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The Pope-Toledo Strike of 1907

(Part II)

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1. *The Second Phase of the Strike*

The second walkout at the Pope plant was much more widespread than the first. The number of men involved was about 1,000 compared to the 250 who had struck in the previous fall. This meant that over ninety per cent of the entire working force had left their jobs, putting the company at a greater disadvantage. It further indicated that many who had been employed as strike-breakers now were in the ranks of the strikers. The *Toledo News-Bee* stated that, "Officers of the company admit the plant is virtually at a standstill About twenty-five per cent of the strikers are not members of any union and struck in sympathy with the union men."¹ The *Toledo Blade* announced, ". . . a large number of the men employed as strike-breakers were among the number to quit. . . . Many of the men say they came here with the understanding there was no strike; and when they arrived, they were without funds and were

compelled to work."² The previous claims of the union seem to be substantiated by this statement concerning the imported strike-breakers. It is also evident that there was much more sympathy by the general populace for this phase of the strike than for the previous walkout.

What had happened in the intervening ten days to cause this new and more serious crisis? It was obvious from the first that both parties interpreted the settlement in a different way. Besides the controversy over the privilege of foremen to hire and fire, it seems there was an agreement that neither side should claim a victory and that the men quietly go back to work. J. J. Keegan, a vice president of the union, made this statement on the day of the second walkout:

The company from the start violated the terms on which the men went to work. When settlement was made, Mr. Schaaf requested that the union do no crowing over any victory and it was agreed that that should not be done by either side; despite this the Pope company caused display advertisements to be placed in both Toledo and Indianapolis papers in which terms of the settlement were grossly misrepresented.³

The advertisement of which Mr. Keegan spoke appeared in the newspapers on February 25. In it the Pope Company proclaimed, "The Machinists' Union did nothing. There was no conference, . . . no compromise. The Pope Plant would continue to be an Open Shop."⁴ The union would have suffered irreparable damage had it admitted this. In reality this was a declaration of war because an open shop was in reality an anti-union shop. Under these circumstances Keegan promised as the second walkout began: "When we go back, the Pope Motor Car Company will be operating a closed shop in Toledo and Indianapolis."⁵ Mr. Keegan was destined to be disappointed but it is probable that this was simply an attempt to obtain a good bargaining position with the company. The *Union Leader*, the weekly union newspaper in Toledo, which printed its first edition at this critical time, also claimed that Schaaf had forbidden more than one-third of any department to be unionized, which resulted in the discharge of fifty-nine men. This, then directly precipitated the strike.⁶

What did the management have to say about these charges? On March 4, Manager Schaaf said, "I have no idea what the strike is about. . . ."⁷ but on the following day he discovered the reason. As he explained. "As soon as the men got back to work, they began . . . to agitate the union business, and it was necessary to lecture some of them."⁸

There was no doubt this time where the sympathies of the people of Toledo lay. Public opinion definitely turned against the company as the dispute took on more of the nature of a conflict with absentee owners, their local agents, and their allegedly unreasonable practices. Parades of strikers were cheered by crowds lining the streets and much pressure was applied to the company by municipal officials and newspapers. The different nature of the strike and the attitude of the public toward the company can be sensed from the following article which appeared in the *Toledo News-Bee*:

...the Metal Trades Association does not want the strike settled at the Pope unless it is an absolute rout and defeat for unionism and strikes. The strikers have not demanded and are not now demanding (in this phase of the strike) a closed shop... about 500 ... were non-union men. And it is believed that if it were not for the Metal Trades Association the strike would have been amicably settled by this time. But the local members of the association are egging the Pope Company on to a finish fight no matter how long it lasts or how much it injures Toledo.⁹

The strike resumed as before but this time it was accompanied by no reported violence. Police Commissioner Macomber said, "...arguments with workers are in a most reasonable tone and they are not in any way obstructing sidewalks."¹⁰ This time, however, the problem of workers was more critical for the company because less than 100 were left on the job after the strike began. Therefore importation of strike-breakers began again. The guard around the plant was doubled. Fortunately, the final settlement of the strike came too quickly for much of a concentration of opposing forces.¹¹

