroyed, but malaria again laid its garrison low. In the spring of 1795, Major Robert Stiehl left the post because of illness, and Colonel William Campbell went to Mackinac, hoping to repair his shattered health.¹²⁸ Because of the virulent fever, Colonel England asked permission to reduce the garrison to two companies. Even in October, the sickness had not abated. The Detroit Commandant wrote that "When the last relief of that unfortunate Post was ordered, there was not a man, woman or child there that was not ill of the prevailing fever."¹²⁹

VIII

General Wayne's emissaries to the Indians finally brought to Greenville chiefs of all the tribes which had been at war with the United States. After protracted negotiations, they signed the Treaty of Greenville on August 3, 1795. The Indians ceded most of the present state of Ohio and patches of land surrounding various forts outside the ceded area. One of these was at Fort Miamis, although it was still occupied by the British.

This treaty "brought to an end forty years of warfare in the valley of the Ohio, during which it is estimated five thousand whites were killed or captured. For three years past, the war had cost the government of the United States over a million dollars a year. The peace which Wayne brought to the frontier endured for fifteen years. . . ."¹³⁰

Early in 1796, the British began to prepare to evacuate Fort Miamis. Lord Dorchester ordered Governor Simcoe to remove all engineer's stores and tools to the post that was being built on the Canadian shore opposite Bois Blanc Island, near the mouth of the Detroit River.¹³¹ This post, soon named Fort Malden, replaced Fort Lernoult at Detroit as the western center of British influence over the Indians.

Although the government of the United States had been impatient to occupy the western posts, it was slow in making arrangements for the transfer of sovereignty. Captain Lewis, sent

to Quebec to receive the orders for evacuation which were to be presented by American officers to the commandants of the forts, did not arrive until some time in May, 1796. When Lord Dorchester offered to order an immediate withdrawal of the British garrisons, Lewis asked for time to permit American troops to advance.¹³²

The general order to evacuate the posts was issued on June 1, 1796, at headquarters in Quebec. Artillery and King's stores were to be shipped down the Lakes, and only a small detachment was to be left to protect the works and the public buildings. At Fort Miamis, a subaltern and twenty men were to remain until the Americans arrived.¹³³

In order to be ready to occupy Fort Miamis, Detroit, and Mackinac, Lieutenant Colonel John Francis Hamtramck,¹³⁴ Commandant of Fort Wayne, moved down the Miamis with a force of about five hundred soldiers—infantry, riflemen, artillery, and light dragoons. At Fort Deposit he halted on June 6, and awaited orders.¹³⁵

On the evening of June 30, the order to evacuate reached Detroit. The ship that brought it carried Captain Henry De Butts, aide to General Wayne. Colonel England immediately wrote to inform General Wilkinson¹³⁶ that he was preparing to withdraw, and that he had ordered vessels to sail for Fort Miamis to remove the garrison there. He mentioned the arrival of Captain De Butts and added: "I shall have much pleasure in affording him every assistance in my power, in hiring or procuring Vessels to bring your Troops here from the Miamis River."¹³⁷

In his camp on the Miamis River, Colonel Hamtramck marked time for a month. Finally, on July 7, two small schooners, which Captain De Butts had chartered at Detroit, arrived.¹³⁸ On these two vessels, the *Weazell* and the *Swan*, Colonel Hamtramck embarked Captain Moses Porter with a detachment of 65 men to occupy Fort Lernoult at Detroit.¹³⁹

Although the orders for evacuation, which each American officer was required to deliver to the British commandant of the post which he was to occupy, had not yet arrived from Philadelphia, Colonel England must have informed Hamtramck that

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Forts Miamis and Lernoult would be delivered without this formality.¹⁴⁰ For, Captain C. W. Shortt, the British Commandant, marched his garrison out of Fort Miamis on July 11, 1796. A detachment from Colonel Hamtramck's command marched in, and the flag of the United States replaced the Union Jack.¹⁴¹ Colonel Hamtramck set sail for Detroit with most of his troops, leaving Captain Andrew Marschalk¹⁴² and Lieutenant Andrew Shanklin¹⁴³ at Fort Miamis with 52 infantrymen, one corporal, and 6 artillerymen as a garrison.¹⁴⁴

IX

General Wayne, who had spent the winter at his home near Philadelphia, was ordered by President Washington in the spring of 1796 to inspect the western posts. On July 16, he reached Fort Greenville. There he awaited the arrival of Winthrop Sargent, Secretary of the Territory North West of the River Ohio, whom he had invited to accompany him to Detroit to establish civil government there.¹⁴⁵ At this time Sargent was acting-governor because Governor Arthur St. Clair was out of the Territory.

