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

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Facsimile of part of a page of the diary of Reverend Nathan Brown

A Conference With Abraham Lincoln

FROM THE DIARY OF REVEREND NATHAN BROWN[1]
Edited by N. Worth Brown and Randolph C. Downes

Reverend Nathan Brown

On the evening of December 31, 1862 three clergymen called at the White House for a talk with Abraham Lincoln. The purpose of the call was to present to him a petition for the complete abolition of all slavery in the United States. This petition had been adopted at a meeting of ministers and laymen of the churches of New York and Brooklyn on December 22 at the Church of the Puritans in Union Square.

The occasion for the meeting was the pending proclamation of the emancipation of slaves in the South announced by President Lincoln for January 1, 1863. The announcement had been made on September 22, 1862, five days after the Union victory over the Confederates at the battle of Antietam in Maryland. In this announcement the President declared that, by virtue of his powers as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, he would, on January 1, declare all slaves within any state or district in rebellion "thenceforward, and forever free."

The abolitionist element, especially the clergy, were disappointed in Lincoln. They saw his obvious purpose of using emancipation as a device to help win the Civil War. They felt that this missed the central issue of the slavery question, and that slavery, being an abominable wrong, should be abolished everywhere as a matter of justice to the negroes. However, the North was not united on this. Many thought that to free the slaves in states supporting the Union, that is Delaware, Maryland, western Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri, would alienate their slave-owning population. Lincoln was sharply criticized for his partial emancipation, and this petition and the subsequent debate at the White House were part of this criticism.

The ministers who brought this petition to President Lincoln on December 31 *were Dr. George B. Cheever, William Goodell, and Nathan Brown. Dr. Cheever and Goodell were editors of* The Principia, *a weekly religious newspaper published in New York City. Dr. Cheever was also pastor of the Church of the Puritans, in which the Memorial was adopted, and seems to have been the chief author of it. However, it is of Reverend Brown that we wish to write because he was the author of the diary on which this article is based.*

Reverend Nathan Brown was born in New Ipswich, New Hampshire, in 1807. *He was the son of "Deacon" Nathan and Betsy (Goldsmith) Brown, who, soon after their son's birth, moved to a newly opened district in southern Vermont and established a farmstead at Whitingham.*

Young Nathan was prepared for college by his father and a local clergyman. At the age of 17 *he entered Williams College as a sophomore, and graduated with honors from that institution in* 1827, *being the valedictorian of his class. After graduation he became principal of Bennington Seminary, where he met and married his first wife, Elizabeth Ballard. After years of teaching he became editor of the Vermont* Telegraph, *published at Brandon, Vermont. Two years later, after six months' study at the Newton (Mass.) Theological Seminary, he was ordained at the Rutland (Vt.) Baptist church and immediately volunteered for foreign missionary service. The long trip around the Cape of Good Hope to India was made on a sailing ship in* 1833. *From Calcutta he went to Burma, thence to Assam where he established several Baptist missions and translated much of the Bible and many of our hymns into the Assamese language. After* 22 *years of service in Burma and Assam, he and his wife, both broken in health, returned to America. Mrs. Brown never recovered and died in this country.*

During Nathan Brown's numerous missionary preaching tours in the United States, he spent considerable time in Ohio, speaking frequently at Cincinnati, Cleveland and Marietta. While in Ohio he accepted the editorship of the Journal and Messenger, *a religious weekly published in Cincinnati. There he became intimately acquainted with Levi Coffin of the "Underground Railroad", and was deeply stirred by the pitiful condition of fugitive slaves. In* 1857

he took the editorship of The American Baptist and Freeman, *an anti-slavery magazine published in New York. He remained with this publication for* 15 *years, and it was during this period that he became associated with Dr. Cheever and Mr. Goodell, active leaders of the anti-slavery campaign in New York City. Together with these clergymen he served on the Committee which presented the Memorial to President Lincoln calling for emancipation on the grounds of* justice *rather than on the basis of political expediency.*

In 1872 *Nathan Brown again volunteered for missionary service, this time for the specific work of translating the Bible into the vernacular, or spoken language, of the Japanese. In the same year he married Charlotte (Worth) Marlit, a widow with two daughters, and with them left for the Orient where he spent the remaining fourteen years of his life. During these years in Japan he translated the New Testament, large portions of the Old Testament, almost a hundred Christian hymns and many religious tracts. In addition to his literary work he organized the Yokohama Baptist Church and a printing house where his tracts, hymn-books and Bibles could be published. Nathan Brown died in* 1886. *His wife remained in Japan, organized and conducted a Christian school for young women. Both are buried in Yokohama under a large, plain stone bearing, at his request, a simple inscription—his final prayer—"God Bless the Japanese."*

1. *The Memorial*[1]

The memorial presented by Dr. Cheever, Reverend Goodell and Reverend Brown to President Lincoln was entitled "Memorial to the President of the United States, and to the United States Congress now in Session." It was published in The Principia, *January* 1, 1863.

Representatives of the nation, and members of its government.

The peril of our country and a sense of our duty to God and humanity impel us to address you.

In presenting our views of the duty of our Government in this crisis, we are only exercising our right and privilege as citizens, and perform-

ing an obligation implied in the Constitution as well as imposed upon as in the word of God.

We believe the whole cause of our disasters to lie in our own continued complicity with that crime of human slavery, which is the foundation and inspiring demon of the rebellion itself.

Had we withdrawn ourselves from that complicity by obeying the command of God, at the outset, the justice and mercy of heaven were pledged for our protection and success, and the divine frown would have been upon our enemies. For there never has occurred upon earth a rebellion so unprovoked and truly infernal as this. There never was a conflict, where the injustice, crime, treason, barbarism, atrocity, impiety were massed so exclusively and entirely on one side, by the very condition of its being a slaveholders' rebellion, and its avowed object the establishment of an empire for the sole purpose of securing and perpetuating, uninterrupted and unlimited, the traffic in human beings. On our side, had we cut ourselves loose from this iniquity, had we ceased to sanction it, there would have been nothing but justice, reason, piety towards God, benevolence towards man, and the cause of all good government on earth. We should have secured the blessing of God, and commanded, from the outset, the sympathy and respect of all the nations.

But the moment we ourselves re-entered into complicity with the very wickedness which was the foundation of the rebellion, we threw away the immense superiority of our moral position, and descended to a level with that of the rebels. Disavowing any intention of interfering with slavery or delivering the oppressed, and on the contrary offering the continuance of slavery, if that would save the Union, we deprived ourselves of the possibility of appealing, as our fathers did, in the war of the Revolution, to the Judge of all the earth for the justice of our cause and the rectitude of our intentions, and we went so far as to inform foreign nations that no moral principal was involved in our quarrel, and that the position of every State and of all persons in it should be the same after the rebellion as before. This announcement was enough to set both God and man against us, as well as against the rebels; and in fact the determination to spare slavery has been the cause of all our disgrace, and all our disasters.

When Fort Sumter was attacked by the rebels, had we replied by a de-

cree of emancipation and a force of only twenty thousand men carrying that decree, the rebellion would have been crushed and the war ended, almost as soon as it began.

But we chose war without emancipation, and God gave us our request, with disaster and defeat as the consequence. Raising great armies without acknowledging and obeying God, without striking at the heart of the rebellion, and placing officers in command who were themselves pro-slavery, and nullifying the emancipating proclamations of such generals as were animated by the spirit of liberty, we confirmed the strength and daring of the rebellion, and gave opportunity and time for the rebels to swell their forces and their means, at first so insignificant, to a gigantic power. We have ourselves deliberately built up and prolonged the Confederate treason, by the determination to avoid striking at its cause. We have provoked the indignation and challenged the avenging justice of the Almighty by resolving that we would not decree the deliverance of the enslaved, till this measure should become a necessity indispensable to the existence of our own government. And even now, when calamity and defeat have pressed us to this movement, we have taken all the dignity and virtue from it, by declaring it to be adopted as a mere military necessity, and by combining with it the offer of continued slavery to as many rebel states as will return to practice that wickedness under the government and guarantee of our own Union.

Had we issued the decree of freedom as an act of justice and obedience to God, instead of merely threatening it as a measure which we were unwilling to execute, it would have secured victory for us. The last terrible battle and carnage and defeat at Fredericksburg would have been avoided, for the rebel armies would have been compelled to look after their own slave property, instead of our taking it in charge for them, while they were left at liberty to keep the field against us.

As if justice to the oppressed were something forbidden, fraudulent, and dishonorable in this conflict, we have deliberately evaded it, until it should have become an ultimate necessity, and then under the fear of destruction we would execute justice, when all other measures had failed. What wonder if the Almighty should have declared, Because I called and ye refused, and have set at nought all my counsel, therefore I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh. For still the guiding star of our policy seems to be to crush the rebellion with as little

injury to slavery, and as little depreciation of slave-property as possible.

This course having been pursued at such a dreadful cost, and found inadequate except for ruin, we have the right to demand that entirely another policy be adopted; the policy of justice and obedience to God; and that men be placed in command of our forces whose heart is in it, and who will at all hazards carry it out. We ask the government to recognize justice as supreme, to put the proclamation of emancipation into the shape and security of immediate and irrevocable law, and to throw the country on "the conscience of our generals," and so upon God.

We demand that the government give us the cause of freedom *against* slavery, and not freedom entering into a new compact *with* slavery, or making use of slavery as a bribe for the purchase of loyalty. We demand freedom to be made as purely and entirely our cause, as slavery is purely and entirely the cause of our enemies. We will have freedom or nothing. No more compromise with slavery! Give us freedom to fight for, against slavery, and the whole heart and soul of the country will be inspired, and in the name of our God we shall set up our banners.

Let the government stand by the country for this glory, and the whole country will stand by the government. Let the Government show, by the unconditional abolishment of slavery, that they are resolved on crushing the rebellion, and the country will support the government with its whole wealth, power, and population. It would be better for us all, men, women, and children, to go down to our graves fighting, than to enter into any terms with this wickedness, or forge any more chains for the enslaved, or submit ourselves ever again to the despotism of the slave-power. We demand the entire destruction of that power, and the deliverence of its victims, as the only ground on which ever again we can boast the dignity and independence of a free nation, or hope for the favor of God, or the enjoyment of permanent, prosperity aand peace. Had we been as earnest in the cause of freedom, humanity, and justice, as the rebels have been in the cause of slavery, cruelty and injustice, we should have conquered them long since. We ask the President and Congress to place our conflict, now, on such grounds that we can confidently implore God to give us the victory.

It is in our power, by this one measure of universal freedom to render our success absolutely certain. By this measure the South would be

made a moral paradise, though now an earthly hell; our whole country would be regenerated; we should create a light of freedom and justice for all the nations; intervention would no more be dreamed of; we should prevent the nations of Europe from the guilt, shame and misery of receiving to their embrace a slave-breeding and trading community as a nation; we should ourselves secure the favor of the Almighty, we should vindicate our own claim to the character of a free government and people, we should release our Constitution from the tyranny of its slave-masters, and of the party in league with them, we should remove the veil of ignorance and misrepresentation in regard to it from the eyes of Europe and the world, and we should disclose its true glory, under its all controlling law of freedom and justice, with its beneficent provisions forbidding slavery and securing liberty to every person . . .