There were signs of a very serious cleavage in the Toledo class structure. The Pope Company seems to have had one very powerful sympathizer, if we can believe the words of the *Union Leader*. It was alleged in that labor publication that a local bank president proposed to the Chamber of Commerce that no loans be granted "...to any employer conducting a union shop or having contracts with employees."¹² If true, this claim indicated an attempt to force employers to line up on the side of the National Metal Trades Association. Also rumors were again circulated that Albert A. Pope was seriously considering dismantling the factory and moving it elsewhere, presumably to a community where there could be less of a problem with unions.

It is at this stage that Mayor Brand Whitlock successfully entered the picture. It has already been seen that he had futilely attempted to arbitrate a settlement in the first phase of the strike. Also, his statement that the Toledo Police Department would not be used as a strike-breaking weapon revealed his progressive attitude. To further examine his stand, we can look to a speech delivered by him in Akron, Ohio, over two years later. He said on that occasion:

...the cause of labor stands for the cause of democracy....
labor has been and is being treated like a commodity. The open shop is in reality a shop that is closed not only against union men but against the highest and holiest aspirations of the laboring man. The open shop is open to union men just long enough to allow the non-union men to take their places. The hope for the future is for the strengthening of labor unions.¹³

It was likely that these words would be spoken by few other mayors in the United States at this time. Few were as sympathetic to labor as Mayor Whitlock. Most were extremely severe toward the opponents of management.

Whitlock's method of bringing peace to strike-torn Toledo was by arbitration. Through the interposition of a neutral agency, Marshall Sheppey of Berdan and Company, together with Frank Mulholland, attorney for the International Union of Machinists, terms satisfactory to both sides were agreed upon. At the time, the terms of the agreement were kept secret in order to avoid a repetition of the causes for the second walkout. This final agreement was in the form of a memorandum signed on March 11 by Manager Schaaf for the Pope Company and Frank Mulholland on behalf of the union.¹⁴ After signing, Mulholland had only this to say about the contents, "It is settled in such a way that there can be no misunderstanding, and in a way satisfactory to all parties concerned."¹⁵ Manager Schaaf said simply that, "...all is satisfactory to the Pope Motor Car Company."¹⁶ No other comments were made by any of the parties concerned.

What were the terms that brought labor peace to Pope-Toledo? Two months later, Business Agent Keck revealed them in the *Machinists' Monthly Journal*. It is probable that this was not a violation of the agreement since there was no protest by the company. The report read as follows:

The conditions of the Pope settlement may be summarized as follows:

All former employees of the Pope Company who went out on strike during the week commencing March 4, 1907, to be reinstated to their former positions. . . . ,

All former employees. . . . who went out on strike prior to March 1, 1907, shall be reinstated as follows:

Said employees to number seventy-five shall report for duty on the night shift, March 12, 1907, and as soon as convenient within two months. . . . given positions on the day shift.

The former employees who have not been provided for. . . . shall be given positions as fast as the company requires more men.

The patternmaker heretofore discharged from the Pope plant shall be reinstated to his former position on March 12, 1907.

The Pope Company, through its management, will not discriminate against any employee, because he is or is not a member of a labor union, and will not interfere, or attempt to interfere with the right of any employee to belong to a labor union.

In case any employee has a grievance, he shall have the right to present his grievance. . . .

No man taken back in pursuance of this memorandum shall discuss 'unionism' during shop hours, and a discussion of 'unionism' during shop hours shall be cause for instant discharge.¹⁷

It can easily be seen that the company which had stated that none of the men would come back to work as union members had granted a major concession. The right to organize a union and even include every worker in the plant in such a union was not denied. It is true that it was not possible to promote such organization on company time, but there can be no doubt that the union made substantial gains by this agreement. It is also true that the union had stated that the strike would not be ended short of obtaining a union shop so they did not completely attain their objective. The settlement, as is usual when arbitration is involved, was in the form of a compromise. However, the union must have been happier

with the terms of the settlement than management. The coming new car season probably had a bearing on the acceptance of these terms by the company.