On July 30, the General and his party set out from Fort Greenville. Besides Wayne and Sargent, there were John Wilkins, Jr., Quartermaster General of the United States army, and Peter Audrain, a Frenchman who had become an American citizen, and was on his way to Detroit. They were escorted by a detachment of dragoons. On August 3 the cavalcade reached Fort Defiance. Sending their horses ahead, the party descended the Miamis in large pirogues to the Rapids.¹⁴⁶

There they again mounted their horses and rode down beside the river. Soon they reached the field of the Fallen Timbers. The sight of this familiar ground recalled to Wayne memories of his momentous victory. Here his companions had a rare treat: "Gen'l Wayne described every position of his army, every movement, and all the particulars of the action."¹⁴⁷ A little later in the day (August 7), General Wayne arrived at Fort Miamis.

A letter which arrived from Secretary McHenry contained the suggestion that Wayne order the abandonment of Fort Miamis because the location, according to report, was very un-

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healthful. The General, in answering the letter, informed the Secretary that he had directed Captain Marschalk to investigate the rumors of numerous deaths among the British troops, and to report to him. He expressed the opinion that there had been a great deal of exaggeration. Nevertheless, he promised to consider the Secretary's suggestion; but, he wrote, Fort Miamis "is, however, an Essential link in the Chain of depots & defenses at this Crisis. . . ." ¹⁴⁸

On August 10, General Wayne sailed for Detroit. ¹⁴⁹ Four days later, Captain Marschalk sent to the Commander in chief Captain Shortt's statement of the public works and buildings of Fort Miamis. They consisted of the following items:

"Four Bastions, two with cazemates [*sic*]

"A Water Battery

"Three Bomb Proofs for Soldiers quarters, with Births [*sic*], in good order, having been lately shingled.

"One Bomb-proof, for Provision Store, and Ordnance Magazine, in good order.

"One Bake House, and oven, in good order.

"One Engineers Store, in good order.

"Six Logg Houses, for Officers quarters, want repair.

"One Logg Guard House.

"One House for Artillery, with births [*sic*]

"One Guard House in the Ditch, in good order.

"Four Logg Houses, on the outside of the works, out of Repair.

"One Blacksmith Shop.

"One Carpenters Shop.

"N. B. The works in general, very much out of repair, having never been properly finished." ¹⁵⁰

Captain Marschalk confirmed the accuracy of Captain Shortt's statement. He enclosed a long letter to General Wayne in which he attempted to prove that the locality was not unhealthful. "It would appear, however, from circumstances," he wrote, "that there has not been, for a considerable time, that attention paid to the Police and cleanliness of the post, so essentially necessary for the preservation of Health. This might possibly be owing to

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the anticipated hour of evacuation. I have, in a great measure, however, removed those obstacles.

"I have, also, Sir, made particular Enquiries, with respect to the disorders &c. said to have prevailed among the British troops in 1794.

"From well informed persons now on the spot, I find, that Colonel Simcoe, with a Detachment, arrived here about the latter part of April, that the Troops were immediately put upon hard fatigue—that they were destitute of tents, or any kind of covering, and fed constantly on salt provision. Added to this, the river water, only, was made use of—no spring having at that time been discovered. Their disorders were generally flux,²⁵¹ which were attributed to the circumstances mentioned, and not to a want of salubrity of Climate.

"I cannot find that more than one officer (and who, if I am not wrongly informed made rather free with his constitution), and four or five soldiers have died at this place. Some indeed, in getting sick, were sent to Detroit, and I believe a few died on their passage—but their deaths might probably be owing, more to their confined and disagreeable situations in the gun boats than to any other cause.

"One of my informants added that he has lived in the vicinity of this post nearly fourteen years, and has never experienced himself or known of any remarkably sickly periods.

"The latter end of July, and the month of August, have been thought by some to be the most unhealthy seasons. I beg leave to observe to your Excellency that since my being in command of the post I have seen no symptoms that have led me into a belief of a particular want of Salubrity of climate.

"I have, at this time, a number of sick in the Detachment, but when it is remarked that the men who at present compose the Garrison have been on the very arduous duty of Boatmen (a Service of all others most severe) since early in February last, and that they were particularly selected for this post on account of their being deficient of clothing (very few of them having received their proportion allowed for the summer months) and that for a considerable part of the time while on

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that service they have not received their rations of whiskey, the necessity of which, as a refreshment, while so employed, must be particularly obvious, they could not, in my opinion from the fatigues they had undergone, be considered in any other state than that of convalescents only, when I took possession of the Garrison with them. Their disorders are generally agues and fever, which appear to me to have originated from Bilious habits, and which I also am of opinion their fatigue under those circumstances has been a principal cause of, and which, unfortunately, I have not been in possession of medicine to remove—all committed to my care in taking charge of the Post, having been a few doses of Tartar Emetic and Salts—a Small quantity of Bark¹⁵² and Castor oil, and a little salve, and which, while they lasted, have been made use of to good affect—I am now entirely destitute, but at the same time have the pleasure to inform your Excellency that there is not at this place any man whom I conceive dangerously ill. I have myself been a subject of the ague, which a very few dozes of Bark easily removed, although the attack was a severe one. A small supply of medicine and Hospital Stores would, in my opinion, very soon remove what sickness is now at this place.