If we receive back any of the rebel slave States, or any portions of them, with their slave-holding guaranteed to them as a right, we not only sanction this crime, but ourselves renew and perpetuate it. Especially, now that the slaves in all rebeldom are at our disposal, and are rightfully judged to be free, by necessity of the rebellion itself, and we assume the rightful authority and power over them, and the right to legislate in regard to them, disregarding the slave-codes as of no authority; a fact which is palpable in our proclaiming liberty to any of them; having assumed this power and right, if we leave any of them slaves, it is we ourselves that enslave them. If we have the right to free any of them, we have to free them all; and this right being given us, along with the opportunity, by Divine Providence, it cannot be just to condemn any of them to continue slavery. The determination to do this would subject our government and people to the wrath of the Almighty; for the attribute of divine justice is the same now, that it was when Jefferson and our fathers trembled before it; and there are no quaker guns in the government of God.

We ask therefore, in the name of God and justice, that the decree of emancipation be entire and unconditional; and especially that no exception or exemption from that decree be made or permitted for any of the rebel States, or for any portions of them, or for any loyal persons in them; since the loyalty of such persons cannot take away from the slaves the right to their freedom, nor confer upon us the right of returning any of the slaves to slavery, or of continuing any of them in slavery. We can recognize no more right in loyal persons to make slaves of their fellow beings than in rebels; and as the Almighty, who alone could give any

right of ownership in man, has made no exception in the case of such persons, so neither can we. Loyalty gives no more dispensation of indulgence in this crime, or title to pretended property in slaves, than rebellion. The right and title of the slaves to their own freedom remain unimpeached, and it is our right and duty, having aassumed supreme authority over them, to protect that freedom . . .

To the Congress now in session, as the Constituted Legislative Sovereignty and power of the nation, alike in war as in peace, we appeal, and to the President as the Executive of our government, in the name of God, Justice and Humanity, that they would immediately enact and execute that decree of universal freedom, obligatory by our own Constitution, as well as by the Law of God, the enactment of which would be that return of judgment unto righteousness, which God demands, and the execution of which would crush and annihilate the present rebellion with its cause, would restore peace and prosperity to the whole country, would destroy all power and motive for any renewed attempt at such treason and would be an illustrious example of freedom and justice for all ages and nations.

GEO. B. CHEEVER,
WILLIAM GOODELL,
NATHAN BROWN,
Committee.

2. *The Conference*

Reverend Nathan Brown's copious diary, from which the following account is taken, is a very intimate document. It reflects the deep religious faith of its author whose missionary life was spent in the service of many races—white, yellow and black. He was a zealot and, as such, was unable fully to appreciate the complicated political and military problems of the harrassed Lincoln.

Dec. 30, 1862. Dr. Cheever and Mr. Goodell sent in urging me to go on to Washington with them, as a telegram had been received from Senator Harlan, that an interview could doubtless be obtained, and that it was important for the Committee to come on and present the memorial—that adopted at the meeting of ministers and others at the Church of the Puritans.

We started from the Jersey ferry at six o'clock. Rode all night and reached Washington in the morning. Found Senator Harlan at the National Hotel. Went up to the White House in the afternoon, Senator Harlan conducting us, but could not get an interview. The Cabinet was in session.

About six in the evening went up again. Senator Harlan seated us in an ante-chamber and went to ascertain from the Private Secretary if we could be admitted. After being gone fifteen or twenty minutes, he came giving the intelligence that the President could give us but five minutes, as he had agreed to meet the West Virginia deputation at 7, and it was now very near that hour, so we followed the Senator to the President's room. We were ushered in where the tall man stood up near the fire, apparently waiting to receive us. Were introduced and shook hands. Mr. Harlan excused himself and passed out of the room.

"Well, gentlemen, be seated." The President sat down in a large chair near the fire-place, Dr. Cheever in a chair on his right hand, near the table and under the gas, Mr. Goodell in another chair next him, while I took the big chair opposite the President, at the other end of the fire.

Dr. Cheever got out the memorial and began to introduce the subject, explaining our object—was afraid the memorial was too long to read. (It wanted then just five minutes of seven by the clock that stood on the mantel.)

"How many pages are there?" Dr. Cheever began to turn them over and count—the length was formidable. He did not venture to tell him how many pages there were.

"Well, read on; if it is too long I'll tell you when to stop." The doctor began: the President stretched out his legs across the fireplace, leaning, or rather lying back in his chair, in such a posture as a tired man or an invalid would assume in order to rest. He fixed his eyes upon me mechanically, and did not, as far as I could judge, take them off, except in a single instance, during the whole reading. In order that I might not appear to be watching the effect of the reading upon him, I directed my eyes to the reader, looking up but seldom towards the President. He listened with imperturbable attention; the memorial was read by Dr. Cheever in a somewhat rapid manner, not with that terrible emphasis

with which he had read it in his own church—that of course would have been to insult the President. The soft unimpassioned tone did not, however, take away the edge of its severity—but the President showed no emotion. Only once did he interrupt that part of the memorial which said that if emancipation was a military necessity in any States, it was in all.

"That's a non sequitur," said he (pronouncing it "sekkitur"), hurriedly raising himself up in his chair and turning his look upon Dr. Cheever —"That's a non sequitur".

Dr. Cheever thought the statement was correct, and the President dropping the subject, allowed the reading to go on till the memorial was done, and Dr. Cheever began to follow it up with further remarks. At length a pause gave the President opportunity to begin. The sleepy eyes opened, the dark complexioned face assumed an expression of interest; a consciousness of mental power, perhaps of superiority, gleamed from the eye, the wide mouth disclosed a seemingly half-sarcastic smile, and if I could read the countenance, it said, "Now gentlemen, I have borne a pretty severe lecture from you, and you don't get off without something of the same sort yourselves". His first words were:

"Well, gentlemen, if you could *prove* to me *one half* of what you have read in that memorial, I should be a happy man!" He then went on to show that the wonderful effects which the memorial predicted would follow the proclamation, in ending the war, were imaginary and without any foundation.

"I *know* it is not so", he said with much emphasis. "You have addressed me a letter through Mr. Greeley, in behalf of twenty millions, assuring me that as soon as I have issued the proclamation, the whole country would rally round me, and thousands of volunteers would rush into the ranks. The proclamation was issued, and see what the result was in the elections, the opposition gaining strength and carrying the majority against us. Instead of the proclamation having brought support to the administration, it has done the reverse".

Mr. Goodell and Dr. Cheever remarked that there was another cause, "that the proclamation was not a proclamation of immediate emancipa-

tion, but a postponement of it". "Yes, I know that is the reason you give for its failure".

According to previous agreement Mr. Goodell and myself left it chiefly to Dr. Cheever to carry on the argument, knowing that the time was so limited. The President said: "You state in the memorial that the whole country would be united on emancipation, that they would be *unanimous*. How could we believe that such men as were leading the opposition in New York city, would be unanimous in approving emancipation?"

Dr. Cheever contended that it would have been so if the blow had been struck at once, instead of deferring it three months. "Your enemies in New York city, even the *Herald* and Fernando Wood would have quailed under it."

The President said one or two victories would do a great deal more towards disarming opposition than any proclamation.

While the discussion was going on, one of the President's children, Tad, a smart little boy, six or eight years old, came bouncing into the room; "You must go away, my son, you can come and see Pa by and by".

The President said the Committee were unwilling to allow him to be the judge of what would be best; their memorial assumed that they knew better than he did, what measures would save the country. "You come to me as God's ministers, and you are positive that you know exactly what God's will is. You tell me that slavery is a sin; but others of God's ministers say the opposite—which am I to believe? You assume that you only have the knowledge of God's well".

"No, Mr. President", said Dr. Cheever, "we only refer to God's word, which speaks plainly on this point. The Golden Rule is sufficient".

The President said to Dr. Cheever that he presumed he was the writer of the memorial. Mr. Goodell said that the other members of the Committee had a part in it.

"Well, Dr. Cheever, I must say that you are a very illogical reasoner, at least that is my opinion—ha! ha! ha!" The President seemed to have a

habit, whenever he said anything sharp or sarcastic, of finishing it up with a sort of forced, mechanical laugh—a pretty good imitation, too, of a right hearty, spontaneous laugh—to show that he was in good humor. This made his sarcasm appear not at all offensive, but rather as good natured pleasantry, and Dr. Cheever could not but thank him for his frankness. Several times his laugh was so earnest, that mingled with his wit, it succeeded in bringing the whole Committee into a tolerably sympathetic he-haw.

The President said all his convictions and feelings were against slavery. "But", said he, "I am not so certain that God's views and feelings in respect to it are the same as mine. If his feelings were like mine, how could he have permitted it to remain so long? I am obliged to believe that God may not, after all, look upon it in the same light as I do".

The Committee answered that this would prove too much—it would excuse any crime which God permits, adultery, murder, treason. Does God's failure to interpose relieve the government of its obligation to punish these crimes?

As the time wore away, the Virginia Deputation became impatient, and the Private Secretary came in to say they had come. "Tell them to wait a little", said the President, and went on with his conversation. "Your memorial represents that a decree of emancipation would produce a *transfiguration*—but I have no evidence that it would produce a 'Transfiguration' "—"I do not know that the British decree of emancipation produced any such transfiguration in England."

Dr. Cheever: "Was there not a transfiguration in the British West Indies? Nor in the Sandwich Islands?"

The President said the idea seemed to be that there would be something miraculous in the effect of emancipation, but he had no evidence of miraculous events in our times. The memorial attributed our military defeats to our generals who did not favor emancipation, and predicted that if other generals were in command, of the same sentiments on abolition as the Committee, we should be sure of victory. He supposed, as a general thing, an officer who was hearty in the work he was doing, would do rather better than one who was not, but when we looked at facts, he did not see that the generals who were in favor with that part

of the community which we represented had done much better than others. Some of the generals of this class had done pretty well, and some had not done so well. He did not see that there was on the whole much difference. Such generals as Reno, Stevens and Kearney had been denounced as pro-slavey, and abused as if they were traitors, but there was proof of their patriotism, that they had given their lives for their country.

The President did not appear to be at all sanguine as to the results of emancipation. He said, however, that the experiment would be commenced tomorrow on a scale of some two or three millions, and if it succeeded with them as the memorialists anticipated, they could then with propriety call on him to emancipate the rest. He thought the proclamation would do something; that it was, on the whole, the best course that could now be pursued, and therefore he had adopted the measure.

The Committee urged upon the President the duty of carrying out emancipation as a measure of *justice*; and not as a mere military necessity. He considered that he had no power to do it except as a military measure; he would be glad to have slavery done away with, but he knew no authority by which he could interfere, except as a measure of war.

Dr. Cheever appealed to him—whether if one of those children of his should be kidnapped and carried into bondage, he would not feel that there was authority in the National Government to rescue and restore him to his parents? This seemed to affect the President, it was a solemn question. He hesitated for a moment, then said hurriedly, as near as I could make out the expression, that it was a case not provided for.

The clock had now reached about twenty minutes to eight, and the topics seemed to have been nearly exhausted, Dr. Cheever having, as chief spokesman, well sustained the argument. Thinking we had held the President quite as long as we could with propriety, I remarked that perhaps we ought not to trespass upon his time further, so we rose to go. He rose and continued his talking—we thanked him for his frankness and candor. He seemed in perfect good nature, and not at all anxious to hurry us off—made several pleasant remarks and wound up by telling one of his stories—not a dog story but a calf story—to show that proclaiming slaves free did not make them free. "As an illustration",

said he, "there is an amecdote, rather a homely one—In one of our western courts there had been an attempt made to show that a calf had five legs—the way the point was to be established was by calling the tail a leg, but the decision of the judge was that *calling* the tail a leg, did not make it a leg, and the calf had but four legs after all".