Compromise as the Pope-Toledo strike settlement of March, 1907, was, it marked the end of an era in the city's labor-management relations. Prior to the strike the very right of labor to organize was disputed. When unions tried to organize the biggest industry in town, management fought back. It sought to destroy organized labor by organized strike-breaking through the use of non-Toledoans. In so doing management not only alienated workingmen but also the Toledo-boasting general public. Now drawn together by a common foe, the workingmen and the average Toledoan, with the aid of a progressive mayor, created a climate of opposition that forced the company to back down. From this time on the right of labor to organize was recognized in Toledo. This made the growth of labor unions inevitable in Toledo as union agents took advantage of their newly won opportunity.

This does not mean, however, that Toledo labor had won recognition as the term is now understood, that is, to bargain collectively with management. The latter could still say that the union did not necessarily represent a majority of the workers in a plant. Unions could organize with less fear of intimidation, but that was not enough to avoid bitter conflict. Many more trials and tribulations needed to be endured before the recognition of equality of bargaining power was obtained.

Thus, this very costly strike had come to an end. Before the second phase of the strike began, it was estimated that it had already cost the company \$100,000.¹⁸ It was to be much more costly in the long run. Still, it was all over now and Toledo hoped that the words of the *Toledo News-Bee* would be prophetic, "... indications are that it will be a long time before there is another strike at the big factory."¹⁹

Before ending this chapter on the strike, special mention ought to be made of the role of the judiciary and government. The role of Mayor Brand Whitlock has already been explained. Without his sympathy the strike might have gone differently for the union. Of course his part in the final arbitration was of great importance. Another factor was the failure of the company to obtain a sweeping injunction from Judge Taylor against the union which would paralyze the union's chief weapons, the strike and peaceful picketing. It must be remembered that this was in an era when the courts in general had a very unfavorable attitude toward

picketing. This strike also took place before the Clayton Act was passed in 1914, which prohibited the use of restraining injunctions in cases between employers and employees, except to protect property, when no other legal means was available. It was fortunate for the International Union of Machinists that two progressive individuals as Judge Taylor and Mayor Whitlock combined to give it a fighting chance. It also must have been a bitter blow for the National Metal Trades Association to be denied the assistance usually available up to this time.

2. *The Fate of the Pope-Toledo Company*

The Pope-Toledo strike was over. Labor had held its own, in fact it had made advances; but the Pope-Toledo company was not to be so successful. The Toledo newspapers make no mention of affairs at Pope-Toledo during the months immediately following the strike. Later events show that during this time the company was struggling for its very existence. The first sign of any trouble came on August 14, when the parent company, the Pope Manufacturing Company of Hartford, was placed in the hands of a receiver. The receiver appointed was Albert L. Pope of Hartford, vice-president of the concern. This action was brought about through a suit by the McManus-Kelley Company of Toledo, advertising agents for the company in an attempt to recover a debt of \$4,306.30.¹ Other creditors then filed similar suits. A representative of the parent company said, "The receivership is due to our inability to obtain accommodation from the banks. We have plenty of assets and are doing excellent business."² All other statements from company officials reflect this same attitude. Emphasis was placed on the tight money market as the cause of the company's troubles. No claim was made that the strike was the chief cause of the company's trouble. The degree of culpability of labor, management, and economic conditions will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.