“Another source of the sickness now here has, I believe, proceeded from some days of hard fatigue, which I found necessary on taking possession of the post to remove some obstacles of very disagreeable nature. The want of soap has also been much felt as it deprives the men of the opportunity of keeping themselves as clean & wholesome in their appearance as is necessary to preserve health.

“The information I have obtained with respect to the climate &c proceeds from Traders, I believe, of respectability and who are willing to come forward on oath to establish the facts they have represented to me.”¹⁵³

Captain Marschalk was apparently anxious to retain his command, and the traders were probably happy to have the protection of his soldiers at the post. If these traders had visited the Fort during the British occupation, surely they knew what havoc malaria had wrought in the garrison. Captain Marschalk's argument seems to have prevailed, for Fort Miamis was retained as a link in the chain of defenses.

X

Now, as during the British regime, Fort Miamis was dependent on Detroit.¹⁵⁴ It was an important strong point on the long line of communication from Fort Washington at Cincinnati. John Wilson, assistant quartermaster general at Fort Miamis, had orders to keep fresh horses always ready for express riders carrying dispatches from the War Department to Detroit.¹⁵⁵

Provisions for the garrison had to be transported from Fort Washington or from Detroit. During the summer, boats were used; during the winter, sleds drawn by horses or oxen followed the trails through the woods, or used the frozen surface of the rivers as highways. In January, 1797, Gabriel Godfroy hauled 2263 pounds of flour on his *traineau* [sled] from Detroit to Fort Miamis.¹⁵⁶ A year later, General John Wilkins, Jr., ordered Matthew Ernest at Detroit to supply Fort Miamis and other western posts with corn from Fort Washington.¹⁵⁷

No further information about the Fort in 1798 had been found. Perhaps it was abandoned in that year. Nevertheless, it was occupied for a short time, at least, during the autumn of 1799. In obedience to the order of Governor Arthur St. Clair, Colonel David Strong, Commandant at Detroit, sent Captain Theodore Sedgwick to the Fort with a detachment of troops in October.¹⁵⁸

The Colonel sent also Jonathan Schieffelin, who had served in 1794 as a volunteer officer under Major Campbell in Fort Miamis, but who was now United States Indian agent at Detroit. To the Fort came about a thousand Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, Wyandot, and Shawnee to receive the annuity promised them at the Treaty of Greenville, and to live for several weeks at government expense.¹⁵⁹

From Captain Sedgwick and Jonathan Schieffelin, the Indians received money and merchandise, and to them they brought their complaints. So insistent were the Shawnee, who were disturbed by some vague fear, and so annoying, that Schieffelin was unable to do his clerical work. To his friend Solomon Sibley in Detroit he wrote: "I am surrounded by a large Congregation of vipers to whom I am just going to preach a Sermon, or rather, deliver a discourse on conciliation & the Rights of man—tho' not *those* of Tom Paine."¹⁶⁰

Captain Sedgwick and his detachment probably returned to Detroit, after the Indians had gone, and left the Fort unoccupied. The War Department has no record of the date of its abandonment; but Fort Miamis is not mentioned in an "Extract from Brigade Orders"¹⁶¹ issued at Pittsburgh, March 23, 1800, which contains the names of other western posts, nor in Secretary of War Henry Dearborn's report for 1801.¹⁶²

After the Fort was abandoned, the buildings probably served as shelter for passing bands of Indians, and for traders as they traveled up and down the Miamis River. Perhaps supply trains or detachments of troops going to and from Detroit halted there for a night. Gradually, however, the barracks decayed, the casemates collapsed, and the ramparts slid down into the ditch.

The surrounding forest was felled, and the wilderness was made into fields. Over the mounds that had once been glacis and rampart, horses and cattle grazed. The stronghold which had loomed so large in Governor Simcoe's martial plans was all but forgotten. Fort Miamis became only a historic site.

NOTES

1. John Graves Simcoe to Baron de Carondelet, Apr. 11, 1794, E. A. Cruikshank (ed.), *The Correspondence of Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe, with Allied Documents Relative to His Administration of the Government of Upper Canada* (Toronto, 1923-31), II, 200. Hereinafter cited as *Simcoe Papers*.
2. Thomas Duggan to Joseph Chew, Apr. 16, 1794, *ibid.*, 209.
3. Dorchester to Simcoe, Feb. 17, 1794, *ibid.*, 154.
4. McKee to Simcoe, July 26, 1794, *ibid.*, 344-45.
5. *Ibid.* Fort Meigs was built on approximately the same site by General William Henry Harrison in 1813.
6. Simcoe to Dorchester, Apr. 29, 1794, *ibid.*, 220.
Samuel F. Bemis, *Jay's Treaty* (New York, 1923), on page 175, gives the impression that Simcoe simply repaired the old fort.
7. Thomas Duggan to Joseph Chew, Apr. 16, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 209. A "snow" is a square-rigged vessel, somewhat similar to a brig.
8. Lieut.-Col. Richard England to Simcoe, May 19, 1794, *ibid.*, 237.
9. Now Monroe, Michigan, on the River Raisin.
10. Simcoe to England, Apr. 18, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 211.
11. Wayne named this post for his friend, the late General Nathanael Greene. Wayne always spelled the word "Greeneville." Others usually omitted the "e," and the name of the town built on the site of the fort is spelled without it.
12. Harry E. Wildes, *Anthony Wayne* (New York, 1941), 349.
13. "General Wayne's General Orders," *Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections*, XXXIV, *passim*. Hereinafter cited as *MPHC*.