I told him we were very thankful for the proclamation, and I hoped it would not prove a mere proclamation, but that it would be fully carried into effect. Mr. Goodell said a few words in favor of having generals that were heartily in favor of carrying it into execution, and we took our leave, the President shaking hands with us as we left.

The next morning everybody was on tiptoe to get a sight of the morning papers, as it was understood they were to contain it, but the document did not appear till three o'clock in the afternoon, and when it did appear it contained the extraordinary declaration that emancipation was an act of *"justice"!* Was that word added subsequently to the reading of the memorial, and the discussion of this subject with the Committee?

(It appears that the word was added by Mr. Chase with the President's acquiescence.)

3. *The Proclamation*

Although the reverend gentlemen who petitioned and debated did not obtain the complete emancipation they desired, they rejoiced that Lincoln had gone as far as he had. They looked forward to the freeing of all the slaves in the near future. They believed the Proclamation of January 1 to be a tremendous inspiration for all Christians to intensify their efforts for the completion of the great work.

Moreover, as Reverend Brown pointed out in the excerpts just quoted, the committee felt that it was responsible for the insertion of the word "justice" in Lincoln's Proclamation. The actual wording of the document at this point is: "And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God".

The pride felt by the ministers in their effort is reflected in the remarks by Dr. Cheever in The Principia *for January* 8, 1863:

What amount of influence, or whether any, at all, was exerted, by our Committee's late interview with the President, on his Proclamation, we have no means of knowing. We have the consciousness of having discharged our duty. The President told us his Proclamation was to be issued the next day. The Washington papers said it was to be signed at noon. Our Committee, we suppose, had the last hearing, on the subject. The grand, distinctive idea urged upon the President, was, that *justice,* and not mere military *necessity,* should characterize a National Act of that description: and now, for the first time, for fifty years, in our national history, the word *"justice"* in relation to the enslaved, has found national expression.

The same spirit of rejoicing is found in Reverend Brown's editorial entitled "An Act of Justice", in his magazine, The American Baptist and Freeman, *on January* 13, 1863:[2]

JUSTICE—we thank the President for that word. It elevates the nation to kinship with the heavens. It writes the name of ABRAHAM LINCOLN among the stars. That single word changes the whole tenor of the proclamation. The emancipation of God's crushed, torn and bleeding children is decreed not merely as a "military necessity", not merely as an "act warranted by the Constitution", though it is unquestionably both, but as "An Act of Justice". Our civil war is now in form what it has always been in reality, the struggle of freedom against oppression.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Manuscript diary of Reverend Nathan Brown is in the possession of his son, Dr. N. Worth Brown of Toledo, Ohio.
2. Quoted from *The Whole World Kin: A Pioneer Experience Among Remote Tribes and other Labors of Nathan Brown.* (Hubbard Brothers, Publishers, Philadelphia, 1890), p. 474.

Dynamite Doings On Delaware Creek

By Kathryn Miller Keller

Ambulance and fire engine chasing was not born of modern motor and movie-thrill manias, as some would have you think. It seems, rather, to be a time-honored American tradition. Take, for example, an incident of sixty-odd years ago when Toledoans swarmed the depot at Erie and Lafayette Streets and made it look as if a Tri-State Fair was being held.[1]

A November Sunday is not supposed to be an ideal time for an excursion, yet the Toledo, Cincinnati and St. Louis R.R. had advertised not one but *three* excursions for the afternoon of November 16, trains leaving at two, three, and four o'clock. Destination: THE EXPLOSION![2]

More particularly, the narrow-gauge trains were hauling sightseers upriver just beyond present day Walbridge Park to Delaware Creek where the Rummel Powder Co. works had been completely destroyed a few days before. But for weeks, even years after, it was referred to as THE EXPLOSION. To this day old-timers reflect the excitement of those Sunday excursionists when they recall the time the "dynamite works let go!"

The explosion was "bad in itself" but through the years it has been "represented worse." A few years ago, the late Chub DeWolfe printed in his Toledo *Blade* column AMONG THE FOLKS several versions of the affair as sent in by readers. Many of these versions showed the embroidery of inaccuracies and half-truths that sooner or later creep into a long-told, oft-told tale. One told of a worker "cooking" dynamite on top of a stove when ashes fell from his pipe into the mixture and set off the conflagration. Another gave a toll of three lives, one man supposedly blown clear over the tree tops into the Maumee River! But when old family diaries were consulted everyone agreed on the date: November 13, 1884. And the Toledo *Blade* of that date bears witness that this was the date of the "Most Lively Shaking Up."[3]

As always when you read of events in old newspapers, you are tempted to quote at length, for in the days of unhurried, one-edition-a-day journalism, the reporter usually turned out a piece of puckish prose well seasoned with puns and cracker barrel philosophy.

The *Blade* reporter did himself proud with the dynamite story in this respect, although he must have been caught with his paper made up for the day when he brought in his story. One can almost hear the editor shouting "stop the presses" (or whatever editors shouted in 1884 before the movies) and see the mad scramble to squeeze the story in somehow. The net result was that the *Blade* front page carried a column headline, DYNAMITE, followed by the tail end of the story "as continued from page 3" where it began!

The *Blade* reporter wrote with the light happy touch of one who had just escaped with his life. And so he must have felt for a few minutes after ten o'clock of that November morning. He had been busy in an upper story office when the quake hit and he was under the "vivid impression" for the moment that "the boiler in the basement had let go."

He flew downstairs and found the streets filled with people, panic and "what was it?" Some thought the Nut and Bolt Works had blown up.[4] Every boiler in town was suspected. But a visiting salesman staying up in the Boody House[5] reputedly shouted: "Grover Cleveland's been elected and the bottom just fell out of my business!"

At first, few, it seems, suspected that the shakeup had taken place way out in the country on Delaware Creek. Nothing exciting had taken place out there for forty years or more, not since the paper city craze had struck the Maumee Valley and two towns, Marengo and East Marengo, were laid out near Delaware Creek, each with the idea of being the future great river port when the canal might terminate at that point on the river. Of course, the canal eventually by-passed the towns to terminate farther downstream. As of 1884 the Delaware valley was just what the *Blade* of 1937 predicted it would be: "That bare and solitary city known to paper—but unknown to population."[6] Which was precisely why A. J. Rummel had established his powder works there on the Henry Westmyer farm.

The *Blade* reporter got his news nose pointed upriver and headed out Broadway. He passed Broadway School where the pupils had stampeded after the shake-up and run down a lady janitor in their fright. Fortunately, Officer Kruse happened by and rescued the lady from the juvenile juggernaut—and in the nick of time. This being during the reign of Victoria, the good woman had, of course, fainted.

The Union School in Maumee too felt the shock. Windows were broken and blackboards fell off the walls. Classes automatically dismissed themselves and one rangy six-foot scholar came down from the top story in something like a half dozen steps—one flight of stairs to a step. For a time it was thought that the Maumee school would be unsafe for occupancy because the blast had cracked the masonry walls. But some stay rods solved the problem—and well, for the old school is still in use hugging two modern wings to its sides.[7]

But back to our *Blade* journalist, who by this time was approaching the Welfare Farm, the present site of Walbridge Park. Here he met someone who told him that it was Rummel's Factory that had gone up. Hurrying on, he noted that the House of Refuge on the farm had eighty or ninety window panes shattered.

Another half mile and he was in sight of the terrible devastation wrought by the explosion of tons of giant powder. The trees were scorched and the underbrush was shorn of every sprout. A hole big enough to drop in a house had been torn out of the hillside. Fragments of sheet iron storage cans no larger than a man's hand littered the area. But, miracle of miracles, though the property loss was terrific there were no lives lost save that of one very dead owl!

The Rummel Mills had consisted of a packing house, a drying house, and a storage room set about 200 feet apart on the south side of the creek. Today, the site can be determined approximately by locating Westmyer Drive opposite the creek from Harvard School.

The *Blade* reporter went about his investigation and assembled a very complete story of what had taken place. Three workmen, William Highthorn,[8] Charles Gaul, and his brother Reinhard Gaul were at work in the packing room. They brought in a tub of nitroglycerine which had been standing outdoors and had frozen in the cold November weather. It was necessary to thaw it out before working with it so N. C. Clark, the foreman, rolled the tub within five or six feet of a coal stove thinking to thaw it slowly but one of the men moved it closer during the morning.

And then one of the workmen glanced toward the tub and saw that it had caught fire. Nitroglycerine cannot be exploded by heat except at a very high temperature but in the ensuing excitement no one stopped to con-

sider the Fahrenheit reading on the smoldering tub. If they had and would have simply emptied the tub, the story might run differently. But instead they picked it up and with a "heave-ho" sent it crashing down the hillside to the creek!

Clark and one of the Gauls were at work in the mixing room at the time. Gaul was working on a platform above Clark turning a crank. With the shout of FIRE from the tub-heavers, Gaul jumped down striking Clark and the two of them went sprawling. Before they could get up, the tub exploded and the building fell in. A kettle of acid tipped over on Gaul and Clark dragged him to his feet and hurried him to the creek. Gaul, in his panic, refused to get into the water and wash off the acid so Clark was obliged to throw him in. Then he once more dragged him out, crossed the canal, and got him into a house. The rest of the workmen seemed to have come away only with singed whiskers. There were really two explosions, the first the burning tub, and then the powder in the storeroom. Fortunately, no one was in the storeroom.

Rummel estimated the loss in explosives at $10,000. In one paragraph the reporter said there were 500 pounds of Hercules powder, 20,000 pounds of dynamite, and three to five tons of gunpowder involved. In another he gave 15,060 pounds of Great Western powder and three to five tons of gunpowder. But a few hundred pounds of powder one way or the other could have made little difference!

The whole thing was such a near tragedy, that the reporter indulged in giving comic sidelights in the November 13 and 14 issues of the *Blade* as a sort of balance to the grim details:

He noted that the ice house of the Grasser and Brand Brewery[9] *standing across the way from the dynamite plant had been damaged. In fact, some one had thought at first that it was the ice house that had gone up—but then everyone knew that ice was high enough already!*

Farmer John Phelan and family enroute to Toledo from their home in Maumee were tossed into the ditch from their wagon when the explosion occurred.

A woodshed in the vicinity looked as if it had had an attack of the ague!

A farm house nearby had collapsed and a passerby ran in to remove the cook stove from the prostrate farmwife.

Glass in a Monroe Street saloon was shattered but it was also reported that one chap (obviously a tippler of note) experienced no trouble, not even spilling a drop even though the blast occurred just as he was about to drink.

Glass in the cars at the Union Depot[10] *was broken.*

News was trickling in from neighboring towns telling that the blast was felt as far off as Bowling Green and even Ontario, Canada. And so, the Toledo Cincinnati and St. Louis inserted an advertisement telling of excursions to the site of the explosion. The following day the *Blade* said there was plenty of souvenir hunting on Sunday and that the fatal keg, whose size seemed to have provoked discussion, was about as big as a washtub.

This was not, however, the last of the Rummel operations—or explosions.