Under the receivership the parent company began a series of financial maneuvers designed to consolidate its holdings and meet its obligations. The *New York Times* summed up the financial structure of the company in this way, "The company has extensive plants in eight states with assets upward of \$8,000,000. The debts are a trifle under \$1,500,000."³ In spite of the confidence of the company representatives, *Horseless Age*, a trade and technical journal of the growing automobile industry, expressed the opinion that, "...the feeling is not too optimistic among the well informed that the company will resume, in view of the changed conditions in banking circles..."⁴ The *Toledo Blade* was hopefully a

little more optimistic about the future of the Toledo plant. On August 15, it announced, "The profits of the Toledo branch of the Pope Motor Car Company since 1903 have been as follows: For 1903, \$55,000; for 1904, \$441,000; for 1905, \$781,000; for 1906, \$461,000. Despite its troubles the Toledo factory will show a good profit again this year."⁵ This optimism was substantiated by later reports that placed the profits for Pope-Toledo at \$50,000,⁶ for the month of April, 1908, and at \$65,000,⁷ for June of that same year. The Toledo factory did not seem to be doing badly in spite of its uncertain future. Whether the rate of return was high enough to justify the capital investment is uncertain. At least it did continue to show a profit.

Even though it remained in the black, all was not peaceful within the company structure. In November, Albert E. Schaaf, who had been manager of the plant for a number of years, was asked by the receiver to resign. There was no objection to his management of the plant, but there was some sort of conflict with the Pope family.⁸ He contested his removal with vigor but to no avail.

After his dismissal the Pope creditors in Toledo made an application in federal court for the removal of Albert L. Pope himself as receiver of the company since they claimed he was not representing the creditors' interests adequately. They asserted that he was more interested in serving the interests of the Pope Manufacturing Company.⁹ There is some evidence of this since there were printed rumors that the parent company intended to replace some of the good machinery with second rate equipment and take the original machinery to the parent plant at Hartford.¹⁰ Then a claim for \$787,987.84 was filed against the Pope Motor Car Company of Toledo by the Pope Manufacturing Company of Hartford which in effect was suing its own subsidiary. The basis for this suit was that the parent company had advanced this money for the conduct of the local plant.¹¹ Judge Taylor, of the circuit court, evidently sided with the Toledo creditors when he appointed another receiver to represent their interests. He later ruled that, although the company could reduce some of its machinery, the plant had to be sold as a going concern and not piecemeal, if the receiver found that its sale was necessary.¹² Also, the other creditors had to be paid off before the parent company's claim could be honored.

From this point on, the sale of the Toledo factory was only a matter of time, especially after the reorganization of the Pope Manufacturing Company of Hartford and the decision to concentrate its efforts on the

plants at Hartford and Westerfield.¹³ Several offers for the Toledo plant and its equipment were rejected by F. A. Scott, the receiver appointed to protect the Toledo creditors' interests, because these offers were too low. On December 31, a sale was made to the Toledo Motor Car Company but this was simply a legal maneuver because the owner of this company was Albert A. Pope. It did have the effect of ending the receivership since the creditors were paid off in full with the proceeds of the sale.¹⁴ Mr. Pope then continued to seek a buyer for the plant.

Was the automobile industry to disappear from Toledo? For a while prospects looked dark. The most serious unsuccessful attempt to purchase the plant was in early 1909, when Richard D. Apperson, an automobile man heading a syndicate of New York capitalists, became interested. The sum of \$1,000,000 was needed and Apperson counted on raising \$200,000 of that amount by a local sale of stock. He hinted that the company might be purchased and moved out of town unless local aid was forthcoming.¹⁵ Nevertheless the local stock subscription was not raised and the Apperson deal fell through. From the evidence available it seemed that the deal failed because of the lack of sufficient financing. Its failure did not seem to be because of any wish to avoid labor trouble in Toledo, or lack of faith in the city itself.