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There are many reports of court-martial proceedings at which soldiers were sentenced to receive 25, 50, or 100 lashes on the bare back, sometimes with "wired catts."

14. Wildes, *op cit.*, 397-99.
15. Dorchester to Simcoe, Feb. 17, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 154.
16. Hammond to Simcoe, Apr. 21, 1792, *ibid.*, I, 131.
17. *Ibid.*, 132.
18. Bemis, *op. cit.*, 5, 6, 16.
19. *Ibid.*, 7.
20. *Ibid.*, 109.
21. *Ibid.*, 13.
22. *Ibid.*, 111.
23. Simcoe to Baron de Carondelet, Apr. 11, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 201.
24. Simcoe to Sir Alured Clarke, Aug. 20, 1792, *ibid.*, I, 200.
25. *Ibid.*, 202.
26. Bemis, *op. cit.*, 162-63.
27. *Ibid.*, 164-67.
28. Dorchester to Simcoe, Feb. 17, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 154.
29. Theodore Roosevelt, *Winning of the West* (New York, 1896), IV, 57.
30. Dorchester to Simcoe, Feb. 17, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 154.
31. *Ibid.*
32. Simcoe to Dorchester, Mar. 14, 1794, *ibid.*, 182-83.

Simcoe admitted that lack of unity among the Indians made his plan impracticable.
33. *Ibid.* Simcoe was at York [Toronto] when he wrote this letter.
34. Thomas Duggan to Joseph Chew, Apr. 16, 1794, *ibid.*, 209.

Robert Pilkington (1765-1834) was a graduate of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1787. Two years later he was transferred to the Royal Engineers. He was sent to Canada in 1790 and returned to England in 1803. Pilkington fought in the Napoleonic Wars and was in command at Gibraltar from 1818 to 1830. He became major general and inspector general of fortifications. Sidney Lee (ed.), *Dictionary of National Biography* (New York, 1896), XLV.
35. Simcoe to Dorchester, Apr. 29, 1794, *MPHC*, XXIV, 658.
36. *Ibid.*
37. England to Simcoe, May 20, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 242.
38. Same to same, June 19, *ibid.*, 279.
39. President Washington wrote: ". . . there does not remain a doubt in the mind of any well informed person in this country, not shut against conviction, that all the difficulties we encounter with the Indians, their hostilities, the murders of helpless women and innocent children along our frontiers, result from the conduct of the agents of Great Britain in this country." Washington to John Jay, Aug. 30, 1794, *ibid.*, III, 16.
40. Bemis, *op. cit.*, 156-57.
41. *Ibid.*, 158-59.
42. *Ibid.*, 188-90.
43. *Ibid.*, 195.
44. *Ibid.*, 197.
45. Randolph to Hammond, May 20, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 238-39.
46. Hammond to Randolph, May 22, 1794, *ibid.*, 240-41.
47. Bemis, *op. cit.*, 202; 219-20.
48. *Ibid.*, 220.
49. Dundas to Dorchester, July 5, 1794, *MPHC*, XXIV, 680.
50. *Ibid.*