A. J. Rummel came to Toledo about 1877. He was a native of Seneca County, attending grammar school in Tiffin and high school in Belleville. He farmed in the summer and taught school in the winter until he was twenty-six years old. Then he went on the road selling Austin Powder. And, in those days he must have had "a good thing" for powder was in demand. Perhaps a statistician will some day calculate how many tons of explosives per square mile (exclusive of Indian warfare) was required to make modern America. With virgin timber to be cleared and veins of stone and oil to be worked, explosives played an important role in the settling of the country. The roads being what they were and dynamite being what it was and is, small dynamite factories were common around the country.

So after selling powder for a number of years and then establishing a store on Summit Street in Toledo, Rummel opened up one of these small dynamite plants at Delaware Creek in 1883. A year later, of course, came

the explosion. He rebuilt the factory, but evidently not at Delaware Creek.[11]

As of 1888 the Rummel store was established in larger quarters in the 100 block of St. Clair Street handling firearms, ammunition, sporting goods of all kinds, and was sole agent for the Austin Powder Company for Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois with a traveling salesman constantly on the road. At this date Rummel is also described as "owner and operator of a large powder mill northwest of the city which is thoroughly equipped with the latest and best machinery where he gives employment to some fourteen persons." The mill had an annual capacity of 300,000 pounds with sales principally coming from iron and copper mines. He had customers in Northern Michigan, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, Ohio, and Indiana.[12] The location of the factory, "northwest of the city" must have referred to the Rummel Works in Point Place along Maumee Bay.[13]

But, at about this same time there was a mixing plant way out in the country on Sylvania Avenue—only it wasn't called Sylvania Avenue but Dynamite Road! That section of Sylvania Avenue from Monroe Street to the quarry town of Silica (which incidentally was then known as Glanntown) was always referred to as Dynamite Road until about the early 1920's when the sandy old trail was paved and took on dignity and its present name.

From recollections of people who lived in the vicinity of Dynamite Road, the Rummel Works was little more than a barn.[14] It stood in the deep woods about a quarter of a mile east of Talmadge Road on the south side of the Dynamite Road—or roughly just about across the street from Horace Mann School. One might suppose that the plant had been located here to supply the several quarry operators up at Silica—but this is only conjecture.

But the experience of one John Robedeau is no supposition but hard reality. Robedeau was working in the barn when this too "let go" and a scale weight went through his hat![15]

Rev. Elliot F. Tallmadge, whose father's Central Avenue farm about adjoined the Rummel property at the back, remembers the explosion distinctly and dates it between the years 1882-6. "It occurred during a thun-

derstorm and we thought the house had been struck by lightning. It damaged one chimney, nothing else," he recalls.

Locating a dynamite factory at Point Place was the happy solution to several problems. A city ordinance prohibited the hauling of nitroglycerine through the city streets[16] and there was probably always some uneasiness, if not a law, to prevent ships coming upriver to take on a load of explosives. Before the turn of the century, Point Place was not "city." So the factory and a long dock where vessels could tie up in the bay was established at Dry Tree Point[17]—or locating it from the land it would be at the present location of 145th and 326th Streets.[16]

Not only the big lake vessels, but rowboats, too, loaded at this dock. During the oil excitement on the East Side men were hired at fifty cents a trip to take loads of explosives across the bay for operators who were drilling and shooting wells in the marshes near Millard and Bay Shore Road. The most famous, and most productive well, was the Klondike gusher which was shot in the mid-1890's.

The Point Place Dynamite Works and dock were destroyed when a stray shot from a hunter's gun struck it. But when this took place is not now known.[16] In a newspaper article telling of Mr. Rummel's death in 1908,[18] it was stated that the mill at Point Place had not been in operation for a year, leading one to believe that, though unused, the place might still have stood intact. The obituary also mentioned that Rummel's sulphur plant on Swan Creek was still in operation. The city directory of 1908 classifies this Rummel enterprise as a sulphur refinery.[19]

And so ends the tale of a quarter century of "dynamite doings" on the Delaware—and elsewhere in Lucas County.

FOOTNOTES

1. Toledo *Blade,* November 17, 1884.
2. Toledo *Blade,* November 14, 1884.
3. Toledo *Blade,* November 13, 1884.
4. The Toledo Bolt and Nut Works was located on Segur Avenue.
5. The Boody House, Toledo's leading hotel, was located at Madison and St. Clair on the site of today's Ohio Building.
6. Randolph C. Downes, *Canal Days,* p. 65.
7. Recollections of Mr. Frank Geer and others at Spring, 1947 meeting of Maumee Valley Historical Society.

8. The spelling "Highthorn" has been used in this paper because the son of William Highthorn, Mr. E. P. Highthorn, used this spelling in writiing to Chub DeWolfe of the Toledo *Blade*. In 1884 the *Blade* reporter used two different spellings, Heighthorn and Hoghdoon.
9. The Grasser and Brand Brewery itself stood at the corner of St. Clair and Williams Streets.
10. This is the Union Depot on Knapp Street now being razed for a new station. At the time of the explosion it was the "new station" and the pride of the city. Previously, the station had been located on the Middlegrounds in the Island House hotel building.
11. *Toledo, Its Resources and their Development,* A Souvenir of the Toledo Bee, Toledo Bee Co., 1890, p. 54.
12. *An Illustrated Review of Toledo, Ohio,* Enterprise Review Publishing Co., 1888, p. 45.
13. Mr. William Keller, Sylvania, Ohio as a boy passed the site of the explosion frequently when going from his home in Maumee to Toledo. After the explosion he recalls seeing no buildings on the spot but only the big hole in the ground. Evidently, Rummel rebuilt elsewhere.
14. Acknowledgment for help in this respect to: Mrs. Herman Miller, Mrs. Murl Smith, Mrs. William Conrad, Mr. and Mrs. Minor Hoag, Mr. Wade Harroun, and Rev. Elliot F. Tallmadge.
15. Letter from Rev. Elliot P. Tallmadge, May 13, 1949.
16. Information given to the Local History Department, Toledo Public Library, by Mr. Charles Mensing, September 30, 1948.
17. Leslie E. Thal, *The Maumee Story,* Toledo Port Commission, 1949. Mimeograph. Page 18.
18. Toledo *Blade,* November 17, 1908.
19. Toledo City Directory, 1908.



Drawing by Kathryn Miller Keller

Old Steady: The Role of General James Blair Steedman at the Battle of Chickamauga

By John M. Morgan

1. *The Controversy: Steedman vs. Gordon Granger*

Few wars in history have given rise to more historical controversy than our own War Between the States. Lack of adequate reporting at the time, confusion in the memories of old soldiers in after years and, above all, political partisanship have given rise to many acrimonious debates.

Toledo, too, has its Civil War controversy. It concerns the part played by our General James B. Steedman in the great and dramatic conflict known as the battle of Chickamauga.

The controversy developed with the publication in 1876 of a small book entitled *Steedman and His Men at Chickamauga,* by Dr. Joseph T. Woods.[1] This work is dedicated to the author's friend, Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, and is vouched for as a "full and truthful account" by General Steedman. It gives Steedman, instead of his superior General Gordon Granger the credit for being in command of the three brigades of Granger's Reserve Corps that went to the rescue of General George H. Thomas at the battle of Chickamauga, September 19-20, 1863. It also gives credit to Steedman for actually ordering the rescue movement. Some years later Clark Waggoner, a prominent Toledo editor and historian of Lucas County, published a pamphlet charging that Woods had given Steedman credit which was really due to General Granger.[2] When a monument was erected to General Steedman in Toledo, General John C. Smith, then Lieutenant-Governor of Illinois and a former staff officer of Steedman's, gave a rebuttal to Waggoner in his dedicatory address.[3] The objective of this article is to compare these claims and counter-claims with the official records in an effort to determine the truth.

2. *James Blair Steedman*

James Blair Steedman is one of the most interesting personalities in Toledo history. Born in western Pennsylvania in 1817 of a family which counted among its members several officers of the Revolution,[4] he worked in newspaper offices for several years. When the Texans revolted against Mexico in 1863 he hastened to join the army of Sam Houston in its successful struggle for independence. On his return from Texas he established himself in northwestern Ohio as a contractor and publisher of a newspaper, the *Northwestern Democrat.* His contracting included a share of the work on the Wabash and Erie Canal, and, later, on the Toledo, Wabash and Western Railroad.[5]

In 1847 he was elected to the lower house of the Ohio legislature, where he served two terms. He went overland to California in 1849, returning to Toledo in 1851. The Democratic Congress of 1857 recognized his considerable political influence by selecting him as public printer. In 1859 he became publisher of the Toledo *Times,* the only Democratic paper then in Toledo. In 1860 he was a delegate to the Democratic National Convention in Charleston and Baltimore as a staunch supporter, of Stephen A. Douglas. On his return he was himself nominated by his party as candidate for Congress. There followed an exciting campaign, culminating in a series of joint debates between Steedman and his Republican opponent, James M. Ashley. These debates are a vivid example of the issues and feelings in what was probably the most important national election in our history. In the end, Ashley was elected by a narrow margin.[6]

While Steedman was attending the Democratic convention in Charleston, he is reported to have taken a sailing trip in the harbor there, during which the question of secession came up. He is said to have vowed to resist any secessionist attempt to remove the flag of the United States from the Charleston forts. Be that as it may, his paper promptly rallied to the support of the Lincoln administration after the attack on Sumter.[7]

Steedman had been in charge of the militia of northwestern Ohio since 1857, and immediately after Lincoln's call for troops he commenced to raise a regiment. This was duly enrolled as the Fourteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, with Steedman as its first Colonel. It went into camp at

Cleveland just twelve days after the fall of Sumter. The regiment took part in the first major Union offensive, McClellan's invasion of western Virginia, and was engaged at Philippi, Laurel Hill and Carricks Ford. The Fourteenth was then transferred to Kentucky and served in the Mill Spring campaign, in which the Northern forces, under George Henry Thomas, drove the Confederates from the eastern part of the state.[8]

While in Kentucky the regiment received a group of fugitive Unionists from east Tennessee. Among them was Senator Andrew Johnson, later President of the United States, who shared Colonel Steedman's tent that night.[9] Shortly thereafter Steedman was promoted and assigned to the brigade of General Robert McCook, who had been killed by a guerilla ambush in Tennessee.[10]

In the battle of Perryvile, Kentucky, October 8, 1862, the first Rebel assault broke through the Union left, under General Alexander McDowell McCook and threatened to rout the entire Northern army. Phil Sheridan's division held, however, and parts of McCook's line rallied. Union forces then advanced to recover the lost ground. Steedman's brigade delivered the final charge in this operation. For his services in this action Steedman received highest praise from his commanders, Generals Gilbert and Buel. During the Tullahoma, Tennessee, campaign of June and early July, 1863, General Steedman had temporary command of a division, and on August 11th he was assigned permanent command of the first division of the newly formed Reserve Corps. It was as commander of this division that James B. Steedman took part in the Chickamauga campaign.[11]

3. *Rosecrans and the Battle of Chickamauga*

The battle of Chickamauga ranks as one of the most important of the war. The Confederacy, strangled by the Union blockade and bleeding from the staggering twin blows of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, gathered its forces from all quarters and sent them to help its Army of Tennessee. The southern leaders knew that they must win a smashing victory somewhere if their cause were to survive. The Army of Tennessee met the Federal Army of the Cumberland south of the city of Chattanooga along the Chickamauga (this Indian name aptly means River Of Death) and

the Southerners won a victory, but, due to the gallant and skillful resistance of the Union left wing, they failed to destroy the Federal army[12] at a critical moment. When this left wing was almost surrounded, Steedman's division arrived and saved the day. The question is, who was responsible for this action, Steedman or his superior and Corps commander, Gordon Granger.