However, prospects for Toledo's automobile future soon brightened. Shortly after the Apperson incident, John N. Willys became interested in the local property. At that time he was manufacturing in Indianapolis a more popular priced car than the Pope-Toledo. The demand for his product was increasing steadily and he needed a larger plant. For this reason he hoped to transfer most of his Indiana operations to Toledo.¹⁶ He came to town and took out an option to buy in April, 1909.¹⁷ Negotiations went along smoothly until it was discovered that part of the plant was situated on property which had never been vacated by the city. The company had buildings on what was supposed to be Cycle Street, and a private railroad switch running across a corner of Lozier Street. Mr. Willys refused to consummate the deal unless the Popes could persuade city council to vacate the land. This was not as difficult a problem as it seems from the diagram. Cycle Street was a street in name only. It had never been used as such by the city since the factory had been built, and had been completely forgotten. Neither the mayor nor the city council had any objection to vacating it in favor of the company. A city ordinance was drafted to this effect and passed the council on May 3, 1909.¹⁸

After this roadblock was removed, the deal was quickly closed. The

Toledo Blade gleefully announced the final terms in this manner on May 25:

The Pope automobile works of Toledo were bought today by the Overland Automobile Company of Indianapolis. The purchase price was \$400,000. The purchaser took possession at Toledo this afternoon. A number of small towns throughout Ohio and Indiana offered him bonuses to build, but Toledo's unrivaled shipping facilities, larger labor market, and fine plant, already in operation, soon decided him to come here.¹⁹

Toledo could well be proud because it had obtained an industry that was to grow into one of its largest and spread the name of Willys and Toledo throughout the world, especially during World War II. However, the labor problems which the Popes had suffered continued to haunt the plant. The new company was to undergo a major strike in 1919 which also had great significance in the history of labor in Toledo.

The purchase price was considerably lower than the \$1,000,000 that Apperson had agreed to pay. This is because it was mainly the site that was being purchased. Willys had much equipment of his own that he was moving from Indianapolis. It is probable that some of the machinery had been moved to Hartford by the Popes as they had originally intended. It may also be due to an increased desire to unload the property and consolidate their other holdings as business conditions worsened.

The Toledo plant was not the only one to be sold by the Popes. The plants at Hagerstown and Elyria were sold also but these sales and the reorganization failed to remedy the lack of working capital. The company had to resort to short-term notes which kept it in constant financial difficulty. Finally, another receivership in 1913 resulted in the liquidation of the entire company. The Popes had battled to stay in the automobile business but had failed.²⁰

Thus ended the Pope-Toledo. It had brought considerable fame to Toledo. It also served to publicize the advantage of that city for industrial development. What had forced the company to leave? Was it the Panic of 1907, the strike, or some fault of the company itself? These are the questions that must next be considered.

3. Conclusions

There were three principal reasons for the downfall of the Pope-Toledo Company: (1) the Panic of 1907, (2) the strike, and (3) the policy of the company. Let us examine each of those individually and attempt to determine if one of these causes is of greater importance than the others.

Most financial historians find the Panic of 1907 difficult to explain. First of all, it did not come when it was expected. According to Theodore J. Grayson's interpretation of business-cycle theorists of that time, it was not due until 1913. It was essentially caused by the things which cause all panics — false prosperity, over-production and over-speculation.¹

In 1906, there had been a great deal of speculation, especially in railroads and industrial properties. This in turn put pressure on banks as reserves began to dwindle. It must be remembered that this was prior to the Federal Reserve System, created in 1913. Early in 1907 a partial liquidation began to take place. Several large flotations for speculative purposes were hampered and money became hard to obtain. Then general business began to lag. Finally, the Knickerbocker Trust Company of New York failed to meet its obligations. This started a chain reaction in which other trusts fell causing the banks which were closely related to these institutions to feel the pinch.² It is rightly called the "bankers' panic."