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51. Dundas to Simcoe, July 4, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 300.
52. Simcoe to Hammond, July 18, 1794, *ibid.*, 324.
53. William Potts joined the Royal Americans in 1756 as an ensign. In 1765 he was transferred to the 8th Regiment as a lieutenant. He returned to England with his regiment as major in 1785. Potts served on the frontier during nearly all of his military career. *Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin*, XVIII, 356.
54. McKee to Simcoe, July 26, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 344-45.
55. England to Simcoe, June 25, 1794, *ibid.*, 294.
56. Pilkington to Simcoe, July 7, 1794, *ibid.*, 309.
57. England to Simcoe, July 9, 1794, *ibid.*, 314.
58. Thomas Wright was a surgeon in the Royal American Regiment. In 1793, he married Therese Grant, a daughter of Commodore Alexander Grant of Detroit. He was stationed at Fort Miamis during 1794 and 1795. Milo M. Quaife (ed.), *The John Askin Papers* (Detroit, 1931), I, 461.
59. England to Simcoe, Aug. 2, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 350.
60. England to Simcoe, July 24 and Aug. 2, 1794, *ibid.*, 339, 350. The letter of July 24 reported 32 men ill; that of August 2, more than 40.
61. McKee to Chew, May 30, 1794, *ibid.*, 253.
62. George Ironside and Ronald McDonnell to McKee, May 3, 1794, *ibid.*, 227-28.
63. Doyle to Joseph Chew, June 9, 1794, *ibid.*, 262.
64. England to Simcoe, June 25, 1794, *ibid.*, 294.
65. McKee to England, July 5, 1794, *ibid.*, 306.
66. England to Simcoe, July 7 and July 9, *ibid.*, 308, 314.
67. McKee to Simcoe, July 26, 1794, *ibid.*, 344.
68. Knox to Wayne, June 7, 1794, Anthony Wayne Papers, 35:88, in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
69. *Ibid.*
70. McKee to England, Aug. 10, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 365.
71. Speech of chiefs to England, Aug. 10, 1794, *ibid.*, 357.
72. England to Simcoe, Aug. 6, 1794, *ibid.*, 359; and England's answer to the chiefs, *ibid.*, 360.
73. Grant came from Scotland to America to fight in the French and Indian War. From 1759 to 1763 he had command of the ships on Lake Champlain; then, until 1778, he was commander of the British navy on all the Lakes. After 1778, he had command of the navy on the Upper Lakes. He had a farm at Grosse Pointe near Detroit. After the American occupation, he continued to live there in his "castle" and to direct the ships of His Majesty's navy. Quaife, *op. cit.*, I, 75-76.
74. England to Simcoe, Aug. 14, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 373-75.
A Captain Hull seems to have been in command of Fort Miamis before the arrival of Major Campbell. Perhaps Captain Stiell was ill. Same to same, Aug. 6, 1794, *ibid.*, 359.
75. Jacques Baby to Simcoe, Aug. 14, 1794, *ibid.*, 379.
76. England to Simcoe, Aug. 14, 1794, *ibid.*, 374-75.
77. *Ibid.*
78. England to Simcoe, Aug. 14, 1794, *ibid.*, 373.
79. Dr. William Harfly was hospital mate at Detroit from 1781 to 1786. After the latter date he was garrison surgeon. He was at Fort Miamis in 1794. After the British evacuation, he was garrison surgeon at Fort Malden, Amherstburg, where he died in June, 1802. Quaife, *op. cit.*, I, 304. Harfly to John Askin, Aug. 18, 1794, *ibid.*, 510-11.
80. England to Simcoe, Aug. 14, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 373.
81. Same to same, Aug. 17, 1794, *ibid.*, 387.

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82. McKee to England; and Information of Robert Newman, a deserter, Aug. 4, 1794, *ibid.*, 351.
83. Wayne to Indians, Aug. 13, 1794, and affidavit, Aug. 14, 1794, *ibid.*, 371-72.
84. McKee to England, Aug. 17, 1794, *ibid.*, 387.
85. Colonel England informed McKee that he did not believe Wayne had orders to attack the posts. England to McKee, Aug. 15, 1794, *ibid.*, 379-80. Nevertheless, he stripped Fort Lernoult of men to reinforce Fort Miamis.
86. Simcoe to Bunbury, Aug. 13, 1794, *ibid.*, 370-71; Simcoe to Dundas, Aug. 13, 1794, *ibid.*, 368-69.
87. Simcoe to Dorchester, Aug. 18, 1794, *ibid.*, 391.
Simcoe, however, did not go to Detroit until after Wayne had retired from Fort Miamis.
88. *Ibid.*, 366.
Three days later, McKee informed England that he had 1000 Indians. He urged that the Lake Indians be hurried forward. *Ibid.*, 371.
89. Abstract of Pay List for a Detachment of the Southern Battalion of Militia of the County of Essex serving as volunteers or by order of Colonel England from August 10 to August 24, 1794, *ibid.*, III, 12.
90. Examination of Antoine Lasselle, *Amer. State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 494.
91. Campbell to England, Aug. 20, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 396.
92. Alexander Harrow migrated from Scotland to Canada. He was an officer in the British naval service. He lived on the American shore of Lake St. Clair. Quaife, *op. cit.*, I, 305.
Campbell to England, Aug. 21, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 398, reported that Captain Harrow and his sailors were in the fort.
93. England to Simcoe, Sept. 8, 1794, *ibid.*, III, 47. A footnote identifies "Schiefelin" as Jacob. They were brothers. Both had participated in raids from Detroit into Kentucky during the Revolutionary War, but Jacob had left Detroit and was probably in New York in 1794. Quaife, *op. cit.*, I, 316.
94. Campbell to England, Aug. 20, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 395.
95. *Ibid.*, 396.
96. *Ibid.*
97. England to Simcoe, Aug. 23, 1794, *ibid.*, 414.
98. Campbell to England, Aug. 21, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 398.
99. *Ibid.*, and Campbell to Wayne, Aug. 21, 1794, *ibid.*, 405.
This letter and the following exchange of correspondence between Wayne and Campbell are printed also in *MPHC*, V, 15-19.
100. Wayne to Campbell, Aug. 21, 1794, *ibid.*, 406.
101. Campbell to England, Aug. 21, 1794, *ibid.*, 398.
102. Same to same, Aug. 22, 1794, *ibid.*, 404.
103. *Ibid.*
104. Campbell to Wayne, Aug. 22, 1794, *ibid.*, 406.
105. Campbell to Bunbury, Aug. 22, 1794, *ibid.*, 408-09.
106. Wayne to Campbell, Aug. 22, 1794, *ibid.*, 407.
107. Campbell to Wayne, Aug. 22, 1794, *ibid.*, 408.
108. Simcoe to Dundas, Aug. 30, 1794, *ibid.*, III, 19.
Dorchester to Simcoe, Sept. 17, 1794, *ibid.*, 101.
Campbell, soon afterward, was promoted to lieutenant colonel.
109. England to Simcoe, Aug. 30, 1794, *ibid.*, 21.
110. Simcoe to Dorchester, Sept. 5, 1794, *ibid.*, 44.
111. Henry P. Johnston (ed.), *John Jay, Correspondence* (New York, 1893), IV, 33
112. Grenville to Hammond, July 17, 1794, *Simcoe Papers*, II, 321; and Portland to Dorchester, July 15, 1794, *ibid.*, 322.
113. England to Simcoe, Sept. 16, 1794, *ibid.*, III, 95.