It seems advisable to set forth briefly such general and particular information as forms the essential background for our enquiry. The Army of the Cumberland was commanded by Major-General William S. Rosecrans. It was divided into three regular corps: the XIV, under George H. Thomas; the XX, under Alexander McD. McCook; and the XXI, commanded by Thomas L. Crittenden. In addition, the troops guarding the long line of communication from the Chattanooga front to the Ohio river had been recently formed into the Reserve Corps, under Gordon Granger. General Steedman's division was a part of this last corps.[13] It consisted of three brigades under Brigadier General Walter C. Whitaker, and Colonels Robert Mitchell and John C. Coburn.[14]

A word should be said about the command procedure of this army. Rosecrans had an unfortunate habit of giving orders directly to division and even brigade headquarters without notifying the corps or division commanders involved. This was not harmful in ordinary circumstances, but under the stress of battle it often led to the disintegration of these corps as effective units. Thus the command of local operations was liable to devolve upon Rosecrans and his staff directly, and at times when the situation was most confused. This led in turn to orders being issued by men who had little knowledge of the troops who had to obey. It was one such order which resulted in the rout of the Union right at Chickamauga.[15] This tendency was accentuated by the fact that Crittenden and McCook were of doubtful ability, while Granger was inexperienced. Thus only Thomas, of the four corps leaders could be fully trusted.

Rosecrans opened his campaign with a brilliant manoeuvre which forced the Confederate General, Braxton Bragg, to evacuate the strategic city of Chattanooga. Rosecrans then pressed forward in pursuit of Bragg's army which was mistakenly supposed to be fleeing into Georgia. In so doing the Union commander split his forces into three separate col-

umns. But Bragg was not fleeing, he was laying a trap. Forced out of Chattanooga, he retired some twenty-five miles southeast to the vicinity of LaFayette, Georgia. Here he was joined by the troops from east Tennessee, under Buckner, those under Walker from Mississippi, and by two divisions of veterans from Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, under James Longstreet. This brought his total strength up to about 65,000 men, against Rosecrans' 58,000.[16] In addition, the three Union corps were now widely scattered over south-central Tennessee and north Georgia. Bragg attempted to strike at Rosecrans' separated forces, but missed his chances, and, after many anxious moments and much forced marching the Army of the Cumberland was finally reconcentrated behind the Chickamauga.[17] Aware that Bragg had been reinforced, Rosecrans ordered forward some of the Reserve to strengthen his field army. General Steedman was ordered to dispose Coburn's brigade to defend the railroad in his care and move to the front with Whitaker and Mitchell. He crossed the Tennessee River at Bridgeport on September 13, and marched to Rossville, Georgia, a few miles south of Chattanooga. En route he was joined by the twenty-second Michigan and the eighty-ninth Ohio, and by the brigade of Colonel Daniel McCook. This, incidentally, was the third of the famous "seven fighting McCooks" whose carreers crossed and influenced Steedman's.[18]

Rossville was some distance to the left and north of the main Union army, but was occupied because it covered the roads by which the Southerners could turn that left and cut Rosecrans off from his new base at Chattanooga. Gordon Granger, as commander of the Reserve Corps, had responsibility for the railroad and other rear areas, but, of course, he had a perfect right to attach himself to any part of his command, including the portion serving in the field. This he did, as we shall see.

During the period from September 14 to 18, the Confederate army assembled on the eastern side of the Chickamauga and commenced moving to its right in order to turn the Union left. Longstreet's men had not arrived, but the rest of their forces were well in hand and ready for action. Rosecrans shifted to his left to meet the rebel advance, which shift, climaxed by an all night march on September 11-19 by Thomas, prevented Bragg from successfully completing his flank movement.

The battle itself may be briefly outlined in this manner. On Septem-

ber 19, the Confederate right wing crossed the Chickamauga and collided with Thomas' men, just coming up after their all night march. There followed a series of charges and counter-charges delivered as the troops reached the field; the end result was about even for the two armies. On the 20th the morning saw a renewal of the Confederate attempt to break Thomas' line, which was a failure. Then the Southern left wing advanced and found a hole in the Federal line, left through a mistake in orders. These orders were sent direct from Rosecrans' headquarters to T. J. Wood, commanding a division of Crittenden's Corps. Crittenden knew nothing about it. Hood's confederate corps drove through this gap and routed the entire right wing of the Union army. Rosecrans, Crittenden, McCook and Assistant Secretary of War Dana were caught in the rush and carried from the field. Thomas alone remained. He reformed his force into a semicircle on Horseshoe Ridge and held on. The Confederate attacks threatened to turn his flanks and drive him also, but, at the Critical moment Steedman's division arrived and drove back the attackers, thus saving Thomas and preventing the decisive victory which Bragg had to have.

4. *Who Was In Command of the Rescue Brigade?*

Our question is, how did this dramatic and providential arrival come to pass? That is, who was responsible for it, Granger or Steedman? The contention of the friends of General Steedman is that it was through his initiative and imagination that this brilliant move was made. The other side claim it for Gordon Granger. To solve this problem it is necessary to go back to the point where these troops crossed the Tennessee and trace in detail their movements and the orders which led to them.

The contentions of Steedman's partisans are as follows: first, that General Granger was never in command of the three brigades of his corps which reached the front, and that these were commanded by General Steedman; secondly, that on the September 17 and 18 Steedman was specifically under the orders of Rosecrans, rather than Granger; and finally, that the movement to support Thomas on the 20th was conceived by Steedman contrary to orders, and was executed by him over Granger's protest.[21]

The truth of the matter is that Granger made the decision in accordance with Rosecrans' orders and Steedman executed it. To ascertain the facts in the matter, one must review the story of the movements of Steedman, Granger and their troops. This can be done only by using the official records. Portions of those records have been used by General John E. Smith in presenting the case for Gordon Granger. Neither side has used the whole record, and we shall see that, if the whole is studied, a clear picture will result; a picture which gives each man his due, although it disproves one of the cherished legends of the Civil War.

The first relevant dispatch is from Granger to Colonel Goddard of Rosecrans' staff, dated 7:00 A. M. on September 14, 1863. This message, sent from a point five miles from Chattanooga, announced that Steedman's command had reached that point and would probably reach Rossville by noon. Another note, this time from Granger to Crittenden, announced that three of Granger's brigades were at Rossville at 12:30, indicating that the estimate in the first message was correct. This second dispatch is headed "Headquarters, Reserve Corps, Rossville".[22]

From these missives two things are clear; that Steedman commanded the column moving to the front, and that Granger was establishing his headquarters with that column. In addition, the absence of any correspondence between Steedman and army headquarters indicates that he was not in charge of the general movements of the force, for then he, and not Granger would report its position and movement. Further, the note to Crittenden shows that Granger was undertaking liaison with the nearest corps of the Federal army, a job done, as far as possible, by the actual commander of the force, not by a mere spectator. These messages show, then, that as of noon on the 14th Granger was commanding his corps, but leaving the actual management of the march to the division commander present, General Steedman.

Final confirmation may be found in two messages of the thirteenth, sent while the Reserve Corps force was still on its way to the scene of action. One was from Granger to James A. Garfield, Rosecrans' Chief of Staff, indicating that Steedman's column was of two brigades, and that Colonel Dan McCook's brigade was six hours ahead of Steedman. In reply, Garfield gave Granger orders to concentrate at Rossville and to

contact Crittenden, which, as we have seen, he did. The orders were not sent to Steedman.[23]

On the 15th there is one dispatch recorded which is relevant. It is from Granger to staff officer Goddard and reports that Granger's scouts had discovered a rebel force near Ringgold, which he believes might be Buckner's, from east Tennessee. The important point for us is that combat intelligence was being transmitted through Granger's headquarters, which would not be the case if Steedman were directly under army headquarters.[24]

On the 16th Granger sent two orders to General James D. Morgan, commanding a division of the Reserve which was guarding the railroad. As an appendix to these orders Granger informed Morgan that McCook's brigade and two regiments under Le Favour were at Rossville. As we already know Steedman was there, Granger had completed his concentration, having two brigades of his first division and one and one-half brigades of the second present.[25]

On the same day the records show several orders and messages from general headquarters which shed light on our subject. A circular order to all corps commanders concerning the posting of pickets was sent to Thomas, Crittenden and McCook, but not to Granger. If this meant that Granger was not in command of his corps field force then the order would have been sent to Steedman; it was sent to T. J. Wood commanding a detached division of Crittenden. The conclusion, therefore, is not that Granger was not in active command, but rather that his pickets were not included in the general order because there was as yet no strong force in his front. A later circular on the subject of ammunition was not sent to Granger or Thomas. As Thomas was unquestionably in command of his corps, it would seem that in the Army of the Cumberland circular orders were often sent to some of the corps commanders, but not to those who were not directly concerned, or who had already carried out their equivalent.[26]

More direct evidence is afforded by two orders from Rosecrans to Granger. The first, sent at five in the afternoon, gave various instructions concerning the rear of the army, and then stated the general position, saying "You hold our left . . . " The later order, signed by Gar-

field, opened with the flat command phrase, "The General commanding directs you to" and arranged the dispatch of a brigade to reconnoitre in the vicinity of Ringgold and support the cavalry in that area. Granger was, therefore, most assuredly the commander of the force at Rossville.[27]

Granger apparently lost no time in executing his orders to move a force on Ringgold. Wood, in his little book *Steedman and his Men at Chickamauga* says, "On Wednesday, the 16th, the commander of the division was surprised by receiving an order direct from General Rosecrans, to make with one brigade a reconnaisance toward Ringgold . . ."[28] This order is made the basis of the claim that Steedman was thereafter acting under orders of the commanding general of the army, not Granger. There is no record of any such order, but, even if it were sent the existence of a similar order to Granger would indicate that Steedman's was a copy sent direct to save time, which did not remove him from the control of his Corps commander.

During the time Steedman was moving toward Ringgold several messages passed through Granger's hands. A circular addressed to all corps commanders was received, asking the number of men present for duty "in the line of battle". Army headquarters considered, therefore, that Granger was in command of a part of the field army. A report from General Minty of the cavalry announced that Steedman was nearing Ringgold.[29] This was forwarded to general headquarters. Apparently, however, Granger was not too busy to see company. A letter from him introduced to Garfield Granger's old friend and the prince of good fellows, Senator Nesmith, of Oregon. As an excuse for sending the note, Granger added a postscript telling Garfield what he already knew, that Steedman had left for Ringgold that morning.[30]

Woods speaks of Steedman's arrival at Ringgold as "uncovering . . . hords of freshly arrived rebel soldiers." He is again suffering from a hyper-active imagination. Granger sent a message the next day to the effect that Steedman had just returned and reported that there was nothing at Ringgold except a small cavalry force under Colonel John S. Scott. Woods further states that Steedman, during his withdrawal, saw a column of 20,000 men advancing toward the La Fayette road on the eighteenth. It is just possible that such a column was seen, but, if so it was composed of three brigades just arrived from Virginia under John B.

Hood. This force, about 5,000 men, was the advance of Longstreet, the rest of whose force did not arrive until the first day's fight was over.