It was this pinch on the banks that effected the Pope Manufacturing Company of Hartford. Automobile manufacturing interests in particular operated on the basis of widely extended credit. The collateral for this credit was the next season's output.³ This was precisely the difficulty the Pope Company faced. It could not obtain sufficient funds to finance the production of its 1908 model cars. *Horseless Age* best summed up the situation that the firm faced:

The New York Evening Post, a paper considered an authority on financial matters, heads its editorial columns with the remark that '...the case of the Pope Company is similar to that of several manufacturing enterprises which got into trouble in 1903. It was grossly overcapitalized; its \$20,000,000 outstanding stock, of which one-half promised cumulative dividends of five per cent or higher, was placed on an enterprise whose excess of earnings over expenses in its first year of corporate life, was barely \$50,000....' Like the industrial companies which went down in the money stringency of four years

ago, it made no adequate provisions for working capital, but had trusted to financing a season's business through the medium of bank loans. The warning of 1903 had been ignored by it, and the investment market rated the stock accordingly. The vicious 'cumulative dividend' promise, which made one year's unpaid dividend a contingent charge on the company's future revenues, would undoubtedly have compelled eventual reorganization, even in an easy money market.⁴

Thus a combination of the company's financial structure and the panic forced it into a corner, out of which the only alternative was receivership.

It must also be remembered that the automobile at that time was strictly a luxury product. Whether the problem was over-production or under-consumption it does not matter. What does matter is that there was bound to be a contraction in demand and a cancellation of orders already made. This tended to make the bad situation even worse, especially since the Pope-Toledo automobile was a very high priced product.

The Pope Company was not the only Toledo firm to feel the pinch. Most large firms had to reduce their labor force, while two—the Vulcan Iron Works and the rolling mill of the Republic Iron and Steel were forced to shut down completely. The Central Labor Union estimated that unemployment was at least 8,000, while the Chamber of Commerce estimated it at least 5,000. A conservative estimate would place unemployment at about ten per cent of the labor force.⁵ The panic did not simply strike at the Pope plant. There was a general contraction of business due to the tightening of credit and a fall in demand. Although the parent company continued to function, the Toledo branch had to be sacrificed on the altar of reorganization.

It certainly cannot be denied that the strike had a part in the company's troubles. Over \$100,000 was lost by the company in the strike and this certainly did not help balance the books. It is also true that the Toledo strike had not been the only strike confronting the Pope Manufacturing Company. Strikes had also been going on at the Pope-Waverly plant in Indianapolis and the bicycle plant at Westerfield, Massachusetts. It is possible that it was the total labor picture throughout the company rather than just the situation in Toledo that helped to undermine it. However, it was the result of the strike in Toledo that the Pope company in that city was left with 185 cancelled orders on its hands for the 1906 model when it was not able to fill the orders promptly.⁶ At the plant automobiles

were manufactured primarily to fill existing orders. This meant that these cars had already been sold until the strike interfered.

In regard to the cause of the receivership, Theodore McManus, whose advertising company held the Pope account and caused the receivership by bringing suit against the company, said, "To say that the receivership was directly caused by the Toledo strike is unjust, ungenerous, and unfair—but had there been no strike there need have been no receivership."⁷ This is a somewhat self-contradictory statement but it does represent one point of view on the company's plight. Another Toledoan heard a worker say during the strike, "We will get our demands or we will ruin the Pope."⁸ If this was their objective, it was certainly accomplished.

As Toledo failed to increase in population during the decade 1900 to 1910, it began to examine its conscience. It sought reasons for its failure to attract both new industry and a larger population. Many laid the blame on labor and the Pope strike. The words of some important Toledoans seem to refute this stand, however. Charles S. Ashley, in an editorial in the *Toledo Blade*, had this to say, "Many consider the labor unions here to be unusually radical, crooked, cranky, and hard to get along with. . . . so far as I can see, it is a great exaggeration; but it is a sad fact. . . . and it remains a serious injury to the city."⁹ Later, when several important men were asked, What is wrong with Toledo? not one even mentioned labor. Charles Reed answered that the city had too many real estate sharks that drove potential buyers out of the city by continually raising the price once a quotation had been made.¹⁰ The fact that a Real Estate Board had been recently established exactly for that reason by the realtors themselves lends more credence to Mr. Reed's statement. Still there is no denying that the strike and the labor situation in general contributed to the decline of the company.