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114. "Simcoe's Diary of a Journey to the Miamis Fort," *ibid.*, 98.
115. England to Simcoe, Oct. 13, 1794, *ibid.*, 127.
116. "Memoranda by Lieutenant William Mayne," *ibid.*, 76.
Lieutenant Mayne reported that the officers in the Fort were: Captain Bunbury, 5th Regiment; Lieutenant Pilkington, Royal Engineers; Lieutenant Givens, Queen's Rangers; Captain Seburn, and Lieutenants Bellingham, Parker, and Gainsfort of the 24th Regiment.
117. Simcoe to Bunbury, Sept. 23, 1794, *ibid.*, 105.
This date is apparently incorrect. The letter was written at Fort Miamis, and Simcoe arrived there only on the 27th.
118. Simcoe to England, Oct. 10, 1794, *ibid.*, 119.
119. Same to same, Oct. 11, 1794, *ibid.*, 120.
120. *Ibid.*, 244.
121. *Ibid.*, 120.
122. Simcoe to Portland, Oct. 24, 1794, *ibid.*, 145-46.
123. Portland to Simcoe, Nov. 19, 1794, *ibid.*, 185-86.
124. England to Simcoe, Nov. 4, 1794, *ibid.*, 167.
125. *Ibid.*
126. England to Simcoe, Jan. 24, 1795, *ibid.*, 272; Antoine Lasselle to Jacques Lasselle, Jan. 31, 1795, *ibid.*, 281.
Other French Canadians and some English-speaking residents of Detroit also used their influence to send the Indians to Wayne.
127. Portland to Simcoe, Jan. 8, 1795, *ibid.*, 256.
The defenses were not yet completed. When Lieutenant Cooper reported that £1200 would be required to complete them, Lord Dorchester ordered that no more money be spent on the post. Dorchester to Simcoe, Mar. 30, 1795, *ibid.*, 338.
128. England to Simcoe, May 2 and May 27, 1795, *ibid.*, IV, I, 24.
129. England to Littlehales, Oct. 15, 1795, *ibid.*, 105.
130. Milo M. Quaife, *Chicago and the Old Northwest, 1763-1835* (Chicago, 1913), 125.
131. Dorchester to Simcoe, Jan. 25, 1796, *Simcoe Papers*, IV, 181.
132. Dorchester to Portland, May 28, 1796, *MPHC*, XXV, 119.
Dorchester mentioned Lewis' request also in a letter of June 3, 1796, to Secretary McHenry. *Ibid.* Lewis did not leave Quebec until June 8. Dorchester to Portland, June 11, 1796, *Simcoe Papers*, IV, 297.
133. General Order, June 1, 1796, *ibid.*, 286.
134. Colonel Hamtramck was a Canadian who joined the American army and fought throughout the Revolutionary War. He became the first American commandant of Detroit. Milo M. Quaife (ed.), *The John Askin Papers*, II, 49.
135. Hamtramck to Gen. James Wilkinson, June 8 and June 16, *MPHC*, XXXIV, 739.
136. General James Wilkinson was in command of the Legion during the absence of General Wayne in Pennsylvania.
137. England to Wilkinson, July 1, 1796, Anthony Wayne Papers, 44:87, HSP.
138. Hamtramck to Wilkinson, July 11, 1796, *MPHC*, XXXIV, 739.
139. *Ibid.*
140. Secretary of War McHenry promised to send the orders "by express" on June 28. McHenry to President Washington, June 27, 1796, Clarence E. Carter (ed.), *Territorial Papers of the United States* (Washington, 1934), II, 561. Wayne received them at Fort Greenville on July 16. Wayne to McHenry, July 22, 1796, Wayne Papers, 45:23, HSP. Wayne was surprised when

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he learned that the posts had been delivered without presentation of the orders.