The 18th dawned in considerable expectancy for the Union army. Enough information was at hand to indicate that Bragg had been heavily re-enforced and was moving to the attack. There is a note of urgency in all Federal messages, as the various officers hurried preparations for the impending battle. Steedman had withdrawn from Ringgold during the night, and was taking position near McAfee's Church, about two miles east of Rossville on the Ringgold road. Granger had sent Dan McCook's brigade to Reed's Bridge, on the Chickamauga about five miles southeast of McAfee's. He set the bridge on fire and later reported that it had been destroyed, but in fact the Confederate advance guard put out the fire, and the bridge was used by the Southern army throughout the battle.

On the afternoon of the eighteenth Granger received an order signed by Garfield, which directed him to send another brigade to Reed's Bridge.[37] Captain Russell, Granger's Assistant Adjutant General, replied, "General Steedman sent the second brigade immediately upon receipt of your order."[38] Granger followed this at 4:30 with information that this brigade had left an hour before.[39] As this brigade was part of his division, there is no reason why Steedman should not order it to march. The fact that he did so does not show him independent of Granger. Until 4:30 on the eighteenth of September Gordon Granger had been with his field force as its active commander, discharging all the duties of that position.

Now, however, occur the events which have, in all probability, led to the confusion as to who commanded the Reserve Corps in the battle. A message was recorded from Granger to Russell, dated from Crawfish Spring, 8:00 P. M.[40] Crawfish Spring was the headquarters of the Army of the Cumberland at this time and was several miles up the Chickamauga. Granger, therefore, had ridden over to report in person to his commanding general. This dispatch was a request that Russell forward the latest news of Whitaker and McCook. Two messages formed the reply. One, from Russell to Steedman, asked for the necessary information. The second, Russell to Granger, contained a summary of what was probably an oral message from Steedman. McCook was supposed to be at Reed's

Bridge, with Mitchell moving to support him. Whitaker was near McAfee's. Steedman thought that Mitchell should go to Whitaker, and would not order this shift, as the present move was by Rosecrans' order.[41] This reply has been taken to mean that Rosecrans had ordered Steedman to move Mitchell. However, we know that this order was sent to Granger. The only meaning possible for Steedman's statement is that he knew the order for Mitchell had originated at army headquarters, rather from Granger himself, and therefore did not feel that his discretionary power as senior officer present justified his reversing an order the reasons for which he could not know.

The reply was apparently regarded by its senders as a request for a change of orders. At 2:25 A. M. of the 19th Russell sent again, saying that no change had been received, and requesting that Mitchell's orders be changed at once.[42] At 3:00 the following message reached its destination:

> *General James B. Steedman:*
>
> *The general commanding directs that you send for McCook and the other brigade for orders to you. Orders to Whitaker are right.*
>
> *R. S. Thoms,*
> *Captain, Aide de Camp.*[43]

This was, without doubt, a direct order from the commanding general to General Steedman. Thoms was Rosecrans' aide, not Granger's. It placed McCook's brigade, as well as Whitaker's and Mitchell's under Steedman's orders, and told him to move them as he saw fit. The order was not sent through Granger. But the reason for this is obvious, and it in no way relieved him of his command. As he was at army headquarters when the order was sent, it was natural enough to send an urgent command to the senior officer with the troops, merely showing it to Granger. This was even more the case when that senior officer had himself suggested the alteration made. Granger was still at Crawfish Spring, for at 7:30 he wrote to George D. Wagner at Chattanooga saying he had just returned to Rossville from a visit to the commander of the army.[44]

At 8:15 the same morning Granger forwarded McCook's statement

that he had burned Reed's bridge, and that he (Granger) had "ordered McCook's and Mitchell's brigades to fall back to this place."[45] The corps commander, then, had resumed command and instead of ordering Mitchell to support Whitaker had ordered both him and McCook to Rossville.

5. *How the Great Confederate Break-Through Took Place.*

It has often been noticed that small things sometimes touch off much bigger events. On the morning of the 19th while retiring, Colonel Daniel McCook, politician, soldier, glory seeker and former partner of one William T. Sherman, sent a message to his right. He was annoyed at having missed what he supposed was a good chance to make a name for himself near Reed's, but thought someone else should have a chance as he had to withdraw. The note, addressed to "General Thomas or any other Union General," said that McCook had burned Reed's bridge and that one or more brigades of rebels were cut off on the Union side. Thomas promptly sent forward the divisions of Brannan and Baird to bag the aforesaid brigade.[46]

They charged head on into, not a brigade, but the advance of Bragg's whole army. General Croxton, commanding one of Brannan's brigades is reported to have asked Thomas which of the four or five brigades in his front was the one to be captured. First Forrest's cavalry, then W. H. T. Walker's infantry corps counter-attacked and drove in Brannan and Baird. Thomas sent in R. W. Johnson's division, followed at intervals by those of Palmer, Reynolds, Van Cleve, Davis, and portions of those of Wood, Sheridan and Negley. On the Confederate side Cheatham, Cleburn, Stewart, B. R. Johnson and Hood pitched in. One erroneous report had precipitated the long-expected battle, and in such a manner as to upset the plans of the commanders of both armies. Seven of the eleven Union divisions had been fully engaged, and three more in part. On the Confederate side also, much damage had been done.

At 1:00 P. M., during a lull in the fighting, Thomas sent a note to Granger asking him to give his position, and mentioning that his prisoners included troops from Virginia and Mississippi, thus proving that Bragg had been heavily strengthened. Shortly after this, Granger report-

ed that Whitaker had been attacked at the crossing of Spring Creek, near McAfee's, and that re-enforcements were being sent. He further says that the enemy was now in strong force at Ringgold. The force in question may have been the brigades of Humphreys and Kershaw, McLaw's division, or Longstreet's corps. They arrived about this time, but as their reports mention no fighting then, the engaged force was probably Scott's cavalry.

On the evening of the 19th Thomas again wrote Granger reporting that he had been severely engaged, and wanting to know if the Reserve Corps was in supporting distance of his left.[52] Later Steedman sent a message to Thomas' left reporting his position.[53] This has also been cited as evidence that Granger was not exercising command, as he sent Thomas' message to Steedman to answer. Even if this were the case it would only mean that Granger considered Steedman better acquainted with the disposition of the McAfee force. But it is not likely that Steedman is answering Thomas, for if he were he would have directed his letter to him. Instead it is addressed to the "Commanding officer, forces on the left of the XIV Army Corps." Steedman gives his position on Spring Creek, (the Little or West Chickamauga) and mentions Whitaker's skirmish of the afternoon. He then asks for information concerning Thomas' left. This is the message of a good division commander who wishes to cooperate with his neighbors in the line. It does *not* imply that the division commander is no longer under the orders of his corps.

The final dispatch of the day is one which shatters one of the cherished beliefs about Chickamauga. All authorities, whether they consider Granger or Steedman to have been in command of the Reserve Corps during the battle, have maintained that that force was moved to the assistance of Thomas on the second day of fighting without orders, if not contrary to orders already received. Yet this is contrary to the record. In a dispatch from Garfield, i. e., Rosecrans, to Granger, sent at 8:00 P. M. on the nineteenth there appears, along with some routine matter, this sentence, "You must help us in the fight tomorrow by supporting Thomas." This was an unqualified order. It recognized Granger as the commander of the Reserve Corps and specified that he was to support Thomas. Presumably it was left to Granger's discretion whether that support could be rendered best by moving to Thomas' left, by protecting

his road to Rossville, or by moving the reserve directly to his position on the field. But there is no doubt that Granger's part for the next day is to assist the main army by supporting Thomas. Whoever executed the maneuver, it was made, not contrary to orders, or even in the absence of them, but in accordance with the instructions of the commanding general.

During the night of September 19-20 General James Longstreet joined Bragg with two more brigades from Lee's army in Virginia. Bragg undertook to reorganize his army into two wings: the right, under Leonidas Polk, and the left, under Longstreet. His plan of battle was to drive the left of the Union army up the Chickamauga and thus cut the Federals off from their base. Bragg's orders to D. H. Hill, commanding the extreme right, were to attack at dawn, with the rest of the army to go in successively from right to left. Hill, however, did not receive his orders until after the attack was supposed to start, so the whole affair was late in starting. Breckinridge, with Hill's right division, went in about 9:30; the rest of the army rolling forward in succession. Negley's division, on the left of Thomas' line was crumpled up, but the rest held, and Polk's troops sustained a bloody repulse.[56]

At eight in the morning Thomas sent a note to Granger informing him that he expected to extend his left down the Chickamauga and asking if Steedman's division was within supporting distance on his left. Later, as the fighting grew severe, Thomas sent repeated appeals to Rosecrans for fresh troops.[57] To provide these reinforcements, the corps of Crittenden and McCook were drawn upon to such an extent as virtually to disintegrate them. Thus, by eleven o'clock all of Crittenden's men had gone to Thomas except Wood, and most of McCook's were on the way. This left those two officers in charge of organizations which, in their lack of troops, resembled Granger's. Again Rosecrans sent direct to a division commander. T. J. Wood was ordered to close up on Reynolds and support him. But either Rosecrans or one of his staff blundered in not realizing that Brannan was between Wood and Reynolds. Wood therefore had to leave the line to obey. Into the gap poured the Confederate Corps led by General John B. Hood. The whole right of the Union line was swept away. Rosecrans, Crittenden and McCook were caught in the rout and carried away. Only Thomas and the left wing remained to face the victorious rebels.[58]

Hood had been severely wounded, however, and Longstreet had gone back to report to Bragg.[59] The various division and brigade commanders made separate charges, but no unified effort was made against Thomas until Longstreet returned.[59] In the meantime Thomas had managed to form a line of Brannan's division, with fragments of other commands.[60] Longstreet did return in due course, and soon had a major assault under way. As his line went forward, Hindman's division of Alabama and Mississippi troops overlapped Thomas' right, but at the crucial moment they were met and driven back by a furious counter-charge, delivered by troops whose sudden and fortunate arrival we must now explain.

6. *Who Ordered Steedman to the Rescue?*

The dawn of the 20th had found Steedman's troops still some miles beyond the Union left, at McAfee's Church. Granger's headquarters at Rossville were about three miles to the rear. As we have seen, Thomas had written to Granger about 8:00. Whether his query concerning Steedman's position stirred Granger up, or not, General Whitaker reports that he visited the McAfee Church position around 9:00. We have occasional references to his being with the field force from then until mid-afternoon.

As the day progressed, the sound of furious conflict rolled up from the south. This was Polk's attack on Thomas. The obvious question in everybody's mind was whether or not to go to Thomas. All reports indicated that there was no enemy in their front. There was no reason, then, to continue to guard the road; the cavalry could do that. The decision was to go to Thomas by the La Fayette road.

Who made this decision? Smith and Woods maintain that it was Steedman; Waggoner and most other authorities give the credit to Granger. Wood states that the movement was started before Granger reached the front, and that he protested that Steedman was violating orders from Rosecrans to hold Ringgold at all hazards. We have seen that no such orders were issued. Further, Woods says that the march began around 11:00. This agrees with the time at which they arrived, between 1:00 and 1:30, as the march was about five miles.[64] But Whitaker's contemporary report mentions that Granger came up about 9:00. The move did not, therefore, begin before Granger came up, but rather

about two hours after, plenty of time for him to make up his mind and give orders to Steedman. Smith has no trouble as to timing, but still retains the supposed fact of orders to remain and hold the road.[65] The real fact is that the keynote of Granger's orders was that he *must* support Thomas. All orders assume Granger to be in command. No doubt the impetuous Steedman, perhaps ignorant of the order sent to Granger the night before, was anxious to move at once, perhaps before the more cautious Granger was convinced that Thomas was drawing the whole rebel attack and the road was safe. Perhaps he even openly urged such a move. Woods and Smith say so, and both were there. But, in view of Garfield's positive order of the previous evening, and Thomas' correspondence of that very morning, it seems to be a virtual certainty that Granger was the man who made the move.