In examining the third factor in the demise of the Pope-Toledo, it will be noted that management, in conducting the affairs of the company, had to bear some of the burden of blame. It has already been seen that, in the opinion of the *New York Evening Post*, the company was overcapitalized and operating on a rather shaky financial basis. Yet other businesses at that time operated in the same manner and managed to survive. In fact, the Pope-Toledo was one of the few automobile firms to fail in that time of economic stress.¹¹

John B. Rae claims that some top-level mistakes were made, including spreading engineers and managers, dividing and selling certain technical

advantages, and producing in too many plants which were not all profitable at one time. He says, "If there had been a serious desire to produce a popular-priced car, why do it at Hagerstown rather than Toledo, whose facilities for large scale production and distribution were much superior?"¹²

This brings up the matter of price. The Pope-Toledo was not a "popular-priced" machine. It was described as an automobile "...meant to be driven only by a chauffeur in black or gray livery. And the price, \$4,000, made it exclusively a vehicle for bankers, brewers, and Wall Street speculators."¹³ The price range began at \$2,800 and the average price was probably about the figure just quoted. Few models of this fine automobile were sold in Toledo itself since most of them were shipped to the East.¹⁴ It is very likely that the tightening money market would affect this high-priced luxury product first because "bankers and Wall Street speculators" were especially hurt by the panic. This is particularly true since an automobile at that time could hardly be classified as a necessity.

It also seems that the change in design in 1906 had an adverse effect on sales.¹⁵ The previous models were much more popular, possibly because there was less competition. Mistakes in design occur today in the automobile industry and some, but not all, have proven fatal. When we combine this evidence with all the other factors, it is plain that it must have contributed greatly to the woes of the company.

There is also evidence that there was either lack of adequate communications or outright dissension within the company. When Manager Schaaf heard of the receivership, he was quoted in the newspapers as saying, "This certainly is news to me."¹⁶ He was forced to resign, without apparent reason, shortly after the receivership began. The reports from Hartford stated that, "...the resort to a receivership is for the purpose of protecting and continuing this great business and not for winding it up."¹⁷ This was the impression given to Toledo and the Toledo management, but it certainly was not a correct impression; this despite the fact that the plant continued to show a profit in spite of all its difficulties.

Is any one of these causes more important than the others? It seems that the strike was the least important of the three factors named earlier in this chapter. The Pope Manufacturing Company would have been in difficulty whether there had been a strike or not, because the panic shut off its credit. The manner in which company affairs were conducted, plus the Panic of 1907 made financial troubles inevitable. The most that can

be said for the strike is that it acted as a catalyst. The company in spite of all its difficulties apparently made no attempt to blame its economic plight on labor problems. This in itself is not conclusive, but the Popes were not the kind to pass over an opportunity of this sort if it were available. There is no doubt that the strike was a contributing factor in the downfall of the Pope-Toledo, but it can safely be said that from the evidence available it was not the dominant cause.

Surely labor had not discredited itself by assuming an overly radical stand. Working men did not have a vested interest in their jobs, but they did have a need for a greater degree of security than they had in 1907. The insistence of labor on such a moderate degree of improvement in their status may have hurt the Pope-Toledo Company and its parent, the Pope Manufacturing Company of Hartford, but that does not mean that labor had taken an unreasonable stand. A vital socio-economic question was at stake: Could an improved, prosperous labor standard be maintained within a framework of the efficient production of automobiles under more enlightened management? The experience of the Willys Overland Company, producing a more popular priced automobile, was to help provide the answer.