141. Hamtramck to Wilkinson, July 11, 1796, *MPHC*, XXXIV, 739.
142. Captain Marschalk, of New Jersey, entered the army in 1791 and was honorably discharged on June 1, 1802. Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army* (Washington, 1903), I.
143. Lieutenant Shanklin entered the army in 1792 and resigned in 1798. *Ibid.*
144. Hamtramck to Wilkinson, July 11, 1796, *MPHC*, XXXIV, 739.
145. Wayne to McHenry, July 22, 1796, Wayne Papers, 45:23, HSP.
146. Peter Audrain's ms Journal, p. 6, Detroit Public Library, Burton Historical Collection.
147. *Ibid.*, 7.
148. Wayne to McHenry, Aug. 10, 1796, Wayne Papers, 45:73, HSP.
149. *Ibid.*
150. Marschalk to Wayne, August 14, 1796, Wayne Papers, HSP.
151. Dysentery.
152. "Peruvian bark," a crude form of quinine.
153. Marschalk to Wayne, Aug. 14, 1796, Wayne Papers, HSP.
154. Forts Mackinac, Defiance, Wayne, Knox, and Lorimier were also dependent on Detroit. Gen. John Wilkins, Jr., to Matthew Ernest, July 16, 1797, Wilkins' Letterbook, Detroit Pub. Lib., Burton Hist. Coll.
155. Wilkins to John Wilson, Sept. 16, 1796, *ibid.*
In 1797, Lieutenant John Whistler was acting quartermaster. Wilkins to Matthew Ernest, July 16, 1797, *ibid.*
156. Receipts, Jan. 9, 1797, Solomon Sibley Papers, Detroit Pub. Lib., Burton Hist. Coll.
157. Wilkins to Ernest, Jan. 9, 1798, Wilkins' Letterbook, *ibid.*
158. Strong to Solomon Sibley, Sept. 21, 1799, Sibley Papers, *ibid.*
159. Schieffelin to Sibley, Oct. 31, 1799, *ibid.*
160. *Ibid.*
161. Sibley Papers, Mar. 23, 1800, *ibid.*
162. *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, 156.

Construction and Physical Appearance of Fort Miami

CARL B. SPITZER

FROM the data provided through the various institutions and individuals mentioned in the introduction of this Fort Miami Number, I have gathered all references to construction and appearances. This includes research of my own at the New York Public Library and the Toledo Public Library. I wish also to extend my thanks to Dr. Curtis W. Garrison for his very helpful cooperation. The data, though not extensive, are explicit. The original plan drawn by Lieutenant Pilkington, mentioned in his letter to Simcoe of July 7, 1794, might be detailed enough to use as a blue print. The committee have written numerous letters and worked diligently to uncover this plan. The series of British military correspondence covering this episode filed in the Colonial Office and the War Office of the Public Record Office, London, were transcribed some years ago for both the Library of Congress and the Canadian Archives. This includes the Simcoe to Dorchester letters now printed in the Cruikshank edition of the *Simcoe Papers*, and also in the *Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections*. This series is likewise calendared in the reports of the Canadian Archives. The printed works are cited by Dr. Bald in his article of this issue. Neither the Library of Congress nor the Canadian Archives has the Pilkington plan with the above mentioned transcripts. There is a personal collection of Simcoe Papers at Wolford Lodge, Devon, England, used by J. Ross Robertson in writing his life of Simcoe. The sketch may possibly be there. Also some data for the sketch on Pilkington in the *Dictionary of National Biography* were found by the author in the Royal Engineers' Archives. It may be possible that after the war we can find something there.

The following summary covers all pertinent data so far secured:

1. Description of Fort Miami in a letter sent July 7, 1794 by Lieut. Robert Pilkington, Royal Engineers, to Simcoe, giving

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progress of the work. (Printed in this issue, page 86). This is the letter which refers to plans enclosed, giving the "disposition of the several buildings; the barracks forming a part of the rampart, and are the lining of it." A brief description is also given of the various bastions and of a covered passage from the river for stores.

2. The letter of Captain Marschalk, United States Army, stating condition of fort as of August 14, 1796, when possession was transferred from the British to the U. S., with list of various structures in the fort, including seven log buildings and six other buildings. Reference is made to the fort having four bastions, also four log houses outside of the fort: "The works in general, very much out of repair, having never been properly finished." (Printed in this issue, page 102.)

3. Survey of site of Fort Miami under direction of General Orlando M. Poe, Engineers Corps, U.S.A., 1888. The original is in the National Archives, Washington, D.C. (Reduced reproduction in this issue.) The engineer's report in part was as follows: "The northeastern angle of this work and a portion of each adjacent curtain, together with the greater part of the demilune in advance of the northern front, are still in a fair state of preservation, and were readily traced. The northwestern bastion can be fairly inferred, and is therefore indicated on the map, but the southern, or river front has been destroyed, and the information in regard to it is insufficient to warrant an attempt to now outline it." (Page 2871, Appendix EEE, House Executive Documents, 1st session of 51st Congress, 1889-1890.)