There are two later pieces of evidence on this point. Colonel Dan McCook, whose brigade was in the column with Steedman's men, reports that he was detached from it and placed where he could cover the Chattanooga road which was the army's direct line of retreat. This order was from Granger, who was manifestly managing the march at that point.[66] Finally there is this brief dispatch:

> *Col. Flynt:*
> *General Granger is moving Steedman with two brigades to General Thomas' assistance.*
>
> *W. C. Russell,*
> *Captain and Assistant Adjutant-general*[67]

General Steedman's partisans claim that the passage in his official report giving the credit to Granger was altered by Steedman's order, to assist Granger who was then in trouble and needed such credit on his record. There is a possibility here, for Granger was perpetually in trouble with his superiors. But this note could not have been similarly treated. Addressed to Colonel George E. Flynt, Chief-of-Staff to Thomas, it is signed by William C. Russell, Granger's Assistant Adjutant General. Captain Russell could not have inserted this note after the event, for he was killed in the struggle for Horseshoe Ridge later in the afternoon.[68] Thus it is clear that the two brigades of Steedman's division, Reserve Corps marched to join the battle under the direction of their corps commander, Gordon Granger, who was himself merely implementing the

orders of Rosecrans. The real credit is not for an original idea, but for a prompt and wise use of discretion as to how to carry out orders given. This credit belongs to Gordon Granger.

En route, near the McCloud house, was a Union hospital, captured by the Confederate cavalry under Forrest. Steedman recaptured the hospital and cleared Forrest off the road.[69] About 1:30 Thomas saw a column of troops approaching his left rear. He knew Steedman was coming, but he had already had a force which was supposed to be re-enforcements under Sheridan turn out to be enemy, so he sent an officer to make sure. The man soon returned with Granger and Steedman. Steedman reported his strength, and the fact that he had 95,000 extra rounds of ammunition. This was water in the Sahara for Thomas, whose cartridge supply was virtually non-existent; Thomas first ordered that they fill a gap on the left of Wood. Before this could be done Hindman's line appeared overlapping the right of the Federal army. Thomas ordered Steedman to shift his force to the right and clear the high ground in that area.[70] This was the counterattack which drove back Longstreet's first grand charge. Thus a combination of forethought by the commanding general, wise discretion on Granger's part, and fast marching plus hard fighting by Steedman's men prevented disaster.

7. *Steedman's Troops Save the Day.*

When Steedman moved off to get into position, Granger remained with General Thomas near the Snodgrass house. The evidence on this score is overwhelming. Granger was seen there later by many observers serving a gun in Smith's battery. He was mentioned as there, along with General Garfield, by Garfield himself, and by Generals Harker and Wood. Even the evidence of his staff officer, Major Fullerton, places him there. None of his subordinates mention his presence with them. Granger himself admits that he was with Garfield, and Garfield was nowhere near the position of Steedman's division. Steedman's division was brought to the field by General Granger, but it fought its battle without him.

A short, rapid march brought Steedman to the deployment area. Major Smith dashed to one brigade, Captain Moe to the other, and soon the

division was in line of battle, Mitchell's four regiments on the right, Whitaker's six on the left. The position they were to carry was a spur of Missionary Ridge, with undergrowth, trees and rocks, scattered thickly over its steep slopes. On it could be seen a large number of Rebels. As Woods correctly puts it, "Plainly every inch of the slope before them was strewn with death."

Steadily the division moved forward up the ridge, exchanging volleys of musketry with Hindman at point-blank range. Slowly, steadily the line advanced forcing the gray jackets back. At one point the 115th Illinois broke for the rear, but staff officers checked the rout, and Steedman himself seized the regimental colors, rallied the 116th and led it back into the fight. Finally Hindman's men broke, and Steedman's line swept on to the heights, where they halted to re-form. For the moment there was a lull. One of the most magnificent charges in American history was over; behind Steedman's new line, on the slopes of the ridge, lay 1,100 men twenty-eight per cent of the division. This was the price of victory, and it was not all that was to be exacted.

Miller's battery came in on the gallop to support the infantry in holding the position. It was just in time. A long, grey line of Confederate infantry moved forward to the counter-attack. This was Hindman's division (Deas' and Manigault's brigades; Patton Anderson was detached), now reinforced by the division of Bushrod Johnson (Johnson's, Gregg's and McNair's brigades). The guns opened, followed soon by Whitaker's and Mitchell's infantry. Still the Southerners came on, driving right up to Steedman's line, engaging hand to hand before they were driven back. Again and again they resumed the attack, only to meet the same fate as before.[76] In one of these charges, the fighting was so close that the 121st Ohio, Mitchell's brigade, seized and bore off the battle flag of the 22nd Alabama.[77]

During one of these assaults Steedman rode past the battery, which was firing furiously. He ordered Lieutenant Closskey to double-shot his pieces. Closskey was resting his elbow on a limber-chest, one hand supporting his chin, absorbed in watching the effect of his fire. He turned his head without lifting it from his hand, remarking, "Been doing it for ten rounds, General". Steedman shot a look at the rapidly approaching

rebels and exclaimed, "Then treble-shot them!" "Never heard of it before," said Closskey. Then, pivoting his head around on its "mount", he yelled, "Treble-shot 'em, boys!" The rifling was virtually torn out of the pieces. But the line held.[78]

About 4:30 General Thomas received orders from Rosecrans, now safe in Chattanooga, to withdraw to Rossville. It was high time, for his line was beginning to go to pieces under the overwhelming pressure. About 4:30 Thomas himself led Reynolds' division to the rear, and, charging up the road, cleared the line of retreat. About 5:00 Longstreet's reserve division, Preston's, went in. Gracie's brigade penetrated the gap on the left of Harker and drove him off. The rest of the division, supported by fragments of the troops already engaged, swept forward, rolling back the Federal line from left to right.[79]

At this point Gordon Granger gave his one and only order of the battle. When Thomas went to clear the line of retreat Granger was the senior officer left on the field. The 22nd Michigan and 89th Ohio had become detached during Steedman's advance, being to the left and somewhat in advance of Whitaker. Now, with his ammunition gone and the troops on his left giving way, Colonel Le Favour sent to Granger for orders. The reply was to hold on with the bayonet. This was a bold order from one who did not know the situation of the troops he commanded, as Granger did not. Brannan's division on Le Favour's left gave way; then Steedman's main line on his right was forced back. The two regiments, along with the 21st Ohio of Negley's division, held on until they were completely surrounded and compelled to surrender. Granger left the field immediately after issuing this order. He did not wait to see its consequences, or to direct the retirement of his men.[80]

As the forces on their left fell back, the main line was forced back by regiments from left to right. By 6:00 the entire line was in a new position, farther back. From here they moved back to Rossville, closing the battle. In the whole of its four-hour fight the division had lost 1,732 men out of less than 4,000 engaged, or forty-three per cent. But this sacrifice had not been in vain, for the division's struggle had saved the Union army from utter destruction.

8. *After the Battle.*

The foundation of the post-war exchanges over the part the Reserve Corps played at Chickamauga was laid in the period immediately after the battle. Gordon Granger and his friend Charles A. Dana, the Assistant Secretary of War, claimed credit for Granger which considerably infringed on what was due to others, and which necessitated an ultimate claim that the Union army had held its position until nightfall. This was simply not true. As Granger was the last corps commander to leave the field his statement on this point was accepted. The error is still not eradicated from history. Granger also tried to avoid responsibility for the loss of Le Favour's two regiments. In this, too, he was successful for the time. It was not until the publication of Gracie's book in 1911 that Granger's claims were refuted. The Steedman—Granger controversy grew, apparently, out of political activities in Ohio, which led Steedman's friends to claim for him more than his fair share of glory, though his proper share was large indeed. The relative roles of both have been well summed in a statement by historian Gracie. "After General Granger had performed his great service in saving the army under Thomas by his timely arrival, it does not appear . . . that his subsequent services were at all creditable. His troops under Steedman, however, did their duty magnificently."[83]

Granger's subsequent career was also something less than magnificent. On the basis of his Chickamauga record as then known he was assigned to command the new IV Corps when the Army of the Cumberland was regrouped. At the battle of Chattanooga his troops were prominent in the decisive charge which cleared Missionary Ridge and avenged Chickamauga. He, however, was repremanded by General Grant again for serving a gun instead of directing his corps. This put him in the bad graces of Grant, while, in the subsequent campaign he managed to earn the dislike of Sherman as well. Thus, when the campaign of 1864 opened, he was in disfavor in both of the main armies. He was quietly transferred to the Department of the Gulf, out of harm's way.

Steedman's career was that of a garrison commander during the spring and summer of 1864, but, in the fall of that year, he joined Thomas at Nashville, and played a distinguished role in that great battle which finally sealed the fate of the Confederacy in the West.

FOOTNOTES

1. J. T. Woods, *Steedman and his Men at Chickamauga* (Toledo: Blade Printing and Paper Co.), 1876.
2. Clark Waggoner, *Honors at Chickamauga* (pamphlet, no date).
3. Gen. John C. Smith, *Oration at the Unveiling of the Monument Erected to the Memory of Maj. Gen. James B. Steedman.* (Pamphlet, no date.)
4. One of Steedman's great-grandfathers was Colonel William Cooke, who commanded the 12th Pennsylvania Continentals. Another great-grandfather and a grandfather were among the families Revolutionary veterans, while his father, George Steedman, was a veteran of the War of 1812.
5. The Toledo, Wabash and western is now the Wabash.
6. Clark Waggoner, *History of Lucas County,* (New York and Toledo, 1888), p. 349.
7. A good, brief account of General Steedman's career prior to the war may be found in Harvey Scribner, *Memoirs of Lucas County and the City of Toledo,* (Western Historical Association, Madison, Wisconsin; 1910), pp. 138-142.
8. Whitlaw Reid, *Ohio in the War* (Cincinnati: Robert Clark, 1895), pp. 103-104.
9. *Ibid.,* pp. 104-105.
10. *Ibid.,* p. 106.
11. Henry M. Cist, *Army of the Cumberland* (N. Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882), p. 67; Thomas Van Horne, *History of the Army of the Cumberland,* (Cincinnati; Robert Clarke, 1875), pp. 190-191.
12. Stanley F. Horn, *The Army of Tennessee* is the best southern account of Chickamauga. Van Horne, pp. 310-385, and Cist, pp. 173-229 are the best Union accounts.
13. Smith, p. 9.
14. For Steedman's assignment see *War of the Rebellion Official Records,* Government printed 1878-1906. (Cited hereafter as O.R.) The assignment is in Serial 52, p. 4.
15. There are many examples of this in the records. The famous order which caused the disaster was sent direct to T. J. Wood, compelling him to leave a gap in the line which the enemy penetrated.
16. Estimates of Union strength are based on returns. Van Horne gives good estimates on pp. 360-361, but is high by about 5,000 for Confederate cavalry.
17. Horn, p. 239 ff.
18. *O.R.* 52, p. 631, 635-636.
19. Only about 7,000 men are included from Longstreet in the previous estimate. The remainder did not arrive for the battle.
20. Van Horne, pp. 331-332.
21. This is an extract from Smith and Woods. No precise page reference is possible, as both are diffuse and poorly organized.
22. *O.R.* 52; pp. 631-636.
23. *Ibid.,* p. 613.
24. *Ibid.,* p. 651.
25. *O.R.* 109, pp. 445-446. The reason for telling Morgan was that these units were portions of his division.
26. *O.R.* 52, pp. 667-668.
27. *Ibid.,* p. 687.
28. Woods, p. 16.
29. *O.R.* 52, p. 709.
30. *Ibid.,* p. 713.
31. Woods, p. 17.
32. *O.R.* 50, p. 113.
33. Woods, p. 19.