FOOTNOTES — Section I

1. *Toledo News-Bee*, March 5, 1907, p. 1.
2. *Toledo Blade*, March 4, 1907, p. 1.
3. *Toledo News-Bee*, March 4, 1907, p. 1.
4. *Toledo News-Bee*, Feb. 25, 1907, p. 9.
5. *Toledo Blade*, March 5, 1907, p. 1.
6. *Union Leader*, Mar. 9, 1907, p. 1.
7. *Toledo News-Bee*, Mar. 4, 1907, p. 1.
8. *Toledo Blade*, Mar. 5, 1907, p. 1.
9. *Toledo News-Bee*, Mar. 10, 1907, p. 1.
10. *Toledo Blade*, Mar. 8, 1907, p. 3.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Union Leader*, Mar. 16, 1907, p. 3.
13. *Union Leader*, Sept. 17, 1909, p. 2.
14. *Toledo Blade*, Mar. 12, 1907, p. 1.
15. *Toledo News-Bee*, Mar. 11, 1907, p. 1.
16. *Toledo News-Bee*, Mar. 11, 1907, p. 1.
17. J. M. Keck, "Business Agents' Reports," *Machinists' Monthly Journal*, XIX (May, 1907), p. 486.
18. *Toledo Blade*, Feb. 25, 1907, p. 1.
19. *Toledo News-Bee*, Mar. 11, 1907, p. 1.

FOOTNOTES — Section 2

1. "Pope Manufacturing Company Fails," *Horseless Age*, XX (Aug. 21, 1907) p. 253.

2. *Toledo News-Bee*, August 14, 1907, p. 1.
3. *New York Times*, Aug. 15, 1907, p. 2.
4. "Pope Manufacturing Company Fails," *Horseless Age*, XX (Aug. 21, 1907) p. 253.
5. *Toledo Blade*, Aug. 15, 1907, p. 10.
6. *Toledo Blade*, June 8, 1908, p. 1.
7. *Toledo Blade*, July 25, 1908, p. 5.
8. *Toledo Blade*, Nov. 11, 1908, p. 1.
9. *Toledo Blade*, Feb. 26, 1908, p. 1.
10. *Toledo Blade*, Feb. 29, 1908, p. 1.
11. *Toledo Blade*, Mar. 12, 1908, p. 1.
12. *Toledo Blade*, April 23, 1908, p. 9.
13. *Hartford Times*, July 31, 1908, p. 8.
14. *Toledo Blade*, Dec. 31, 1908, p. 1.
15. *Toledo News-Bee*, Jan. 21, 1909, p. 1.
16. *Toledo Blade*, March 31, 1909, p. 1.
17. *Toledo Blade*, April 16, 1909, p. 1.
18. *Toledo Blade*, May 25, 1909, p. 1.
19. *Ibid.*
20. John B. Rae, *American Automobile Manufacturers*. (Philadelphia: Chilton Company, 1959), p. 62.

FOOTNOTES — Section 3

1. Theodore J. Grayson, *Leaders and Periods of American Finance*, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1932), p. 507.
2. Davis Rich Dewey, *Financial History of the United States*, (New York: Longman, Green and Company, 1928), p. 481.
3. *New York Times*, Aug. 15, 1907, p. 2.
4. "Pope Manufacturing Company Fails," *Horseless Age*, XX, Aug. 21, 1907, p. 254.
5. *Toledo Blade*, Dec. 19, 1907, p. 1.
6. *Toledo News-Bee*, Aug. 15, 1907, p. 1.
7. *Toledo News-Bee*, Aug. 17, 1907, p. 10.
8. Interview with Ernest Braun (Pope employee in 1905) Feb. 4, 1963.
9. *Toledo Blade*, Jan. 5, 1906, p. 4.
10. *Toledo Blade*, Sept. 2, 1910, p. 8.
11. John B. Rae, *American Automobile Manufacturers* (Philadelphia: Chilton Company, 1959), p. 62.
12. John B. Rae, p. 61.
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14. Interview with Ernest Braun, Feb. 4, 1963.
15. John B. Rae, p. 61.
16. *Toledo News-Bee*, Aug. 15, 1907, p. 1.
17. *Hartford Times*, Aug. 14, 1907, p. 1.