4. From *Anthony Wayne*, by H. E. Wildes, page 412: "Attackers must cross a wide abatis, then leap a ditch and climb an elevated parapet before coming to the thick walls of the fort."

5. Samuel F. Hunt, "Anthony Wayne and the Battle of 'Fallen Timbers,'" in *Ohio Arch. & Hist. Quarterly*, IX, 229, has this brief description of the fort after stating it faced the river: "The rear had two regular bastions furnished with eight pieces of artillery, the whole surrounded by a wide, deep ditch about twenty-five feet deep from the top of the parapet."

6. Gen. William H. Harrison was an aid to General Wayne in the Maumee Valley campaign, and tells of Wayne's inspection of Fort Miami with a view of storming it. "But an accurate examination of the defenses of the fort, made by the general at great personal hazard showed but too clearly that our small howitzers which had been transported on the backs of the horses, our only artillery, could make no impression upon the massive earthen parapet, and the deep fosses and fraising* by which it was surrounded afforded no prospect of the success of an esca-lade."

7. In *Notes in the North West Territory* by Jacob Burnet (New York, 1847), is a reference to Fort Miami on page 176: ". . . the whole surrounded by a deep ditch, with horizontal pickets projecting from the parapet over the ditch. From the bottom of the ditch to the top of the parapet, was about twenty feet perpendicular. The works were also surrounded by an abatis* and furnished with a numerous garrison."

Our attempt to find contemporary American plans at the National Archives, the Library of Congress, and the Historical Society of Pennsylvania also met with failure. However, we obtained a photostatic copy of plan of Fort Augusta on the Susquehanna River, built 1756 on present site of Sunbury, Pa. In addition, Mr. Peckham of the William L. Clements Library, kindly sent us seven photostatic copies of maps and views of four different forts, more or less contemporary: Forts Lernoult (Detroit), Franklin and Erie in western Pennsylvania, and Malden in Ontario.

June 7, 1943, Richard Logan, George Welles and the writer, of our committee, made a brief tour of inspection of the fort. We found the ramparts existing substantially as indicated in the U. S. survey of 1888. Quoting from my record of the trip, "we gave some attention to any evidence of the ravelin which formerly existed at the edge of the fort parade facing the river, and we thought we could notice indications of a triangular

* Fraising and abatis: a row of stout pointed stakes extending out almost horizontally from the parapet is a fraise. An abatis is a row of trees with the branches left on, lying with branches pointing outward on the glacis beyond the ditch.

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extension of the parade as indicated in the map. We noticed particularly the elongated terrace below the level of the parade (on the map the figures for the level of this terrace are given as 37.6'). We were puzzled at the nature of this terrace, especially in view of the fact that the report of Pilkington to Simcoe, in reference to the 'flat bastion on the waterfront' was as follows:

I have availed myself of a hollow in the ground before the left face of the ravelin by making a covered passage under the glacis for a communication with any work on the adjacent rising ground, and it gives easy and secure access in receiving of stores into the fort from the side of the river.

"The long ditch running from the river in a northeast by northerly direction past the parade and northeast bastion could easily be the route used for getting supplies from the river up to the fort.

"The earthworks of the bastion on the property west of the fort have disappeared and the ditch which surrounds it has been filled in. But within the indicated boundaries of the bastion is a rectangular depression about 6 ft. deep (not shown on the map), with its sides more or less coinciding with the indicated boundaries of the bastion or casemate. We all believe that this depression probably represented a cellar or storehouse beneath the ground level of the bastion."

I am sorry that I could not find more definite information relative to the physical appearance of the fort, especially of the various buildings, some of which formed an integral part of it. I believe that a careful survey and some conservative excavation should be recommended to the Metropolitan Park Board. In this way it may be possible to establish the ground plan of the fort, and the plans of other contemporary forts should be helpful. Mr. Howard Peckham of the William L. Clements Library writes: "No doubt much of your reconstruction work must be founded on actual diggings at the site and a careful survey of the ground in the light of the verbal descriptions. Much splendid work of this sort was done a few years ago at Yorktown, when the Revolutionary earthworks were reconstructed and separated from the Civil War earthworks. If Mr.

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Storm, our map expert, and I could be of any help in measuring and consulting on the spot with you, I am sure we could get leave for a day or two."

Mr. Peckham's kind offer should be seriously considered, and it might be advisable also to secure the assistance of Mr. E. C. Zepp, Curator of State Memorials and Dr. Morgan, Curator of Archaeology, both of the Ohio State Museum; or some other archaeologist, such as Prof. Carl Blegen of the University of Cincinnati, with a long and varied experience in Greece and Asia Minor. It may be difficult, however, to determine how the various buildings were constructed; and if, for instance, a small scale model is made in the future, care should be used to insure accuracy.