34. Hood reached the vicinity of Reed's Bridge about 4:00 on the eighteenth, moving from Ringgold. Horn, p. 256.
35. *O.R.* 50, p. 113.
36. Smith, pp. 20-21.
37. *O.R.* 50, p. 66.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
39. *Loc. cit.*
40. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 119-120.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 121-122.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
46. *O.R.* 52, p. 743; Van Horne, p. 333.
47. Van Horne, pp. 333-340.
48. Van Horne, p. 258.
49. *O.R.* 50, p. 127.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
51. Woods, p. 28.
52. *O.R.* 50, p. 135.
53. *Loc. Cit.*
54. *O.R.* 52, p. 741.
55. Horn, pp. 259-261.
56. Archibald Gracie, *The Truth About Chickamauga* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911), p. XXXIV.
57. *O.R.* 50, p. 139.
58. Van Horne, pp. 347-348.
59. Horn, pp. 264-266.
60. Gracie, p. XXXIV.
61. *O.R.* 50, p. 139.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 862.
63. Woods, pp. 35-41.
64. Gracie, p. 132.
65. Smith, p. 25.
66. *O.R.* 50, p. 871.
67. *O.R.* 52, p. 752.
68. *O.R.* p. 856.
69. Gracie, p. 114.
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 153-158 gives the complete case on the subject of Granger's movements.
72. Smith, pp. 26-27.
73. Woods, p. 63.
74. Gracie, p. 55.
75. Woods, p. 63.
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-67.
77. *O.R.* 50, p. 167. The 22nd Alabama was of Deas' brigade.
78. Woods, p. 65.
79. Gracie, pp. 60-63; pp. 139-149.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 139-143.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 133-138.
82. Steedman had 3,913 men O.R. 50, p. 850. Loss given there.
83. Gracie, p. 157.

Ernest Tiedtke

By R. Lincoln Long

(Editor's Note: Ernest Tiedtke, long a member of the Historical Society of Northwestern Ohio, died at Orlando, Florida on February 3, 1950. The following remarks on his character and life are taken from the funeral sermon of Reverend R. Lincoln Long of the Collingwood Presbyterian Church, Toledo, delivered on February 9, 1950.)

Some years ago, a certain Rotarian canvassed the membership on the ethical standards in business and professions. And this was Mr. Tiedtke's answer and is a help perhaps in remembering this difference concerning which you know so much:

"In reply to your personal mimeographed letter of March 3rd, the observance of the Golden Rule in my experience in dealing with both buyer and seller for over forty years (as a broken down grocer) will prove in the long run not only the most profitable but also it will solve nearly every conflict between individuals and nations. To sell this idea to the world, aye, there's the rub. That is what you preachers are hired for." —Sincerely, Ernest Tiedtke.

The story of Ernest Tiedtke's business career is inseparably woven with the history and the enterprise of Toledo. One friend said: "Mr. Tiedtke was always on the job, every day when he was there; no man enjoyed his life more than he did. Writing letters to cheer people up (kidding them) was his habit. He was versed in securities, values and real estate. Had his fingers on the pulse of things; a man of excellent judgment."

There, you see, is Toledo background; the work that men who live in a fool's paradise can never know. The sensible way of security which men and communities need, but so seldom appreciate.

Men were books to him. They made up almost his whole library. Anyone who sat near him for counsel, (and literally thousands through the

years came to seek his advice) found that they received his entire attention and it was focused on every one. Like Abe Lincoln he passionately hated the evil word about anyone. He knew how to tell the truth or to recommend with positive statement, never negative, or of condemnation. He seems to have been born with a Will Roger's kind of love for people.

His keen sense of humor was ever without malice, and with all his success in business, so many and so varied, this sense of affectionate, original and playful humor was probably his most useful means of keeping in common touch. . . .

And now a bit about understanding, and understanding such a man is also our responsibility if we are friends in faith. His language and conversation were not characterized by invention for selfish ends. Property, money, and the little family's home were important, because of human value. Hundreds of men and women working with him through the years knew that he understood their problems and knew that his advice did not appeal to their weaknesses. Wrangling and palaver he abhorred and ostentation meant deception. And so he loved the truth, and those who understood that, understood him.

This should be the purpose of every such service as this—appreciation, understanding, and the promise to carry on for fulfillment and for fellow citizens because they can be "friends that sticketh closer than a brother", for, the Tiedtke brothers were even greater in friendship than blood relationship.

A man that hath friends must show himself friendly; and there is a friend that sticketh closer than a brother.

The President's Page

A Message from Lehr Fess, the Society's New President

UNDER THE leadership of Richard D. Logan as President, with the co-operation of its officers and members, the affairs of the society were placed upon a stable financial basis and its activities materially extended for the welfare of the community. After the untoward loss of President Logan, your new President was pleased to accept the honor of succeeding him, but with some trepidation regarding my ability to carry on the expansion of the work of the Society. Having been raised in the atmosphere which surrounds the family life of a history professor, I have an abiding interest and profound appreciation of the importance of history as an influence for the good of present day society. In undertaking the duties incident to the Presidency, I bespeak the co-operation of each member in continued interest in its affairs and the further promotion of its activities.

In the "President's Page" it is my desire to continue the series of short essays on constitutional rights. For want of a better title, this series is called "Charters of Freedom."

LEHR FESS

Charters of Freedom

Magna Carta

To refer to Magna Carta as the original Charter of Freedom is somewhat of a misnomer. It was extorted from King John June 15, 1215 under compulsion of the barons on the meadow of Runny-mede. The barons were primarily interested in their own affairs and essentially the charter related to feudal rights and obligations rather than to modern principles of freedom for the common man.

King John had no intention of abiding by its terms and immediately repudiated it. This resulted in war with the barons. Although its first

grant provided "that the English Church shall be free and enjoy all her rights in their integrity and her liberties untouched" the Pope declared the Charter null and void and excommunicated the barons who obtained it.

But from the time of its issue it became a symbol to the people as well as to the barons, and each succeeding king was expected to confirm it. As time went on, men read into its clauses meanings never intended by its drafters. In the struggle between autocracy and popular rights under the Stuarts in the 17th century, the proponents of liberty, in ignorance of the law of the 13th century, referred to the charter as a solemn grant to the people which the Stuarts were withholding. Trial by jury, habeas corpus and the right of Parliament to control taxation were thought to have been secured by the Great Charter. Although these fundamental rights are not found in the charter, it did provide certain administrative reforms from which these rights may have germinated. For example:

"No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor will we send upon him, except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."

"To no one will We sell, to none will We deny or defer, right or justice."

"Neither We nor our bailiffs shall seize any land or rent for any debt so long as the debtors' chattels are sufficient to discharge the same."

"Common pleas shall not follow our Court, but be holden in some certain place."

"No sheriff, or any other man, shall take the horses or carts of any free man for carriage without his consent."

"There shall be one measure of wine throughout Our kingdom, and one of ale, and one measure of corn, towit, the London quarter, and one breadth of dyed cloth, russetts, and haberjects, to wit, two ells within the lists. And with measures so shall it be also with weights."

"We will only appoint such men to be justiciaries, constables, sheriff, or bailiffs as known the law of the land and will keep it well."

Magna Carta also ordained that no scutage (1) or aid should be imposed save by the common council of the realm. To this council the bishops, abbots, earls and barons were to be summoned by the King's letters. But this council of barons was not in any sense a modern parliament. Later on in the 13th century the kings began to summon representatives of the shires and boroughs, to attend meetings of the common council to grant a tax and the "Commons" came into existence at the close of the Century. In spite of the prestige gained by the Charter in later years, it played little part in the development of parliament.

Viewed in the perspective of the time it was granted, the struggles between the King and the barons, which it unsuccessfully sought to alleviate, and its subsequent reconfirmation, it checked the tyrannical exercise and abuse of power by the sovereign. It also mitigated or abolished many grievances incident to feudal tenure. Its employment as a symbol of liberty in the 17th century has made it a most potent influence in the events of history.

(1) *Military service due from a knight or in lieu thereof a knight's fee from which mercenaries could be paid.*

News

Annual Meeting of the Society

The thirty-second annual meeting of the Historical Society of Northwestern Ohio was held January 25, 1950 at the office of Carl B. Spitzer. Vice-President John H. Taylor presided. The following trustees for the term expiring in 1952 were elected: Horace E. Allen, Will F. Broer, Randolph C. Downes, Walter A. Eversman and Julian H. Tyler. Paul Block, Jr. was elected for the term expiring in 1950 to fill the vacancy created by the death of Richard D. Logan.

The report of the Librarian was read, indicating 22 volumes added to the library and 66 volumes bound during the year 1949. The sum of $200 was allocated for the binding program of 1950. The Treasurer's report showed the Society to be in excellent financial condition.

The Executive Director reported on the year's progress of the Society's affairs. Attention was called to the third annual historical essay contest in the city and county high schools on the subject of finding a name for the new North End Bridge and East Side Expressway. It was reported that the project to publish Dr. Frank H. Hickerson's "History of the University of Toledo" was dropped because the author withdrew his permission for publication. Work on the Lucas County Historical Series was announced as having progressed to the approaching publication of Volume III to be entitled *Lake Port.* Research on Volume IV, *Industrial Beginnings,* will begin as soon as the writing of *Lake Port* is finished. Various projects for the acquisition of a building for the Historical Society were reported on. An increase in salary of $120 a year for the Executive Director was requested and granted.

At a meeting of the Board of Trustees following adjournment, the following officers were elected for the year 1950: President, Lehr Fess; Vice-President, Paul Block, Jr.; Secretary-Treasurer, Carl B. Spitzer; Librarian, Mrs. Max Shephurst; Executive Director, Randolph C. Downes. Harvey S. Ford was named assistant Secretary-Treasurer. President Fess announced that he would appoint three special committees: Membership, Building, and Editorial and Publications.

Lucas County Tourists' Guide

It is with real pride that the Historical Society announces the appearance of Kathryn Miller Keller's *Lucas County Tourists' Guide*. Its 72 pages of spirited narrative are divided into four tours: The Historic Banks of the Maumee River from Toledo to Grand Rapids, Older Sections of the City of Toledo, Lucas County—Countryside of Contrasts, and Eastern Part of Lucas County. Each tour is arranged so that the tourist can drive from site to site with the aid of very explicit directions. There is also a summary of sites for each tour with an accompanying map and with accurate mileage notations to enable the tourist to use the *Guide* with considerable facility and precision. This publication is admirable adapted to the enjoyment and profit of every person in the County. Saturday and Sunday afternoons should be more enjoyable than ever for families wanting to picnic and to learn more about our countryside.

This is the first of a series. Each year will see the enlargement of our Guide and the addition of new tours.

All members of the Society are entitled to this tour service free. All new members will likewise receive free copies of the *Guide*. Extra copies are available for 75 cents or for 50 cents each by the dozen.